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5Introduction
Global investing is more than ever a reality. Academic works published over the last thirty 
years have definitely convinced practitioners that they could not content themselves with 
investing their clients’ wealth in their domestic market exclusively. Foreign financial markets 
provide investors with benefits in terms of risk diversification. By expanding the investment 
universe, they also offer higher expected return potential.
The huge number of stocks traded on the various national markets implies a need to 
summarize the information on these numerous securities into a few relevant statistics, and to 
group firms accordingly. One possibility, which has been traditionally followed, relies in 
considering each national market as a distinct entity. Thus, stocks are classified into different 
groups depending on their nationality. Accordingly, the traditional top-down route would 
consist in selecting first countries to overweight or underweight, and then pick stocks within 
each of the selected countries. The belief that globalization led international markets to 
becoming close to fully integrated poses a new challenge. Shall we continue approaching 
global investing with this traditional country-by-country approach? Or shall investments be 
conducted worldwide, without making any reference to the portfolios’ national dimensions. 
Under this alternative, which clearly considers national influences to have become of minor 
importance, global economic sectors are usually considered as the dimension of choice.
Whether international financial markets are integrated in such an extensive way that portfolio 
managers should disregard the national characteristics of their portfolios and rely on a global 
sector-by-sector approach is still an open question. It is perhaps true that markets have been 
moving towards integration over time. Also, globalization is apparent through the great 
number of international mergers and acquisitions and the ever increasing level of foreign sales 
and assets held abroad. Though, many factors, such as differences in economic policies and 
accounting standard or the still prevalent home bias, prevent capital markets from being fully 
integrated.
While academic research shows that country influences are and will probably remain
important determinants of security returns, practitioners behave as if the opposite was true. 
Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003) report results from a survey conducted on the behalf of Merrill 
Lynch. For the purpose of this survey, portfolio managers were asked which dimension they 
6thought was the most important in terms of portfolio diversification. In 1997, 75% of them 
were convinced by the superiority of the country-by-country approach. No later than in 2001, 
only 10% were still favoring this approach. Although emerging markets, or atypical markets 
such as Japan, are still considered by investors as having a clearly distinct nationality, 
common belief is that worldwide developed markets are nowadays highly enough integrated 
to justify switching from the traditional country-by-country to a new global sector-by-sector 
approach.
This new paradigm certainly constitutes the main reason that led banks and brokerage houses 
to reorganize their financial research departments along sector lines. Traditionally, financial 
analysts were mostly specialized by countries. There were financial analysts following firms 
headquartered in Switzerland, while others were assigned firms headquartered in the U.K., 
irrespective of the industry sector in which these firms were active. That is, a given analyst 
could have been assigned Novartis, UBS, and Logitech, all of which are Swiss firms active in 
the pharmaceutical, financial, and technology sectors respectively. Over the recent past, there 
has been a clear shift towards reorganizations of financial research departments along industry 
lines. Accordingly, there are nowadays relatively more analysts following firms active in a 
single industry, whilst headquartered in various countries. Such a sector-specialized analyst 
could then be assigned UBS, Deutsche Bank, and Citigroup. That is, firms active in the 
financial sector, irrespective of their headquarters’ location.1
Investment managers now demand for sector-by-sector research and, to be competitive, 
brokerage houses have to conform to this requirement. However, this does not mean that a 
financial analyst specialized in the global financial sector will forecast UBS earnings more 
accurately than a financial analyst specialized in Swiss firms. The present work deals with this 
issue. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to explicitly raise the question of the 
relative performance of country- versus sector-specialized financial analysts by looking at the 
accuracy of their earnings forecasts and the information content of their recommendations. 
Instead, academics have usually relied on the study of factors affecting stock returns to 
advocate the way financial research departments should be structured. If country-specific
factors are the most important determinants of stock returns, financial analysts should 
specialize by countries. The rationale is that analysts should benefit from economies of scale 
  
1 From now on, I will refer to these two types of analysts as “country specialists” and “sector specialists” or 
“country-specialized analysts” and “sector-specialized analysts” interchangeably.
7in their information acquisition and production activities due to commonalities among firms 
that share a same country of domicile. If, on the other hand, sector-specific factors explain 
relatively more of stock return variations, financial analysts should specialize by sectors. I
explain further in the text why such a conjecture is not appropriate and, thus, why my
contribution is important to get insight into the relationship between financial analysts’ 
specialization and forecast quality. Yet, for my work not to be orthogonal to the existing 
literature, I still devote a Chapter to the relative importance of country and sector factors in 
stock returns. It is the purpose of Chapter 1, which can be seen as a descriptive analysis of the 
relative importance of country and sector factors in European stock returns.
Chapters 2 and 3 constitute the core of my research. In the former, I show that country 
specialists issue on average far more accurate earnings forecasts than their sector-specialized 
peers. To get the economic meaning of how significant this difference in performance is, one 
can compare its level to another variable that significantly impacts financial analysts’ 
accuracy: “firm experience”. My results show that sector-specialized analysts would need to 
follow a given firm for more than five consecutive years to being able to forecast its earnings 
as accurately as would a “junior” country-specialized analyst.
Chapter 3 builds on this finding. Acknowledging the relative higher accuracy of country-
specialized analysts, I investigate whether the market recognizes this difference. The analysis 
of short-term price reactions around stock recommendations reveals that investors do not 
make a clear distinction between country- and sector-specialized analysts. Long-term price 
reactions further show that, consistent with the results presented in Chapter 2, 
recommendations issued by country specialists convey more information than those issued by 
their sector-specialized peers.
In Chapters 2 and 3, I also investigate the factors that provide country specialists’ with their
comparative advantage. My results lead to the conclusion that the higher quality of country 
specialists’ forecasts results from country-specific factors in a broad sense. Country 
specialists are mostly based within the same country as the set of firms they follow. This is 
obviously not the case for sector specialists who, by definition, follow firms headquartered in 
several countries. Also, country specialists are in general located geographically close to the 
firms they follow. While physical proximity does not seem to deliver any comparative 
advantage, institutional and cultural proximity – as proxied by location within the same 
8country as firms – is a powerful source of outperformance. Domestic financial analysts’ 
outstanding knowledge of the country’s particular features allows country specialists to 
release more accurate, as well as more informative forecasts. Moreover, country specialists’ 
superiority is highest in countries with strong country-specific factors and in small national 
markets, which reinforces the idea that country-specific factors in a broad sense play a major 
role in the financial analysis industry.
In the rest of this introductive part, I discuss two strands of literature that relate most to the 
problematic I raise thereafter. I focus in a first step on the relative strength of country and 
sector factors in stock returns. I then introduce financial analysis and discuss why country-
and sector-specialized financial analysts may perform differently.
The Relative Importance of Country and Sector Factors
Up to the nineties, asset allocation was mostly based on the premise that country factors were 
the dominant source of stock returns’ variation. Thus, international diversification was 
commonly admitted as the primary way of reducing variance in the asset management 
industry. Today, practitioners tend to privilege global sector-based asset allocation strategies. 
They usually justify this shift in the asset allocation paradigm as the necessary consequence of 
increasing globalization and integration of financial markets. Although there is no one-to-one 
relationship between financial integration and the relative importance of country and sector 
factors, I first discuss some potential drivers of and, above all, forces playing against financial 
market integration. This may provide useful insight on how and why country factors may still 
constitute important determinants of security prices. I then review the roots and main results 
of the literature on the relative importance of country and sector factors.
The Drivers of Financial Market Integration in Europe
Drivers of European financial market integration are numerous. Perhaps most importantly,
over the last decade, are the advent of the European Monetary Union and the Euro, together 
with all additional measures undertaken with the objective of eliminating sources of market 
segmentation. Another crucial factor of integration relies in the progress of information and 
communication technologies, which have increased the availability and timeliness of 
information worldwide. As such, they have eroded national barriers by improving access to 
9foreign markets. The elimination of regulation barriers to cross-border pension funds’ 
investment, coupled with the advent of the single currency, decreased the constraints these 
institutions had to home-bias their portfolios in virtue of currency matching rules. Also, 
competition among firms has become truly global, mostly through the vast activity of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, and through the fact that numerous firms now diversify their 
sales and production activities internationally.
Even though all these forces should drive financial markets towards greater integration, 
several factors still prevent from talking about a truly “global” financial market. Many of 
these factors are most apparent in emerging markets. One may think of political risks (e.g. 
prohibitions on repatriation of the capital invested in foreign countries), poor corporate 
governance, or poorly functioning domestic financial systems. More generally, in developed 
markets, differences persist in economic policies, tax, and legal systems. Even though efforts 
are being made to harmonize accounting standards, there also remain substantial divergences, 
even across European countries. Moreover, while European firms have shown a clear 
tendency to internationalize their sales and production activities over recent years, the 
domestic market remains dominant for the majority of them.2 Last but not least, psychological 
barriers remain numerous. While information technologies have so much evolved that timely 
worldwide information is readily available, investors remain to a large extant unfamiliar with 
foreign markets and trading procedures. They know less about foreign stocks than they do 
about domestic ones and probably perceive them as riskier. This is especially true for small 
stocks; see Kang and Stulz (1997). Also, foreign investors can be at a disadvantage because of 
distance (Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001)), language and culture (Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001)), or simply because of time-zone differences. Interestingly, institutional investors, 
which have been given more freedom in their ability to invest abroad, still show a strong 
tendency to overweight their domestic market.
  
2 I look at data extracted from the Worldscope database over the period 1994-2003. For a typical year, namely 
2002, even in a small open economy such as Switzerland, more than 40% of the firms’ production is sold within 
the country. Also, more than 40% of Swiss firms sell less than 50% of their production abroad. In the U.K., for 
instance, approximately 60% of firms’ sales are made within the domestic market, and more than 60% of U.K. 
firms sell less than 50% of their production abroad. Moreover, more than 20% of U.K. firms sell less than 10% 
abroad and are, in this sense, mostly domestic-oriented firms.
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Country and Sector Effects in Stock Returns
Why Is the Question Relevant?
Over the last decade, many authors – both from the academic and practitioner side – have 
investigated the relative importance of country versus sector factors. Which of country or 
sector factors is having the predominant influence on stock price variations is a key question 
that is usually aimed at solving several issues. First, if sector effects primarily impact stock 
returns, then portfolio managers should approach their investment process along sector lines. 
Conversely, the traditional top-down country-by-country approach should be pursued in a 
world where country effects are more important than sector effects. Second, many researchers 
have relied on results from this literature to draw conclusions on how financial analysts 
should structure their research. If sector factors are more relevant, one should organize 
research along sector lines. Conversely, if country factors are predominant, any single analyst 
should focus on firms headquartered within a single country. As a consequence, many 
attempts have been made in order to disentangle country and sector effects, and several 
advices have been put forward on how to diversify portfolios and how to organize financial 
research.
I do not believe such conclusions can be drawn from the literature on country and sector 
factors. First, while there is an obvious link between the relative importance of country versus 
sector effects and portfolios’ risk reduction benefits, there is no such straightforward
relationship. De Moor and Sercu (2005) analytically show that the standard methodology used 
in the literature on factors does not allow to concluding on whether sector-based or country-
based diversification is more efficient. That is, even if sector factors were more important 
determinant of stock returns than country factors, country-based diversification could still 
provide higher risk-reduction benefits under certain circumstances; see also Adjaouté and 
Danthine (2003). Second, as I argue and show in Chapter 2, the very fact that country or 
sector effects are most pronounced does not tell whether financial analysis should be 
performed along this particular factor. Indeed, there are many forces at play that determine the 
quality of analyst forecasts. Commonalities among firms due to shared country of domicile or 
industry are only a small piece of the puzzle.
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The Early Stage of the Literature: A Puzzling Fact
The question of the relative importance of country versus sector factors has attracted many 
practitioners’ attention, as this topic is of an obvious relevance to them. Though, this literature 
takes its roots in a more academic-oriented question. Instead of a question, one may even talk 
about a puzzling fact.
The first papers that dealt with industry factors were in fact interested in solving a somehow 
strange feature of international equity markets. As a result of globalization and financial 
integration, financial markets should be expected to be highly dependent. Though, 
correlations between national stock indices have always been at surprisingly low levels, given 
the presumed level of integration. As correlations are the key to international diversification 
benefits, many efforts have been made to understand which country-specific influences could 
explain these low correlation levels. All of these country-specific influences need not, 
however, be related to the level of integration of international markets.
According to Roll (1992), stock indices may differ in several instances. First, they may differ 
in terms of their construction. Specifically, the number of individual stocks widely differs 
across national indices. The level of industry concentration also shapes the level of 
diversification of each national stock market. Beyond these rather technical features, national 
stock market indices may also behave differently because of differences in their industrial 
structures.3 According to this view, the Swiss stock market would outperform other national 
indices because firms in the banking and health care sectors performed better than average 
rather than because the Swiss economy is particularly wealthy. At the extreme, stock market 
indices could perform differently for the only reason that their industrial compositions differ. 
Perfect integration would therefore be fully consistent with low correlation levels across 
country indices. Even in perfectly integrated markets where country-specific influences are 
  
3 Obviously, many other influences are at play. Different exposures to common global risk factors may explain a 
significant part of cross-country differences; see e.g. Ferson and Harvey (1993). Market segmentation is another 
potential determinant of the differences between the performances of national stock markets. It may result from 
investors’ home bias. In this case, different stock market behaviors would result from the different sentiment and 
evaluation of investors from different countries, since stocks are mainly held by domestic investors. 
Segmentation may also result from different political and institutional environments across countries. This may 
induce shocks that affect only firms within the country, or may cause global shocks that influence national 
markets differently. Under segmented national markets, the French and Swiss stock markets would behave 
differently because banks in these countries are subject to different shocks, not because there is a greater 
proportion of banks in the Swiss market index.
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nil, industry effects could be at work to push international correlations downward. Thus, it is 
not because cross-country correlations are low that international diversification is beneficial. 
If countries’ differing industrial structures drive the low correlations between national stock 
markets, then diversifying primarily across industries rather than countries would be more 
efficient. Roll (1992) reports that global industry indices explain as much as 40% of the 
volatility of daily stock market index returns. However, his result is highly biased in favor of 
industries, as it incorporates the effect of a global market factor. In other terms, the variables 
considered by Roll are industry returns, rather than industry factors. Whereas the former 
contains other influences beyond the only influence of the industry, the latter would and 
should have been the true measure of the variability brought by industries.
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995) develop a methodology for studying the importance of 
industry-specific factors. According to their model, any stock return can be decomposed into 
four elements: the return on a global market index (common to all stocks), a country-specific 
“pure” factor return, a sector-specific “pure” factor return, and an idiosyncratic, firm-specific 
component. The term “pure” emphasizes that country and sector factors are net of all other 
influences. The country factor of a given national market is the return on a portfolio that takes 
a pure bet on this particular country, with no exposition to global or sector influences. 
Similarly, a given sector factor return is a pure bet on the particular sector. Whereas Roll 
(1992) fails to disentangle the global and sector-specific components, this decomposition 
allows a clear and straightforward way of disentangling the different influences governing 
stock prices.
Building on this model, Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) report that sector influences explain 
almost nothing of the cross-sectional differences in country stock index returns. Specifically, 
over the period 1978 to 1992, industry factors explain approximately only 1% of the total 
variation of the 12 European country index returns considered in their study. Also, country-
specific forces explain almost all of the low observed correlation levels between country 
indices.
Lessard (1976), Grinold, Rudd, and Stefek (1989), and Drummen and Zimmermann (1992)
also come up with results consistent with industry factors having little influence on national 
stock index returns. Though, these studies find a more significant role of industries than is 
apparent in Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994). Beyond differences in sample periods, sizes, or 
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markets covered, this apparently stronger evidence of a significant impact of industry-specific 
influences certainly comes from a problem similar to the one in Roll (1992)’s study. Indeed, 
industry index returns were used as proxies for industry factors, while country index returns 
were used as surrogates for country factors. The problem, which the Heston and Rouwenhorst 
(1994) methodology solves, is that industry indices are polluted with country influences, to 
the same extent that country indices are confounded by industry influences.
The intuitive appeal of the Heston and Rouwenhorst methodology, but also the difficulty to go 
beyond and improve it, has led many researchers to rely on this particular approach. Beckers, 
Connor, and Curds (1996), Griffin and Karolyi (1998), Marsh and Pfleiderer (1997), 
Rouwenhorst (1999), L’Her, Sy, and Tnani (2002), Hamelink, Harasty, and Hillion (2001), 
and De Moor and Sercu (2005) among many others, all confirm the result according to which 
very little of country index return variation can be explained by their industrial composition.
The Relative Importance of Country and Industry Factors
Thus, industry composition fails to explain the low correlations observed between national 
equity market indices. But another, arguably more pragmatic or practitioner-oriented question 
remains. Are country effects more influent than industry effects when it comes to individual 
stock return variations? Indeed, if industry composition cannot explain country index returns, 
country composition cannot explain global industry index returns. This should not come as a 
surprise. Industries (countries) are in general well diversified in terms of countries
(industries). Thus, country (industry) effects tend to compensate each other and be of a lesser 
relevance in explaining industry (country) indices. Though, both country and industry effects 
are strong determinants of individual stock return variations. As a consequence, the question 
that has motivated researchers over recent years has been to determine whether country or 
industry effects are the dominant source of stock return variations.
One general result emerges from the literature. On average, country factors are more 
important determinants of stock returns than industry factors; see e.g. Heston and 
Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995), Beckers et al. (1992), Beckers et al. (1996), and Griffin and 
Karolyi (1998). While this is presumably the strongest message of this literature, additional 
results have emerged since the mid-nineties. I provide a detailed review of this literature in 
Chapter 1.
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Financial Analysts: Their Job and Specialization
There has been huge amount of work undertaken on financial analysts. Ramnath et al. (2005) 
report that more than 250 papers dealing with financial analysts were published between 1992 
and 2005 in nine major journals.4 They further remark that, over the 6 months preceding the 
last version of their review of literature, 105 working papers with the word “analysts” in the 
abstract had been posted on the Social Sciences Research Network. I do not aim at providing 
here an exhaustive review of this vast literature. Instead, I focus on a few narrow topics which 
are of interest in the context of my work.5 This will be done in Chapters 2 and 3. In the 
present section, I introduce financial analysts and what their job consists in. I then discuss the 
potential advantages and drawbacks conveyed by organizing research along country or sector 
lines.
What Do Financial Analysts Do?
Financial analysts act as intermediaries between portfolio managers – for whom they are 
supposed to work – and the managers of the firms they evaluate. They are specialist advisors, 
whose role is to gather and process information and then communicate it to investors who, in 
turn, buy, hold, or sell stocks. Sell-side analysts publish written reports, which usually contain 
in depth analysis of the firm.6 Their fundamental, technical, or quantitative analyzes return 
mainly three figures of interest: earnings forecasts for various time-horizons, stock 
recommendations, and price targets. They are usually complemented with information 
rationalizing the forecasts and recommendations. Earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations have been the two most extensively studied variables in the academic 
literature, presumably because the time horizon of price targets is usually not clearly defined.
Financial analysts need information inputs, which they process, and return outputs in the 
forms mentioned above. The inputs to financial analysis are manifold. Financial statements 
represent an important part. Though, financial analysts themselves usually recognize that this 
  
4 These nine journals are: The Accounting Review, Contemporary Accounting Research, International Journal of
Forecasting, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Finance, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Accounting Studies, and Review of Financial Studies.
5 I refer the reader to Kothari (2001) for a broad review of the literature on the relation between capital markets 
and financial statements, and to Ramnath et al. (2005) for a more focused review of the research on analysts’ 
decision processes and the usefulness of their forecasts and stock recommendations.
6 I focus here and in all the remaining of this work on sell-side financial analysts.
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does not constitute their most important source of information. Instead, direct contact with the 
managers of the company being evaluated appears as a predominant source of information.
Of course, financial analysts must know the firms they are covering. They must know what 
these firms do, and know and evaluate their managers, their strategies and the likely 
consequences of them. In order to do so, they must be experts in the industry sector in which 
these firms compete, together with the position of the firms in their sector. This is, as a matter 
of fact, an argument which is often advanced to justify that financial research departments 
should be structured by sectors instead of countries. Yet, analysts must also master the 
political, legal, regulatory, and ethical environments of the firms they follow. A far from 
exhaustive list of such factors may include the firm’s political influence, labor law, product 
and price regulations, taxation of the firms, and international trade treaties.
This outstanding knowledge of the firms’ businesses constitutes the qualitative part of the 
financial analysis process. Financial statements provide the quantitative dimension. Thus, 
financial analysts must understand what financial statements say, but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, what they do not say.7 That is why financial analysts must also have a thorough 
knowledge of the specific accounting standards followed by the firms they cover. This is also 
probably why additional sources of information turn out to be so important for financial 
analysts. Indeed, the source of information considered by financial analysts themselves as the 
most important is direct contact with the companies’ managers. Barker (1998) reports results 
from a survey-based study. He shows that personal contact is significantly more important 
than earnings announcements and financial statements. The author suggests four reasons why 
personal contact is so crucial. First, it is the timeliest source of information. Second, it allows 
analysts to ask the questions they are willing to ask. Third, it provides analysts with a 
comparative advantage over their peers. Fourth, it enables analysts to focus on strategic and 
forward-looking issues.8 Rogers and Grant (1997) confirm this finding. They screen analysts’ 
reports and find out that analysts rely heavily on information external to the corporate annual 
reports. In fact, only half of the information found in analysts’ reports can be traced to 
  
7 For instance, Graham et al. (2002) report that, while the income statement, the balance sheet and the cash flow 
statement all constitute crucial information, financial analysts make an extensive use of the financial statement’s 
footnotes.
8 Note that this may not be true anymore, because of the recent implementation of regulation FD in  the United 
States.
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financial statements. Moreover, half of the financial statements’ information can be found in 
the narrative sections rather than in the basic financial statements.
From their knowledge of the firms, their underlying business, and their financial statements, 
financial analysts must find a way to translating their understanding into a valuation of the 
firms. For that purpose, they must rely on appropriate valuation technologies, which vary 
from very simple multiple to more sophisticated real option methods. In general, the choice of 
a particular model depends on the particularities of the firms being valued. This in turns 
mainly depend on the industry in which the firms are active. Block (1999) surveys
approximately 300 members of the Association for Investment Management and Research
and reports that the most widely used valuation model is a simple Price-Earnings ratio (PE). 
In fact, approximately half of the surveyed analysts answered they never used present 
valuation techniques, while only 15% always used present valuation techniques. Demirakos et 
al. (2004) screen financial analyst reports and confirm that analysts mostly rely on simple PE
multiples. Though, they show that the choice of the valuation methodology depends in general 
on the particular economic sector.
Financial Analysis: Sector- or Country-Based Structures?
To the same extent that portfolio managers should structure their investment process along 
predefined characteristics, it is generally assumed that financial analysis should focus on, and 
specialize in firms sharing common features. It is also usually assumed that to determine what 
these characteristics are, one shall adhere to some vision of the world, regarding what the 
main factors governing stock prices are. The most followed approach has been to consider 
these characteristics as being either countries or economic sectors. In Europe, both 
specializations co-exist, and there is no consensus about which approach – by sectors or by 
countries – is best.
Solnik and McLeavey (2004, p. 277-278) argue that there are in fact two clearly distinct 
questions. First, shall a firm valuation be performed within the context of its industry? 
Assuming that the industry can be unambiguously defined, the answer to this first question is 
a clear and unequivocal yes. It would not come to anyone’s mind to argue that a company can 
be analyzed without making reference to its competitors and the environment in which it is 
active. This runs through a wide knowledge and understanding of the industry the firm 
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belongs to. For example, analysts must be aware of the industry life cycle, the competition 
structure within the industry, or any other factor related to it. In most cases, this competition 
has become truly international. Yet, one has to keep in mind that country-specific factors, 
such as human capital, stage of the domestic markets, corporate governance, or management 
practices are also important aspects of this environment.
The second question raised by Solnik and McLeavey is: “Shall a company be valued relative 
to other companies within the same industry or relative to other companies within the same 
country?” In other words, shall financial analysis be performed along industry or country 
lines? Whilst answering the question by relying on the relative importance of country and 
sector factors, Solnik and McLeavey acknowledge that the answer is not that straightforward. 
They give reasons for that. Beside the fact that answering the question of the relative 
importance of country and sector factors is a hard task, the authors emphasize on one of the 
main caveats of the industry-based approach by stating “any industry classification is open to 
questions”. The first problem arises when having to determine the number of industries. Shall 
we define 7, 10, or 30 industries? Also, every industry must have intern homogeneity, while 
there must be reasonable heterogeneity across industry groups. For instance, is “Union 
Pacific” a firm active in the railroad industry or in the transportation industry? Depending on 
which choice is made, the analysis of the industry will not be similar. The railroad industry 
has already experienced a full industry life cycle, while the transportation industry has not.9
Country-by-country financial analysis can also be criticized. Firms now compete on a global 
basis. Both their revenues and production activities are truly international. It is therefore 
difficult to assign a nationality to a multinational firm. However, this critic can similarly be 
addressed to sector-based analysis. Beside the extensive activity around cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions, there have also been numerous cross-industry mergers and acquisitions. For 
instance, what industry shall one assign to “Virgin Group”? Media, transportation, 
telecommunications, leisure, or non-durable goods?
Valuing firms relative to their competitors in the same industry group also implies having to 
analyze and compare financial statements published in different countries. Large 
  
9 Note that this problem also applies to the first question raised by Solnik and McLeavey. While firms have to be 
valued in relation with their competitors and environment, it still remains that one has to determine what these 
competitors and environment are.
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capitalization firms usually release these documents both in their domestic language and in 
English. But smaller firms often publish these documents in their domestic language only, 
making information difficult to understand for foreign financial analysts. Also, accounting 
standards differ across countries. Even though developed countries are enforcing 
harmonization and increased quality of accounting standards, problems remain for smaller 
firms, especially in countries with a weak tradition of information transparency. And even 
when identical accounting standards are used, cultural, institutional, political, or tax 
differences make international comparisons difficult. Corrections are required to make 
financial information comparable across countries; see e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995) about 
international measures of financial leverage for instance.
Geographic location may also be an important determinant. Country-specialized financial 
analysts have by definition the opportunity to be located geographically close to the firms 
they follow. This is not the case for sector-specialized analysts who follow firms 
headquartered in many different countries. The information obtained directly from the firms’ 
management has been advocated to be of primary importance for financial analysts. As 
reported above, it appears as a more important source than accounting-based information; see
Barker (1998). Location, therefore, may drive to a large extent the decision to organize
financial research departments along country or industry lines. It may also affect the quality 
and quantity of information available to financial analysts. Lastly, visiting firms worldwide is 
an extremely time-consuming and expensive process.
Yet another feature is worth of interest. There is a vast literature on investment managers, 
who show a strong tendency to home bias their portfolios. It may very well be that financial 
analysts are characterized by the same feature. Behavioral explanations may be advanced. To 
the same extent that investors are unfamiliar with foreign firms and markets, financial 
analysts may feel more confident with firms that they know well, because located in their 
home country. Differences in language may also constitute a barrier to information acquisition 
and be interpreted as a disadvantage; see Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) in the context of 
portfolio managers. In Chapter 2, I report summary statistics on financial analysts and their 
location relative to the firms they follow. Whereas country-specialized financial analysts are 
almost exclusively based within the same country as the set of firms they cover, sector-
specialized analysts are not. Though, the reported figures indicate that sector specialists tilt 
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their portfolios towards domestic firms, which tends to confirm the argumentation above of 
the presence of home bias in the financial analysis profession as well.10
The information environment and the existence of commonalities across firms are also
significant determinants that shape the structure of financial research departments.
Information complementarities can facilitate the process of analyzing firms and contribute to 
a better understanding of the firms’ economics. According to Kini et al. (2003), analysts tend 
to cover single-country portfolios in countries where national influences are strong, and 
specialize in firms that belong to a single economic sector in industries where common 
economic forces are prominent. As they argue, this is consistent with the objective of
producing high quality research, by taking advantage of economies of scale in information 
acquisition and production.
It is probable that brokerage houses weigh forces and constraints beyond economies of scale 
in gathering and interpreting information when setting analyst department structures. Cost 
considerations are such an additional influence. Even though large brokerage houses can 
afford implementing branches in many countries to keep financial analysts close to the firms, 
smaller brokers may not have this opportunity. Therefore, they may rather make the choice of 
having a geographically centralized department organized by sectors. However, this is not 
what one observes. A close look at the I/B/E/S database indicates that large brokerage houses 
mostly perform sector-by-sector research. Their smaller competitors often focus on a single 
country, with financial analysts specializing in this particular country.
  
10 This question has not been explored in the literature and, of course, one cannot draw definite conclusions from 
these rough statistics.
Chapter 1: Are practitioners right? On the relative importance of 
industrial factors in international stock returns
(in collaboration with Dušan Isakov)
Published in the Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 140 (2004), 355-379
Abstract
This paper investigates the relative influences of industrial and country factors in international 
stock returns. Until very recently, academic research has consistently found that country 
factors dominate industrial factors. This result is in contradiction with practitioners beliefs. 
This paper re-examines this issue by analyzing a sample of more than 4000 stocks quoted in 
20 developed countries. We find that on average the country effect still dominates stock 
returns over the period 1997-2000. This result has to be interpreted with caution though, as an 
analysis that allows for time-varying relative influences demonstrates the rapidly increasing 
impact of industry effects in recent times. We find, in particular, that this trend is common to 
all 20 developed countries considered and not only to those that are member of the European 
Monetary Union. We interpret this result as evidence of the increasing globalization of 
international equity markets.
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1.1 Introduction
In recent years, an increase in the harmonization of economic, monetary and fiscal policies 
has been observed in developed countries, and especially in countries of the European Union. 
There has also been a trend towards a general deregulation of markets as well as a progressive 
elimination of barriers to international investments. Finally, trading and communication 
systems have benefited from technical improvements over this period. The consequence of all 
these changes should be a greater integration of international capital markets. Therefore, 
factors that drive equity returns are very likely to have changed over time. More specifically, 
integration should have an effect on the relative importance of the following factors: the 
country where the company is domiciled and the industry in which the firm has its main 
activities. One would expect that the more segmented markets are, the more influential 
national effects should be. Conversely, global industry factors should play the major role in 
integrated capital markets.
There is strong evidence that practitioners now believe that industry is more important than 
country in the evolution of stock returns. For instance, Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003) report 
that in 1997, 20% of managers of European equities believed in the superiority of portfolio 
allocation strategies based on industrial sectors, while 50% of managers thought that country 
factors were dominant. These proportions have been reversed in 2001. About 75% of 
managers think that investment strategies based on industry are superior to country strategies 
while only 10% still believe in the dominance of country effects. Another piece of evidence is 
provided by Bolliger (2004) who documents that most banks and brokers have decided to 
reorganize their research departments according to sectors rather than countries. Further 
confirmation of this fact is found in the presentation of stock quotes in financial newspapers 
and specialized magazines. Most classify stocks according to the industry they belong to 
rather than according to the market where they are quoted (at least in Europe). The expansion 
of several cross-market industrial investment funds is another example of this radical change 
in the practice of top-down asset allocation. The question is therefore: Are practitioners right 
when they assume that the industrial factor is the main determinant of stock returns?
Academics have addressed the issue of the relative importance of country and industry factors 
long before the recent developments in international financial markets. However, the evidence 
in favor of the approach taken by practitioners recently is very weak as most of the empirical 
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results show that the country influences have been stronger than those of industries. Our paper 
contributes to the ongoing debate by providing new insights on this issue by analyzing more 
than 4000 individual stocks from 20 developed markets over the period 1997-2000. 
Consistent with the most recent studies, this paper shows that the impact of industrial factors 
on stock returns has increased significantly and, in fact, that they dominate country factors in 
many cases. This research also provides some additional results. First, when we restrict our 
sample to stocks from the eight countries member of the European Monetary Union (EMU), 
we find that they respond today more to industrial than to country effects. One could think 
that this result is a consequence of convergence of economic and fiscal policies within EMU 
countries. However, we find that this does not seem to be the case since all developed 
countries have witnessed an increase in the significance of industry factors. Therefore, this 
trend is more likely to be attributable to an increasing globalization of the world economy 
rather than to convergence of EMU economies. Second, we document that small 
capitalization stocks are more sensitive than large caps to national influences. Third, we 
observe an atypical behavior of information technology and telecommunication stocks over 
the last part of the period under study. Finally, we find that the results are robust to the 
definition of industrial classification and to the number of industries taken into account.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature, while 
section 1.3 presents our data. Section 1.4 describes the methodology used to measure the 
relative influence of both factors. Empirical results are detailed in section 1.5. We provide 
some concluding remarks in section 1.6.
1.2 Review of Literature
In the sixties, academic literature already considered industrial factors as being a potential 
determinant of stock returns. King (1966) and Meyers (1973) assign an explicit role to 
industrial factors in a study of the structure of U.S. equity returns. Lessard (1974) is the first 
to extend the issue of the importance of industries to an international context. Through an 
analysis of market and sector indexes, he finds that national effects dominate industrial effects 
in international stock returns. Grinold, Rudd and Stefek (1989) confirm Lessard’s results. Yet, 
they find large differences depending on the country or sector that is analyzed. They conclude 
their article with the following statement: "Most countries are more important than industries, 
but most important industries are more important than the less important countries". A large 
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fraction of this literature reaches similar findings regarding the dominance of country over 
industry factors and the dispersion of these effects. Such results are reported by Drummen and 
Zimmermann (1992), Beckers, Grinold, Rudd and Stefek (1992), Heston and Rouwenhorst 
(1994, 1995), Beckers, Connor and Curds (1996), Griffin and Karolyi (1998), Rouwenhorst 
(1999) and Kuo and Satchell (2001). The only exception to this fairly homogeneous literature 
is the paper by Roll (1992) who finds that industry factors are the most important. However, 
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) show that Roll’s results are not valid since the variables that 
are used to explain 40% of the country index variances are not industry factors but rather 
industry returns. As such, they do not represent only the effect of the industry, but also other 
influences such as world (or global) factors.
Beckers, Connor and Curds (1996) and Griffin and Karolyi (1998) provide some interesting 
extensions of the results obtained in the literature. Beckers, Connor and Curds (1996) find that 
industrial factors appear to be more influential when stocks are classified into 36 different 
industries rather than into seven global sectors (although the country influence remains 
dominant). Second, they find that the European Monetary Union country members are much 
more integrated than other countries. Griffin and Karolyi (1998) consider both 66 industries 
and 9 sectors and confirm that industry influences grow with a finer definition of industrial 
sectors. They also distinguish countries belonging to different regions of the world. As they 
include in their sample the most important emerging countries, they find that these are less 
integrated at the international level. Third, they differentiate between traded and non traded-
goods industries11 and find an intuitively appealing result that traded-goods are on average 
more influenced by industrial factors than are non traded-goods industries.
Overall, the previously mentioned studies show that country effects are more important than 
industry effects. Moreover, most of them do not find any growing importance of industries 
relative to countries with data extending up to 1998. The first two papers that give credit to 
the practitioners top-down industry approach are Baca, Garbe and Weiss (2000) and Cavaglia, 
Brightman and Aked (2000). They find out that the industry factors have become more and 
more influential over the period 1995 to 1999. In particular, Baca, Garbe and Weiss (2000) 
conclude that the influence of the country factor was on average two to three times larger than 
the industrial factor until 1995 but that this ratio has dropped to 1.23 during the 48 months 
  
11 Non traded-goods industries are defined to be those for which high transportation costs prevent international 
trade.
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prior to March 1999. Cavaglia, Brightman, and Aked (2000) are the first to report that 
industry effects are more important than country effects at the end of the nineties.
1.3 Data
Our sample consists of weekly local currency denominated excess returns. We use the one-
month Euro-market interest rate for each market that we analyze to proxy for the risk-free rate 
of each particular country. Daily returns would have been less appropriate because of the 
trading-time difference between the countries included in our sample. On the other hand, a 
significant part of information would have been probably lost with the use of monthly returns. 
Moreover, in order to avoid issues such as abnormal Monday or Friday returns, our returns are 
calculated from Thursday to Thursday. We consider a total of 4359 stocks from 20 countries 
from January 1997 to December 2000. This sample period contains 205 weekly returns. In our 
view, a twenty-country sample is more realistic than a smaller or restrictive sample since it is 
close to the real universe of shares available to each investor. However, we do not include 
emerging markets in our coverage because of their specific features and their relatively small 
degree of integration. As one the goals of the paper is to analyze the robustness of our results 
with respect to different settings, we conduct our empirical study on six different datasets. 
Our base sample contains 2162 firms followed by Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI). Each stock is assigned to one of the 10 broad sector categories defined by this 
company and to the country where its headquarters are domiciled. This sample can be 
considered as a large cap sample as Morgan Stanley follows only firms that represent the top 
60% of the domestic market capitalization. 
To check for the robustness of our results we repeat the tests on different datasets. This will 
give us some insights on different hypotheses. The second sample includes the same universe 
of assets as the base sample, but stocks are assigned to industries according to Thomson 
Financial Datastream. Table 1.1 reveals that the stocks do not always belong to the same 
industry according to one provider or the other. The results obtained with this sample will 
show if the differences between the two classifications have an impact on the conclusions.
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Table 1.1: Comparison of MSCI/Datastream Classifications
This table provides the correspondence between MSCI and TF Datastream industrial classifications. Each row 
indicates the number of stocks of a particular MSCI industry that are present in the different TF Datastream 
industries. Columns indicate the number of stocks of a particular TF Datastream industry that are present in the 
different MSCI industries.
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The third sample uses the TF Datastream classification and includes all the stocks followed by 
TF Datastream. This increases the size of the sample to 4359 stocks. It includes companies 
with smaller capitalization than those followed by MSCI. Tests on this dataset and 
comparison with the results obtained with sample 2 measures the sensitivity of the 
conclusions to the inclusion of small size stocks. Sample 4 will again use MSCI classification 
but a finer decomposition of industrial structure. The results from this sample will provide 
insights on the sensitivity of the results to the refinement of the classification. In particular the 
results will show if industry effects are stronger when a finer decomposition of industries is 
used as found by Beckers, Connor and Curds (1996) and Griffin and Karolyi (1998). In 
sample 5 and 6, we restrict our universe to stocks of companies domiciled in the countries that 
are member of the European Monetary Union12 to check if the general process of 
harmonization at work in Europe as well as the introduction of a common currency reinforce 
industrial influences (and/or decrease country effects) and if the results differ from those 
  
12 These countries are: Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal.
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obtained for developed markets in general. The second European dataset excludes stocks from 
the information technology and telecommunication services sectors as they display a very 
atypical behavior over the years 1999-2000. Table 1.2 summarizes the main features of the 
samples used in this study
Table 1.2: Characteristics of the Samples
This table summarizes the features of the six datasets that are successively considered in the empirical part. It 
shows the total number of stocks included in the sample, the number of countries considered, the type of 
industrial classification and the level of refinement of the industrial classification.
Sample Number of shares
Number of 
countries
Industrial 
classification
Number of 
industries
1 2162 20 MSCI 10
2 2162 20 Datastream 10
3 4359 20 Datastream 10
4 2162 20 MSCI 23
5 504 8 MSCI 10
6 462 8 MSCI 8
1.4 Methodology
To determine the relative importance of industry and country factors in international stock 
returns, we use the methodology developed by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994). This 
procedure is widely used in the literature. It assumes that each individual stock return can be 
decomposed into four components that are: a global common factor, a country factor, an 
industry factor and a component that is specific to each firm. This amount to writing the 
return generating process of every stock i (originating from country k and active in industry j) 
at a given date t as:
iit t kt jt itr a g d e= + + + " (1)
where rit is the local currency excess return on security i at time t. The analysis of local 
currency-denominated excess returns corresponds to an analysis of market returns available to 
every investor (whatever his or her nationality) under the hypothesis of fully hedged excess 
returns, as shown by Singer and Karnosky (1995). at is a term common to every stock in the 
world at time t, whereas gkt and djt are respectively the pure country k and industry j 
component of the date t return for a firm that belongs to these particular country and 
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industry.13 eit is an idiosyncratic disturbance term. At any given date t, every country k and 
industry j pure effects can be estimated by means of the following cross-sectional regression, 
which is a simple generalization of equation (1):
t
1 1
for   i 1,...,N  
K J
it t kt ik jt ij it
k j
r C Ia g d e
= =
= + × + × + =å å (2)
where Cik is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm i belongs to country k and zero 
otherwise and Iij is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm i belongs to industry j and zero 
otherwise. K and J are respectively the number of countries and industries considered in the 
sample and Nt is the number of stocks included in the cross-section at time t. By estimating 
this equation cross-sectionally at each date t, we obtain K+N time series of pure country and 
industry effects. These time-series are then used to determine the relative importance of 
country and industry factors. 
Unfortunately, equation (2) cannot be estimated directly because of the multicollinearity 
problem induced by the fact that each firm belongs to both one country and one industry. One 
way to avoid this issue would be to define one country and one industry as a benchmark. 
However, to avoid potential interpretation problems caused by the choice of an arbitrarily 
selected benchmark, Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) propose to adopt a more general and 
intuitive approach. It is possible to estimate the model directly by imposing the constraints 
that, for equally-weighted portfolios, the sum of the industry coefficients equals zero and the 
sum of the country coefficients equals zero. This method, proposed initially by Suits (1984) 
and Kennedy (1986), allows interpreting each coefficient as a deviation from the mean value 
of the sample. Formally, the two constraints are as follows
1
0  
K
kt kt
k
m g
=
× =å (3)
1
0 
J
jt jt
j
n d
=
× =å (4)
where mkt and njt are respectively the number of stocks in country k and industry j available at 
time t. Thus, running cross-sectional regression (2) subject to restrictions (3) and (4) for each 
period gives estimates of gkt and djt. The two constraints have a couple of interesting 
consequences. First, since the sums of country and industry coefficients both equal zero, the 
coefficient at is the average return of the sample, which is nothing else than the return at date 
  
13 We use the terminology "pure" to emphasize the fact that these variables represent country returns net of world
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t of an equally-weighted world index.14 The second interesting feature of this methodology is 
that it allows decomposing each country and each industry return into its principal 
determinants. By summing equation (2) over each stock in country k and dividing it by the 
number of stocks in that particular country (mkt), we obtain the following expression for rkt, 
the country k equally-weighted return at date t:15
1 1 1 1
1 1kt ktm m K J
kt it t kt ik jt ij it
i i k jkt kt
r r C I
m m
a g d e
= = = =
æ ö
= = + × + × +ç ÷
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Decomposing each global industry index in the same way, the following relationships are 
obtained for each country k and industry j equally-weighted return at each given point in time:
1 1
1 ktm J
kt t kt jt ij
i jkt
r I
m
a g d
= =
= + + ×åå (5)
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where rkt and rjt are respectively the country k and industry j equally-weighted returns. As 
equation (5) shows, the return of the country k index can diverge from the world return (at in 
the right-hand side of the equation) for two reasons. First, because the return of country k, net 
of industry influences, is potentially different from the worldwide return (which implies that 
gkt is different from zero), and second, because the industrial composition of country k
(represented by the third term) differs from that of the world index. If, for instance, on 
average across the world, the financial industry outperforms, the resulting impact of the Swiss 
industrial composition on the Swiss index (which includes many financial companies) will be, 
all other things being equal, positive. Notice also that if the industrial composition of a 
country is exactly the same as the world’s industry composition, the resulting industry effect 
would be zero for that particular country.16
    
and industry influences and industry returns net of world and national influences.
14 In the case of a sample including European stocks only, a would represent the return of an equally-weighted 
European index.
15 Note that the i-summation is taken over firms from country k only.
16 That is due to the restrictions (3) and (4).
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The cross-sectional estimation of the coefficients at, gkt and djt of equation (2) at each given 
point in time t provides time-series of coefficients. Following Heston and Rouwenhorst 
(1994) or Baca, Garbe and Weiss (2000), we focus our attention on the time-series variances 
of the coefficients of equations (5) and (6), which are a measure of the explanatory power of 
the country and industry factors. More specifically, for every country k returns (equation (5)), 
the variance of gkt measures the pure country variance, and the variance of the term 
1 1
1 ktm J
jt ij
i jkt
I
m
d
= =
×åå represents the cumulative sector-effect variance. For every global sector j
returns (equation (6)), the variance of djt measures the pure sector variance, and the variance 
of the term 
1 1
1 jtn K
kt ik
i kjt
C
n
g
= =
×åå represents the cumulative country-effect variance. To assess the 
relative importance of country and industry factors we will compare the average (across all 
countries) pure country variance to the average (across all industries) pure industry variance.
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Results for the base sample 
We first consider the 2162 firms from 20 countries that are grouped into industrial portfolios 
according to the 10-sector MSCI classification (i.e., dataset 1). Panel A of table 1.3 displays 
the variances of the components of each country index, where the variances of the second and 
third terms of equation (5) are respectively in the first and third columns. In the same manner, 
panel B reports the variances of the components of each industrial index, where the variances 
of the second and third terms of equation (6) are respectively in the first and third columns. 
All the variances are estimated over the whole period from January 1997 to December 2000.
Panel A shows that only a small portion of the country index returns in excess of the world 
return can be on average attributed to the specific industrial composition of the countries. 
Indeed, the average variance of the weighted-sum of the industrial effects represents only 
2.8% of the variance of the two effects. This is probably due, at least in part, to the fact that 
the country indices are generally industrially well diversified. Concerning industrial indices, a 
similar conclusion emerges from panel B. Nevertheless, even though the country factor 
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Table 1.3: Variances of Country and Industry Components
The first and third columns of the panel A display the variances of the pure country effects and the variance of 
the cumulative sector-effects for each country. The second and fourth columns of the panel A report the ratio of 
these two variances to the variance of the sum of the two effects. Panel B reports the variances of the cumulative
country-effects and the variance of the pure industry effects for each industry. The second and fourth columns of 
panel B report the ratio of these two variances to the variance of the sum of the two effects. The variances are 
estimated over the whole period from January 1997 to December 2000.
Panel A
Variance (in 
squared %) 
Ratio relative 
to market
Variance (in 
squared %) 
Ratio relative 
to market 
Belgium 2.839 91.14% 0.098 3.13%
Germany 2.345 101.70% 0.048 2.08%
Spain 3.162 106.41% 0.196 6.61%
Finland 4.406 104.72% 0.048 1.13%
France 2.33 100.55% 0.027 1.18%
Italy 5.522 104.68% 0.116 2.20%
Netherlands 2.974 99.04% 0.039 1.30%
Portugal 6.664 108.57% 0.3 4.89%
Switzerland 2.146 98.36% 0.11 5.06%
Denmark 3.613 102.61% 0.081 2.29%
United Kingdom 1.53 94.78% 0.026 1.63%
Norway 5.649 101.41% 0.268 4.80%
Sweden 4.845 103.76% 0.096 2.05%
Australia 2.741 97.81% 0.077 2.75%
Hong Kong 14.867 101.59% 0.106 0.73%
Japan 4.604 99.69% 0.007 0.15%
New Zealand 5.319 96.67% 0.223 4.06%
Singapore 17.747 100.00% 0.152 0.86%
Canada 1.581 97.49% 0.039 2.39%
United States 1.897 87.06% 0.15 6.88%
4.839 99.90% 0.11 2.81%
Panel B
Variance (in 
squared %) 
Ratio relative 
to market
Variance (in 
squared %) 
Ratio relative 
to market 
Energy 0.278 4.73% 5.943 101.09%
Materials 0.063 4.22% 1.522 102.48%
Industrials 0.063 15.31% 0.31 75.14%
Consumer Discretionary 0.011 4.30% 0.231 94.03%
Consumer Staples 0.027 1.70% 1.488 93.24%
Health Care 0.075 5.10% 1.469 99.55%
Financials 0.081 9.24% 0.888 100.97%
Information Technology 0.158 1.70% 9.165 98.68%
Telecommunication Serv. 0.308 5.10% 5.249 86.79%
Utilities 0.155 4.29% 3.647 101.19%
0.122 5.57% 2.991 95.32%
Pure country effect Sum of 10 industry effects
Sum of 20 country effects Pure industry effects
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explains only a small fraction of the industry returns, the comparison between the level of the 
average variance of the pure country effects and the one of the pure industry effects shows 
that the former is a more powerful variable to explain equity returns. Indeed, the average 
variance of the pure country effects is 4.839, which is greater than the average variance of the 
pure industry effects of 2.991.
However, comparing this result to those of previous studies which use the same methodology 
leads to the conclusion that the gap between these two variances is pretty small. Indeed, if one 
computes the ratio of the average variance of the pure country effects to the average variance 
of the pure industry effects, it is only 4.839/2.991 = 1.62. This ratio is very close to the one of 
1.23 computed by Baca, Garbe and Weiss (2000) but it is relatively small in comparison to 
the ratios provided in the literature, as it is shown in table 1.4. This seems to indicate that the 
relative importance of industry over country effects is growing in recent periods.
Table 1.4: Summary of Results
This table compares the different results obtained in the literature. The last column provides the ratio of the 
average variance of pure country effects to the average variance of the pure industry effects.
Period Universe Ratio
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) 1978 - 1992 Europe 4.45
Beckers, Connor and Curds (1996) 1982 - 1995 World 5.53
1982 - 1995 Europe 1.99
Griffin and Karolyi (1998) 1992 - 1995 World (9 sectors) 11.42
1992 - 1995 World (66 industries) 3.32
Baca, Garbe and Weiss (2000) 1995 - 1999 World 1.23
Furthermore, even though the influence of the country factor seems to be larger on average 
than the variance of the industry factor, table 1.3 also shows the divergence existing between 
the different results according to the country or the industry taken into consideration. For 
instance, one can notice very strong national effects for markets such as Hong-Kong or 
Singapore (14.867 and 17.747), which in turn confirms the intuition that these capital markets 
are less integrated than Great Britain or the United States, which show far smaller variances 
(1.530 and 1.897). We find similar results at the industry level. The variances are between 
0.231 for the consumer discretionary sector and 9.165 for the information technology sector.
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Thus, according to these initial results, we conclude that the country factor remains, on 
average over the period 1997 to 2000, a slightly more powerful explanatory variable than the 
industry factor. We also confirm the Grinold, Rudd and Stefek (1989) statement that there is a 
wide dispersion in pure country and industry effects.
1.5.2 Robustness of the results
To get further insights into the country-industry effects, this section addresses the following 
questions: (1) Is there an impact of industrial classification on the results? (2) Does the 
inclusion of smaller capitalization securities in the sample significantly alter the conclusions 
of the analysis? (3) Does the number of industries considered within the industrial 
classification influence the results? (4) Are countries member of the EMU relatively more 
influenced by industrial factors than the other developed countries? (5) Is the atypical 
behavior of the information technology and telecommunication services industries likely to 
lead us to biased conclusions?
To answer these questions we re-estimate our model on different samples. Besides the first 
sample, that contains 20 countries and 10 sectors as defined by MSCI, we use the other five 
datasets described in section 1.3 and summarized in table 1.2. The average results, estimated 
on the whole period, are provided in table 1.5.
Table 1.5 confirms the results obtained with our base sample: the country factor is a more 
influential variable than the industry factor as its variance is higher. The only exception comes 
from the fifth sample (i.e., the first European sample) where the pure country effect average 
variance (2.162) is lower than the pure industry effect average variance (3.171). However, it 
is quite important to note that this result is essentially due to the very strong industrial 
influence of the information technology and telecommunication services industries. This can 
be seen when one takes into consideration the sample which does not include the securities 
belonging to these two sectors (i.e., dataset 6). In this case the results are, on average over the 
whole period, more favorable to the country factor. A second conclusion that emerges from 
the analysis of the results shown in table 1.5 is that the European countries are less sensitive 
to national factors than the other countries in the world. The six figures of the first column of 
panel A are evidence of this clear-cut result. Indeed, it appears that the first four rows of this 
column, which are related to the worldwide estimations, show country effects average 
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variances uniformly twice as big as the two average variances resulting from the estimations 
considering the European samples and reported in the two last rows. Finally, it should be 
noted that our results are robust to the definition of the industrial sectors as well as to the 
number of industries into which the stocks are divided.
Table 1.5: Results for Alternative Datasets
The first and third columns of the panel A display the variances of the pure country effects and the variance of 
the cumulative sector-effects for each country. The second and fourth columns of the panel A report the ratio of 
these two variances to the variance of the sum of the two effects. Panel B reports the variances of the cumulative 
country-effects and the variance of the pure industry effects for each industry. The second and fourth columns of 
panel B report the ratio of these two variances to the variance of the sum of the two effects The variances are 
estimated over the whole period from January 1997 to December 2000.
Panel A
Variance 
(squared %)
Ratio relative 
to market
Variance 
(squared %)
Ratio relative 
to market
20 countries, 10 sectors MSCI 4.839 99.90% 0.11 2.81%
20 countries, 10 sectors DS (2,162 shares) 4.782 96.82% 0.112 3.18%
20 countries, 10 sectors DS (4,319 shares) 4.697 93.48% 0.114 3.54%
20 countries, 23 industries MSCI 4.798 100.20% 0.126 3.46%
8 countries, 10 sectors MSCI 2.162 99.63% 0.041 1.92%
8 countries, 8 sectors MSCI 2.313 100.46% 0.038 1.58%
Panel B
Variance 
(squared %)
Ratio relative 
to market
Variance 
(squared %)
Ratio relative 
to market
20 countries, 10 sectors MSCI 0.122 5.57% 2.991 95.32%
20 countries, 10 sectors DS (2,162 shares) 0.144 10.08% 2.535 92.17%
20 countries, 10 sectors DS (4,319 shares) 0.16 8.87% 2.466 88.91%
20 countries, 23 industries MSCI 0.194 9.46% 2.786 90.23%
8 countries, 10 sectors MSCI 0.106 5.57% 3.171 96.45%
8 countries, 8 sectors MSCI 0.089 6.53% 1.587 98.44%
Country indices
Pure country effect Sum of 10 industry effects
Sector and industry indices
Sum of 10 country effects Pure industrial effect
1.5.3 Evolution through time of the country/industry effects 
The results above represent the average relative influences of country and industry between 
January 1997 and December 2000. However it is very likely that these relative influences are 
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evolving through time. More precisely, the industrial factors may have gained in importance 
relative to the country factors in recent periods. To test this hypothesis, we compute the 36-
weeks moving average of the average country effects variances and of the average industry 
effects variances. We then consider the ratio of these average country variances to the average 
industry variances as a measure of the relative importance of the country factor relatively to 
the industry factor. The choice of a 36-weeks period is a results form the trade-off between 
using a shorter period which could lead to a lack of statistical power, and using a longer 
period which could excessively smooth the data.17 The evolution of the ratio resulting from 
the base sample (2163 stocks, 20 countries and 10 MSCI industries) is shown in figure 1.1 for 
the period October 1997-December 2000.
Figure 1.1: Evolution over Time of the Relative Country/Industry Influences
Evolution of the ratio of the variance of the country effects to the industry effects for the sample of 20 countries 
and 10 industries according to the MSCI classification. Variances have been estimated over 36-weeks intervals.
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Figure 1.1 shows that the importance of the industrial influences has increased relatively to 
country influences, at least since the third quarter of 1998. Some convincing numbers also 
confirm the magnitude of this radical change: the ratio reaches its maximum of 5.39 in March 
1998 and plummets until 0.53 at the end of December 2000 (the industry factor is stronger 
than the country factor since March 2000, i.e. the ratio is smaller than 1). Thus, although it is 
  
17 Estimations considering periods of 12, 24, 48 and 52 weeks have also been computed but they do not provide 
very different results from the ones presented for 36 weeks.
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true on average over the whole period that the country factor remains the most important of 
the two factors considered here, this is no longer true when the effects are allowed to be time-
varying. The more recent value of 0.53 of this ratio implies that the variance of the industry 
factors are, over the short period of 36 weeks prior to the end of year 2000, almost two times 
as large as the country factors.
Moreover, having in mind that this ratio has been estimated from a sample containing 
countries from all over the world, the use of a European sample should provide an even 
sharper result. Inversely, a factor that could be responsible for this strong industrial effect is 
the presence in the sample of information technology and telecommunication services stocks, 
which show a powerful industrial behavior. To illustrate the strong impact that the stocks 
from these two industrial sectors are likely to have on the results, we provide in figure 1.2 the 
time evolution of each pure industry effects variance for the sample of 8 country members of 
the EMU. One notices from this figure that stocks from these two industries have a very 
strong influence (high variance) especially towards the end of the period that we consider.
Because of these results, we have excluded these two sectors from the European Monetary 
Union sample to check if they were responsible for the domination of the industry effects over 
the whole sample. The results, obtained from the sixth dataset and reported in table 1.5, show 
that it is the case.
In order to check if there are differences in the evolution of the relative influence of 
country/industry factors we have computed the evolution of these ratios for the six samples 
that we use in our study. They are displayed in figure 1.3.
Several insightful results are emerging from these graphs. First, there is a clear difference 
between the two EMU samples and the four world samples during the first half of the period 
under study. But the trend toward financial markets integration of countries from all over the 
world has been stronger than for the 8 EMU countries during this four-year period. Thus, it 
cannot be argued that Europe is a far more strongly integrated region in comparison to other 
developed countries of the world. Moreover, if we keep in mind that the four world samples 
include stocks that are traded in market places such as Singapore or Hong-Kong (countries 
that are known to be segmented markets with important country influences), these results
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of Variances of Different Industrial Sectors
Evolution of the variance of the pure industry effect for the sample of 8 EMU countries and 10 industries according to the MSCI classification. Variances have been estimated 
over 36-weeks intervals.
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Figure 1.3: Evolution of the Country/Industry Variance Ratios for Alternative Datasets
Evolution of the ratio of the variance of the country effect to the industry effect for different samples considered 
in our research. Variances have been estimated over 36-weeks intervals.
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seem to indicate that the most important financial markets are likely to have grown into a 
strongly integrated world market (with a powerful industry factor). As a matter of fact, these 
countries appear to be as integrated as European countries.
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A second interesting result emerging from these estimations is the constantly higher ratio 
provided by our third sample (i.e., the sample considering the smaller capitalization stocks) in 
comparison to the results obtained with the base sample (i.e., the sample containing only the 
2’162 stocks followed by MSCI). Even if the gap between these two ratios is no longer so 
important, these two evolutions show the relative stronger national behavior of the small 
capitalization stocks.
Last but not least, figure 1.3 provides another important result. It shows that the relatively 
growing importance of the industry factor over the country factor during this four years period 
is robust to the definition of the industrial classes as well as to the number of industries taken 
into consideration. European integration is therefore not the only cause of the increasing 
influence of the industrial factors relative to the country factor but it is more likely that this 
increase is due to a worldwide globalization that is observed in most developed countries. 
This is seen by a careful examination of the last two graphs with respect to the others. 
Although the EMU samples have a lower ratio at the beginning of the period, they are catched 
up by the other samples towards the end of the observation period as all of them have ratio 
around or lower.
1.6 Conclusion
The recent trend towards globalization and the growing harmonization of economic policies 
should lead to an increasing integration of equity markets. This in turn should also imply an 
increase of the relative influence of global industry factors over country specific factors in 
stock returns. Most practitioners are convinced of this fact and this is evidenced, among other 
things, by the reorganization of financial research along industry lines in the most important 
financial institutions across the world. However, recent academic studies continue to give 
credit to the relative superiority of national influences over industrial influences in stock 
returns. Applying a methodology similar to that used in the previous academic literature 
documenting the dominance of the country effect, we provide new results that indicate that 
practitioners might very well be right.
First, we find that, on average over the period from January 1997 to December 2000, the 
country factor remains the most important of the two factors in the explanation of stock price 
behavior. As such, our initial findings on more recent data are broadly consistent with most of 
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the previous literature. Nevertheless, further analysis that studies the time trend of national 
and industrial effects shows that the relative importance of the industrial factor increases 
significantly during our four year period. More precisely, our results on the whole period lead 
us to the following conclusions: (1) Industry factors currently appear to be more influential on 
stock prices than country factors. (2) There is evidence to support that the most developed 
equity markets are extremely integrated, probably to the same extent as the European markets. 
(3) Information technology and telecommunication stocks have displayed a very atypical 
behavior since 1998. It should be noted that our results are robust to industry definitions as 
well as to the number of industries taken into consideration.
Do our results mean that investors should not take into account national influences when 
selecting a stock and should forget about the potential for diversification provided by 
international investments? The answer is no, at least not on the basis of the evidence provided 
in this paper. First, the results drawn from the application of the Heston and Rouwenhorst 
(1994) methodology are sensitive to the data set taken into consideration. Second, despite the 
fact that industry factors are currently important, no conclusion can be drawn with respect to 
the level of correlations existing among the different sectors and the different countries. Third, 
as we only consider a limited period of time, we cannot extrapolate about the future evolution 
of these relative influences. Finally, this paper raises another important question: what are the 
reasons that have led to such dramatic changes in the relative importance of industry factors 
over this four-year period? All these topics are left for future research.
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1.7 Chapter’s Addendum: Recent Extensions
There has been numerous researches on the relative importance of country and sector factors
in stock returns over recent years. Efforts have been made in mostly two directions. First, 
some authors have tried to overcome the main drawback of the Heston and Rouwenhorst 
(1994) methodology that consists in considering stock sensitivities to country and sector 
factors to being equal to either one or zero. Second, many studies have focused on the 
dynamics of the relative importance of country and sector factors.
1.7.1 Beyond the Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) methodology
The assumptions behind the Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) approach, which drives most of 
the results in the literature, have sometimes been considered as strong, and even unrealistic. 
For instance, the most criticized feature of the model is that stocks’ sensitivities to countries 
and industries are either equal to unity or to zero. Brooks and Del Negro (2002, 2006) 
estimate a latent factor model in which loadings are not constrained to unity, and show that 
such a restriction is strongly rejected by the data. Though, for 21 developed markets over the 
period 1986-2002, they confirm the conclusions of previous studies. That is, country factors 
are more important than sector factors. In an attempt to determine why country-specific 
shocks are so much more important, they remark that within-group heterogeneity in betas is 
far greater within industries than within countries. Also, many industry betas are negative, 
whereas almost all country betas are positive. According to the authors, country-specific 
shocks conform much better to the notion of an aggregate-level shock than industry-specific 
shocks. Indeed, a country-wide shock would similarly affect all firms within the country, 
while it wouldn’t be the case for an industry-wide shock.
While the approach is interesting per se, two problems emerge. First, Brooks and Del Negro 
need a balanced sample to being able to estimate their model. Thus, their results suffer from a 
very strong survivorship bias, as stocks included in the analysis have to be traded 
continuously from 1986 to 2002. Whether or not this bias impacts the relative importance of 
country and sector factors is opened to question. Second, their results are averages over the 
whole time period. Thus, the only information they bring, though relevant, is that the average 
result according to which country factors are more important than industry factors, which has 
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been reported many times in the literature, also holds when factor loadings are not restricted 
to be equal to one.
Marsh and Pfleiderer (1997) also allow sensitivities to differ from one. They rely on a 
different estimation method, though, as they use an iterative approach. Whereas this approach 
allows them to work with unbalanced samples, the statistical properties of the resulting 
estimators are not well-known. Also, they concentrate on a very short time period, as their 
sample extends from July 1996 to July 1997. For the 29 countries in their sample, they report 
results consistent with previous research. They also consider two different levels of industry 
aggregation. Contrary to Beckers, Connor, and Curds (1996) and Griffin and Karolyi (1998)’s 
evidence, they show that the relative explanatory power of country and industry factors is not 
substantially affected by the use of 68 industries or 9 major sectors. They argue that, because 
there is so much noise in industry classifications, “more is not better”.
1.7.2 Evolution through Time
It is very likely that the relative importance of country versus sector factors is not constant 
over time. Firms have become more and more international through the extensive activity of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions over the recent past. This could have increased their 
sensitivity to foreign or global shocks, and reduced their exposure to domestic shocks. Also, 
declining barriers to international investments, the advent of the single currency within the 
European Monetary Union, and advances in information technologies should be reducing 
home bias. Domestic investors’ sentiment may now play a smaller role than in the past. All of 
these changes may have a negative impact on country-specific factors.
Baca, Garbe, and Weiss (2000) and Cavaglia, Brightman, and Aked (2000) document a 
significant decrease in the importance of country relative to sector factors over time. Focusing 
on the nineties, the former argue that country and industry factors have become of roughly 
equal importance at the end of the nineties. The latter go a step further. Their results indicate 
that, at the end of the nineties, sector factors have probably become more important than 
industry factors.
This rise in the importance of sector relative to country factors has mostly occurred over the 
second part of the nineties, and showed its strongest evolution at the very end of the nineties; 
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see L’Her, Sy, and Tnani (2002), Ferreira and Ferreira (2006), Brooks and Del Negro (2004), 
among many others. Therefore, this pattern coincides with the rise and burst of the 
information technology (IT) bubble. One may therefore wonder whether the declining role of 
country factors relative to industry factors is only a temporary phenomenon due to the IT 
bubble. Conversely, it can be due to firms becoming more global, investors decreasing home-
bias, and greater policy coordination, which would imply that this change is more likely 
permanent.
Brooks and Del Negro (2004) investigate this issue. They perform two sets of tests. First, they 
estimate the Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) model from two different samples: one that 
includes all the stocks in their sample, and another that excludes stocks from the technology, 
media, and telecommunications (TMT) sectors. While they document a large increase in the 
relative importance of sector factors in the unrestricted sample, they find no significant 
change since the mid-eighties in the sample restricted to firms outside of the TMT sectors. As 
they argue, this finding is hard to reconcile with the notion that the rising importance of 
industry relative to country factors is the result of increasing economic and financial 
integration. Second, they split their sample according to the level of firms’ international 
activities. For that purpose, they rely on the Griffin and Karolyi (1998)’s traded versus non 
traded-goods industry measure. They also use a firm-level measure computed from 
accounting-based data such as foreign sales and assets. Both measures lead to the same 
conclusion. Whereas sector factors are relatively more important for firms more opened to 
international markets, the rise in the relative importance of sector factors has been more 
pronounced for more domestic firms. Here as well, Brooks and Del Negro (2004) interpret 
this result as further evidence against the hypothesis that the rise in sector effects is driven by 
globalization.
The general conclusion of the Brooks and Del Negro (2004) paper is that the observed 
increase in the relative importance of industry factors is very likely to be only a temporary 
phenomenon rather than a permanent, structural change. Results from other studies support 
this view. Adjaouté and Danthine (2003) exploit a long time series of data and show that both 
the strength of country and the strength of industry factors follow cycles. An interesting 
insight of their study is that in the seventies already, industry factors were appearing as more 
important than country factors. Indeed, a study that would have been conducted with data 
from 1977 to 1979, at a time of truly global shocks, would have probably concluded that 
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sector factors were more important than country factors. Therefore, consistent with Brooks 
and Del Negro (2004)’s evidence, the authors argue that caution must be exercised before 
definitely concluding that the observed rise, and perhaps dominance, of sector factors is a 
phenomenon linked to permanent structural changes. Bekaert et al. (2005) bring an additional 
piece of evidence in favor of the temporary interpretation. They show that the growing 
influence of industry relative to country factors documented over the nineties mainly results 
from an increase in underlying factor volatilities and not from increased exposures to global 
factors. Based on this, they conclude that globalization has not changed the very fact that 
country factors dominate sector factors. Accordingly, the decrease in the relative importance 
of country over sector factors is likely to be only a temporary effect.
1.7.3 A Permanent Change within European Markets?
Market integration does not seem to explain the recent rise in the relative importance of 
industry effects at a worldwide level. Indeed, if integration had been the driver of a permanent 
change in the relative forces of industries and countries, the importance of the latter should 
have decreased over time. This is not what is observed. If anything, country effects became 
more important over the nineties. The rise in the relative importance comes from the industry 
side. Industry factors became extremely strong over the second part of the nineties. Moreover, 
this dramatic rise in the magnitude of global industry effects seems to be driven by a narrow 
set of sectors, namely the technology, media, and telecommunication sectors. One may also 
argue that this trend occurred too fast to be consistent with a structural change.
Overall, everything plays against financial integration as a convincing explanation. 
Acknowledging this fact, Brooks and Del Negro (2005) wonder whether the global world 
market is the right place to look at. They recognize that the recent past has acknowledged the 
emergence of large regional trading blocks. Consequently, they split their sample into three 
regions (Europe, America, and Asia), and hypothesize that market integration may occur at a 
regional level.
With a sample extending up to year 2002, they cannot conclude that industry effects have 
become more important than country effects in the American and Asian blocks. However, 
they report for the European market a strong increase in the relative importance of industry 
over country factors. Industry factors were twice as important as country factors at the end of 
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their sample period, leaving open the possibility that integration has played an important role 
within the European market.
Despite of Brooks and Del Negro (2004)’s results, it is still hard to conclude on whether the 
relative increase of sectors observed over the second part of the nineties is a permanent or 
only a temporary effect. While country-specific factors may have lost part of their relative 
advantage, they remain influential even within the European area. Recall the ratio of the 
strength of country to the strength of sector factors that we computed in Chapter 1. Loosely 
speaking, if this ratio is larger than one, country factors are more important than sector 
factors. Conversely, if sector factors are relatively more important, the ratio is less than one. 
Extending the sample period investigated above and computing this ratio focusing on the 15 
major European countries, one gets figure 1.4 reported just below, where the dashed line is 
drawn at the level of one. This figure shows that the stark decrease of the relative importance 
of country factors that occurred over the last years of the nineties has not been confirmed in 
subsequent years. Instead, at the end of 2003, country factors were, again and even within the 
presumably highly integrated European area, roughly twice as important as sector factors.
Figure 1.4: Recent Evolution of the Country/Industry Variance Ratio
Evolution of the ratio of the variance of the country effect to the industry effect for the 15 major European 
markets up to the end of year 2003.
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Chapter 2: Financial Analysts’ Performance: Sector versus Country 
Specialization
Forthcoming, Review of Financial Studies
Abstract
Brokerage houses normally structure their research activities along either country or sector 
lines. I investigate whether organizational structure affects the quality of financial analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Specifically, I compare the performance of country-specialized financial 
analysts with that of sector-specialized financial analysts. The former issue forecasts 
considerably more accurately than the latter. Country specialists benefit from an informational 
advantage over sector specialists. A superior knowledge of country-specific factors, as well as 
geographical proximity between analysts and the firms they cover, are significant 
determinants of this advantage.
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2.1 Introduction
Financial research departments are usually structured along either country or industry lines. 
At one extreme, brokerage houses organize their research activities along country lines. For 
instance, some analysts follow UK firms, while others are restricted to German firms. These 
country-specialized analysts may be required to follow firms from many different economic 
sectors. At the other extreme, brokerage houses ignore all national dimensions and rely on 
global sector structures. For instance, some analysts follow firms in the banking sector, while 
others specialize in the technology sector, irrespective of the nationality of the firms. These 
sector-specialized analysts may have to deal with firms headquartered in many different 
countries.
Research on US firms is mostly performed by sector specialists within the US market. 
Conversely, research on Japanese firms is almost exclusively performed by country 
specialists. While brokerage houses producing research on European firms once favored 
country-based structures, they have shown a clear tendency to switch to more sector-oriented 
structures over the last decade. In today’s global environment, this issue has become of 
critical importance. Is it better to rely on the traditional country-based approach, placing 
analysts close to the firms’ headquarters, thereby allowing them to build strong relationships 
with local firms and their managers? Or should research departments be organized with an 
global sector perspective, with analysts focusing on big-picture industry trends and 
competition among firms regardless of their location? This paper focuses on European 
markets, where both country- and sector-based specializations coexist, and evaluates the 
impact of financial analysts’ specialization on the accuracy of their earnings forecasts.
The results indicate that country specialists issue far more accurate earnings forecasts than 
their sector-specialized peers. Over the period 1994–2004, the average forecast error of sector 
specialists was approximately 6% larger than that of country-specialized analysts. This 
differential accuracy is not only statistically but also economically significant. For example, a 
sector-specialized analyst would have to follow a firm for more than five years to outperform 
an inexperienced country-specialized analyst by as much as 6%. This outperformance is
robust across countries and sectors, and does not depend on firms’ characteristics such as 
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market capitalization or level of international activities. Country specialists owe their
informational advantage to their superior knowledge of country-specific factors and their 
geographical proximity to the firms they follow.
These results have several implications. First, they add to the literature on the determinants of 
analysts’ coverage. According to Kini et al. (2003), if analysts tend to specialize by countries 
(sectors) in markets (sectors) with relatively strong national (sector-specific) influences, it is 
because they aim to produce high quality research. The data does not support this assertion. 
Over the period 1994–2004, sector-specialized analysts did not noticeably outperform country 
specialists in any of the sectors or the countries considered in the sample.
Second, the number of countries and industries followed by analysts are classic proxies for the 
complexity of their portfolios. This paper shows that specialization is more important than the 
mere fact that increasing the number of countries and/or industries renders their task more 
arduous. Hence specialization should be considered an important determinant of forecast 
accuracy.
Third, knowing which analysts are more likely to produce the most accurate earnings 
forecasts is obviously of interest to asset managers. But more importantly, it has strong 
implications for the overall portfolio allocation process. Academic research shows that 
country-specific factors remain at least as influential as industry-specific factors. Moreover, 
international diversification is still at least as important as industry diversification. This 
research further reveals that country-specialized analysts perform better than industry-
specialized analysts. These three findings, put together, really indicate that managers who 
adopt a sector-based approach at the expense of the traditional top-down international 
portfolio allocation could very well be on the wrong track.
Fourth, this research is of concern to the financial analysis profession itself. Obviously, 
forecast accuracy is not the only force that helps to shape the organization of financial 
research departments. For instance, small brokerage houses may not have the financial 
resources to maintain offices in a number of different locations. Also, marketing 
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considerations may drive the choice of a particular structure. Financial analysis departments 
may be organized along sector lines if portfolio managers demand sector-based research. 
Nonetheless, results in this paper suggest that decentralized research departments organized 
along country lines are better at producing accurate earnings forecasts.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.1 reviews the relevant literature and presents 
testable hypotheses. Section 2.2 discusses the methodology and the data. Results are set out in 
Section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Background and Testable Hypotheses
2.2.1 Background
The relative performance of country- versus sector-specialized financial analysts is closely 
related to the issue of location. Financial analysts specializing by country can locate within 
the same country as the whole set of firms they follow, and even geographically close to 
them. Obviously, this cannot be true of sector-specialized analysts who follow firms 
headquartered in different countries.
Information asymmetries due to geography are real. They have been shown to explain, at least 
partially, the well-documented home bias puzzle; see, e.g., Brennan and Cao (1997), Coval 
and Moskowitz (2001), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Hau (2001), Ivkovic and Weisbenner 
(2005). Accordingly, local or geographically proximate market participants are assumed to be 
better informed than foreign or more distantly located ones.
This “Geographic Information Asymmetry Hypothesis” (GIAH) has been explored in the 
context of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. Orpurt (2003) makes a distinction between 
earnings forecasts issued by analysts located in the same country as the firm for which the 
forecast is issued (local analysts) and by analysts based abroad (foreign analysts). Although 
Orpurt’s tests cannot be directly linked to the home bias puzzle, his cross-border distinction 
between local and foreign analysts produces results that support the GIAH. That is, local 
analysts tend to issue more accurate and timelier forecasts than foreign analysts. Bae, Stulz, 
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and Tan (2006) look at a large sample of 32 countries and again compare the performance of 
local and foreign analysts. Their results support the notion that local analysts tend to issue 
more accurate earnings forecasts than their foreign peers. In addition, they propose a way to 
test whether this local advantage is due to information asymmetries between local and foreign 
analysts, or is simply driven by the demand for analyst services. Specifically, the local 
advantage should be higher in countries where foreign ownership and capital flows are lower, 
since the demand by foreign investors for analyst services, and therefore the resources 
allocated to foreign analysts, should be lower for such countries. Their results support the 
information-based explanation. Malloy (2005) also tests the GIAH, but with a different 
approach, using the geographical distance between US analysts and the firms they cover. His 
results are consistent with those of Orpurt (2003) and Bae, Stulz and Tan (2006). That is, 
geographically proximate analysts seem to benefit from an informational advantage, which 
translates into the production of more accurate earnings forecasts.
In some ways these results are in line with a couple of studies on other determinants of 
financial analysts’ performance. Barker (1998) interviews UK analysts and reports that the 
source of information they consider most important is “direct contact with the company.” 
Bolliger (2004) documents a decrease in the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts as the 
international diversification of analysts’ portfolios increases. He also provides evidence of a 
negative relationship between forecast accuracy and industry diversification, but concludes 
that the synergies gained by following only a few industries are “more than offset by the 
difficulty to produce forecasts with portfolios containing firms from several European 
countries.”18 He thinks this may be “partly due to a better knowledge of the various local 
institutional contexts.” In light of the results presented above, it may also be a matter of 
proximity, as financial analysts who follow firms in several countries are, on average, located 
further away from the firms they track.
Clement (1999) reports a strong negative association between forecast accuracy and the 
number of industries followed by analysts. His results indicate that, all else being equal, the 
forecast error of an analyst who follows 8 industries (the 90th percentile value of his sample) 
will be 2.9% larger than that of an analyst who concentrates on a single industry. Jacob et al. 
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(1999) report similar results, whereas Mikhail et al. (1997) find very little evidence of a 
relationship between industry concentration and forecast accuracy. None of these has 
anything to say about the influence of the international dimension of analysts’ portfolios.
In fact, the way analysts’ organization affects their performance has received very little 
attention from academics. They rely rather on the relative importance of country and industry 
factors when advising how financial analysis departments should be organized. Magee (1974), 
among others, reports that industry-wide commonalities in earnings are large.19 He remarks 
that “from the viewpoint of an investor or security analyst, such a result indicates that industry 
earnings outcomes have potential value for those who are able to forecast these outcomes 
accurately.” Hence both academics and practitioners frequently argue that financial analysis 
should be organized along industry lines. Analysts specializing in a given industry should 
have superior knowledge of it, which should enable them to produce more accurate forecasts 
than otherwise diversified analysts.
However, the mere fact that industry membership can be shown to have a significant impact 
on earnings does not tell us whether structuring research departments according to this factor 
will enable information to be acquired and produced more efficiently, or financial analysts to 
issue more accurate forecasts. Therefore we cannot rely on the relative influence of country 
and industry factors on earnings when advocating how financial analysis should be 
performed. Instead, we must explicitly raise this question by examining the performance of 
financial analysts as a function of their specialization. In what follows, I study whether 
specializing in a sector gives analysts a comparative advantage enabling them to release more 
accurate forecasts than if they specialized in a country (and vice versa).
2.2.2 Testable Hypotheses
Financial research departments producing research on European firms have historically been 
organized along country lines. Many banks and brokerage houses still follow this approach. 
Switzerland’s Bank Julius Baer, for instance, has seven research centers in various European 
    
18 The “diversification” of country and industry portfolios is measured by the number of countries/industries for 
which analysts supply forecasts over a given fiscal year.
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countries and clearly relies on country-by-country structures.20 Other brokerage houses, 
though, now organize research along sector lines. This tendency to switch to sector-based 
structures casts some doubt on the ability of country-specialized analysts to outperform 
sector-specialized analysts. If, as Kini et al. (2003) suggest, analysts’ coverage is driven by 
the concern to produce high quality research, the synergies gained by specializing in a sector 
might very well offset the synergies gained by specializing in a country. Nonetheless, 
country-specialized analysts potentially benefit from a strong informational advantage owing 
to their location close to the firms they follow and/or their good knowledge of the firm’s 
country-specific factors. Provided that they have incentives to issue accurate earnings 
forecasts, this should lead country-specialized analysts to outperform sector-specialized 
analysts. Therefore, I state the first hypothesis as follows:
H1: country-specialized analysts produce on average more accurate forecasts 
than sector-specialized analysts.
In Europe, Orpurt (2003) concludes that local financial analysts (i.e., analysts based in the 
same country as the firms they follow) tend to issue more accurate forecasts than foreign 
financial analysts (i.e., analysts based abroad). However, we cannot infer from the evidence 
that local analysts have an informational advantage over foreign analysts, whether the source 
of this advantage is being located close to the firm or a better knowledge of the country’s 
institutional factors. In fact, if most local analysts specialized in firms headquartered within 
the same country, their superior performance might potentially result from informational 
advantages due to both proximity and their expertise in local institutional factors.
The next two hypotheses investigate whether the superior accuracy of country-specialized 
financial analysts is the consequence of one or both of these two potential advantages:
H2: proximity explains the superior accuracy of country-specialized analysts.
H3: a good knowledge of country-specific factors explains the superior accuracy 
of country-specialized analysts.
    
19 See also Schmalensee (1985), Rumelt (1991), Powell (1996), McGahan and Porter (1997), and Hawawini, 
Subramanian, and Verdin (2003).
20 See John Rubino, “The New Global Industry Analysis”, CFA Magazine, July-August 2003.
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In order to disentangle location and the knowledge of country-specific factors, I reason as 
follows. Both country and sector specialists, if they are located close to the firm for which 
they issue the forecast (hereafter “proximate analysts”), will obtain an informational 
advantage from this proximity. More distantly located analysts (hereafter “distant analysts”), 
whatever their specialization, do not have this particular advantage. Moreover, country-
specialized analysts, whenever they are based close to or far away from the firms they follow, 
should profit from an informational advantage related to their superior knowledge of the 
country’s institutional factors (assuming, of course, that they have such knowledge). Sector-
specialized analysts, especially when based abroad, logically cannot enjoy this potential 
advantage. One might argue that locally based sector specialists may draw some advantage 
from their knowledge of country-specific factors. The descriptive analysis below indicates 
that most analysts’ followings are biased towards domestic firms. Hence sector specialists 
may be quite well informed about their home country’s fiscal policies, accounting rules, and 
other relevant country-specific factors. Therefore, the possibility that locally-based sector 
analysts may also benefit from an informational advantage due to their superior knowledge of 
country factors is allowed for. The following table summarizes the above discussion.
PROXIMITY COUNTRY FACTORS
Proximate YES YES
Distant NO YES
Proximate YES YES / NO
Distant NO NO
Sector specialist
The analyst has an informational advantage due to
Analyst Location
Country specialist
If geographical proximity is important, proximate country specialists ought to outperform 
more distant country specialists and proximate sector specialists ought to outperform more 
distant sector specialists. If knowledge of country-specific factors is a source of informational 
advantage, distant country specialists ought to outperform distant sector specialists. 
Depending on the level of country expertise of proximate sector specialists, proximate country 
specialists may also outperform proximate sector specialists.
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2.3 Methodology and Data
2.3.1 Measuring Analysts’ Specializations
Kini et al. (2003) sort analysts according to their degree of sector and country specialization. 
According to their classification scheme, an analyst is considered a sector specialist if all the 
forecasts s/he issues during a given fiscal year relate to firms of different nationalities but in 
the same sector. Over the same fiscal year, analysts who issue forecasts for firms active in 
different sectors, but headquartered in the same country, are categorized as country 
specialists. “Absolute” specialists are analysts who issue earnings forecasts for firms in a 
single sector within a single country. “Generalists” are analysts who follow firms 
headquartered in various countries and are active in various industries.
This classification scheme is not entirely satisfactory. Analysts who spend most of their time 
following firms in a single country (sector) should also be included in the country (sector) 
specialist group even if they issue forecasts for firms in different countries (sectors). Yet the 
above criterion would not identify them as specialists. In consequence, I propose another 
measure. It is a concentration ratio based on the Herfindahl Index (HI), which is generally 
used as an indicator of the amount of competition among firms in an industry. For each 
analyst, I compute both a sector and a country HI. Each analyst’s country (sector) HI is 
computed as the sum over all countries (sectors) of the ratios of the number of firms followed 
by the analyst within a given country (sector) to the total number of firms for which the 
analyst issued forecasts during the fiscal year. These are formally given as:
2 2
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where , , ,c c a y a yN Na = and , , ,s s a y a yN Na = . , ,c a yN ( , ,s a yN ) is the number of firms in country 
c (sector s) for which analyst a issued forecasts over fiscal year y. ,a yN is the total number of 
firms followed by analyst a over fiscal year y. A country (sector) HI has a value of 1 (i.e., its 
maximum value) when the analyst follows firms that are all headquartered in a single country 
(active in a single sector). Analysts who follow more than one, but not many countries 
(sectors), but devote most of their attention to firms within a single country (sector), will have 
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a country (sector) HI close to one. HI values go towards zero as analysts’ portfolio 
diversification increases.
Analysts are classified as country (sector) specialists if their country (sector) HI is larger than 
0.90 and their sector (country) HI is smaller than 0.90. Analysts whose country and sector HIs 
are both above 0.90 are classified as “absolute” specialists. Note that the specialization 
measure proposed by Kini et al. (2003) is a particular case of the HI measure, where the cutoff 
value is set to 1.21
Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of the way financial analysts organize their research. On 
this graph, each dot represents one analyst. Each is characterized by her country and sector 
HIs. Approximately 70% of the 2936 analysts lie either on the upper- or right-side lines of the 
graph. That is, more than two thirds of analysts are either absolute, country, or sector 
specialists in the sense that they follow firms in only one country or sector, or both. No other 
pattern emerges from this figure. This confirms the fact that, in Europe, analysts tend to 
specialize either in a country or in a sector.
2.3.2 Measure of Financial Analysts’ Performance
To gauge financial analysts’ performance, I follow the classic accuracy measure based on 
analysts’ forecast errors. Within each given fiscal year, the absolute value of the forecast error 
of every single earnings forecast ( , , ,a j t yAFE ) is given by:
, , , , , , ,a j t y j y a j t yAFE EPS F= -
,j yEPS is the actual earnings per share announced by firm j for fiscal year y, and , , ,a j t yF is the 
latest one-year forecast of fiscal year y earnings of firm j released by analyst a at date t.
, , ,
, , ,
,
a j t y
a j t y
j y
DAFE
PDAFA
AFE
= -
,j yAFE is the mean absolute forecast error calculated over all analysts’ forecasts of firm j’s
earnings in fiscal year y. , , , , , , ,a j t y a j t y j yDAFE AFE AFE= - is the demeaned absolute forecast 
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error. A positive value of PDAFA indicates a better than average performance. A negative 
value of PDAFA indicates a worse than average performance.
Figure 2.1: Analysts’ specialization in fiscal year 2001
This figure gives a picture of financial analysts’ organization based on my Herfindahl Index (HI) measure. Each 
dot represents one of the 2936 individual analysts who issued one-year earnings forecasts for European firms 
during year 2001. The horizontal axis reports analysts’ country HIs. The vertical axis reports analysts’ sector 
HIs. A value close to 1 for the country (sector) HI indicates a strong concentration (i.e. specialization) of the 
analyst’s portfolio in firms of a single country (sector). A value close to 0 for the country (sector) HI indicates a 
highly diversified portfolio in terms of countries (sectors).
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21 In what follows, I consider a 0.90 cutoff value. Results remain unchanged when computations are performed 
with thresholds set to 0.85, 0.90, or 1, and when the raw HI measures are used instead of imposing an arbitrary 
threshold.
56
2.3.3 Regression Model and Control Variables
The following pooled regression model is estimated to test whether it is advantageous for 
individual financial analysts to specialize by country rather than by sector:
(1) , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
1
L
a j t y j y ABS a y COS a y SES a y l a j l t y a j t y
l
PDAFA ABS COS SES za b b b g e
=
= + + + + +å
, , ,a j t yPDAFA is the proportional demeaned absolute forecast accuracy measure defined above. 
,j ya is a firm-year fixed effect.
22
,a yCOS is a dummy variable that is equal to one if analyst a
is a country-specialized analyst over fiscal year y and zero otherwise. ,a ySES is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if analyst a is a sector-specialized analyst and zero otherwise. 
,a yABS is a dummy variable that is equal to one if analyst a is an “absolute” specialist and 
zero otherwise. The L control variables are represented by the z’s. These variables control for 
ability and / or skills. Indeed, it is important to make sure that the potential superiority of one 
analyst's specialization to another is not due to more skilled analysts concentrating in this type 
of specialization. The considered control variables are defined below. They are those that 
have been shown to explain financial analysts’ forecast accuracy; see, e.g., O’Brien (1990), 
Stickel (1992), Mikhail et al. (1997), Clement (1999), Jacob et al. (1999), and Bolliger (2004). 
Two additional control variables may have an impact on the performance of country- and 
sector-specialized individual analysts. First, Specialization Change (SPCHG) is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the analyst was in another specialization group over the preceding 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise. It allows taking account of the fact that an analyst who 
switched from one specialization to another may need some time to adapt to his or her new 
position. Second, Specialization Experience (SPEXP) is the number of successive years the 
analyst has been in his or her current specialization. Analysts may benefit from a learning 
effect in the particular country or sector they are specialized in.
As mentioned above, the concern of not picking out fixed effects such as analysts’ skills or 
ability when measuring the difference in performance between country and sector specialists 
is central. Perhaps the most important of the L control variables is AvPercRank. It is the 
measure of analysts’ past accuracy proposed by Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) and Hong 
  
22 Firm-year demeaning all variables is equivalent to estimating the model with a firm-year fixed effect (see 
Greene (2003), pp. 287-293). Owing to the huge amounts of data, I follow this approach.
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and Kubik (2003). For each year and each firm for which a given analyst issues a forecast, the 
analyst is ranked according to her forecast accuracy relative to other analysts who issued 
forecasts on the same firm over the same fiscal year. Percentile ranks are constructed in order 
to account for differences in coverage across firms and years. Formally, the measure is given 
by:
, ,
, ,
,
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100 100a j ya j y
j y
Rank
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FirmCoverage
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= - ´ç ÷ç ÷
è ø
where , ,a j yRank is analyst a’s forecast accuracy ranking for firm j over year y, and 
,j yFirmCoverage is the number of analysts who issued forecasts on firm j over year y. For
each analyst in each year, , ,a j yPercRank is then averaged across all firms covered by the 
analyst to provide an average measure of the analyst’s forecast accuracy as follows:
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where ,a yN is the number of firms followed by analyst a during fiscal year y. The summation 
term is taken over these ,a yN firms. More generally, the L control variables are given by:
- NBCO (number of countries) is the number of countries followed by the analyst.
- NBSE (number of sectors) is the number of sectors followed by the analyst.
- AGE (forecast age) is the number of days between the date at which analyst a’s last 
forecast for firm j’s earnings was issued and the date at which actual earnings per
share were announced.
- FEXP (firm experience) is the number of years the analyst has been issuing forecasts 
of a particular firm’s earnings.
- GEXP (general experience) is the number of years the analyst has been in the 
database.
- SPEXP (specialization experience) is the number of successive years the analyst has 
been classified in her current specialization.
- SPCHG (specialization change) is a dummy variable that equals one if the analyst was 
in another specialization group during the previous fiscal year.
- BSIZE (broker size) is a dummy variable that equals one if the analyst works for one 
of the brokerage houses in the top size decile. The size of the brokerage house is 
computed as the number of analysts employed during the fiscal year.
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- FREQ (frequency) is the number of forecasts released by the analyst over the fiscal 
year.
- AvPercRank (Average Percentile Rank) is the measure of the analyst’s past accuracy, 
as defined by Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) and Hong and Kubik (2003).
2.3.4 Data
One year earnings per share (EPS) forecasts are taken from the I/B/E/S International 
Historical Detail File database. The period studied is from 1994 to 2004. The sample includes 
the fifteen major European markets: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
The decision to confine to European markets was dictated by the following considerations. 
First, the reorganization of financial research departments already referred to is mainly a 
European phenomenon. Second, keeping within Europe provides us with a large cross-section 
of country- and sector-specialized analysts. Conversely, most analysts following Japanese 
firms are country-specialized.23 In the US market, analysts tend to specialize by sectors within 
the US.
The I/B/E/S Identification File is used to ascertain the country of origin of each firm. The 
industry sector in which each firm is active is given by the two-digit code provided by 
I/B/E/S. Eleven sectors are defined: Finance, Health Care, Consumer Non-Durables, 
Consumer Services, Consumer Durables, Energy, Transportation, Technology, Basic 
Industries, Capital Goods, and Public Utilities. Firms for which I/B/E/S does not define a 
country or an industry are excluded from the sample. In the whole world sample, 166 firms 
are given two countries by I/B/E/S. I manually checked the location of their headquarters on 
www.Business.com or on their home websites. Fifty-three of them are headquartered in one 
of the fifteen European countries considered here and are therefore included in the sample.
I/B/E/S reports earnings forecasts released by both individual analysts and teams of analysts. 
As there is no additional information about how teams are structured, how many analysts they 
  
23 On a yearly basis over the period 1994-2001, the I/B/E/S database contained on average 206 country-
specialized analysts reporting forecasts of Japanese firms’ earnings, but only 2 sector-specialized analysts.
59
include, and what the analysts’ specializations are, they are discarded from the sample. Only 
forecasts released by individual analysts are considered.24 Also deleted are analysts for whom 
I/B/E/S does not provide a code or a name and analysts who had issued forecasts for fewer 
than three firms over the relevant fiscal year.
In addition, the sample is restricted to one-year earnings per share forecasts issued before the 
actual earnings announcement date. Forecasts for which there is no data about actual earnings 
or for which the currency is unknown are also eliminated from the sample. Finally, only 
forecasts issued for firms followed by at least three analysts are considered. Table 2.1 
summarizes the resulting dataset.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Financial Analysts: Location and Average Characteristics
The first panel of Table 2.2 offers some interesting insights into the geographical location of 
financial analysts. It reports analysts’ location with respect to the firms they follow. 
Depending on specialization, the percentage of analysts based in the home country of the 
firms they cover varies from 34.3% to 93.1%. That is, approximately one third of the firms for 
which sector-specialized analysts report earnings forecasts are headquartered in the same 
country as the analyst. The high percentage of domestic firms covered by country specialists 
indicates that country-specialized analysts tend to be located within their country of expertise. 
Also, analysts tend to be located geographically close to the firms they follow. For instance, 
almost all firms followed by sector specialists that are headquartered within analysts’ home 
countries are also located less than 100 kilometers away from the analyst; country specialists 
are based less than 100 kilometers away from the headquarters of nearly 60% of the firms 
they cover. On average, the distance between analysts and firms is far lower for country than 
for sector specialists. The former are on average based 185 kilometers away from the firms 
they cover, whereas 676 kilometers separate sector specialists from the firms they follow.
  
24 For this purpose, all records for which the analyst’s name did not include a first name initial are deleted. So are 
all names that included “/” or “&” characters.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the number of firms, forecasts, and analysts included in my sample. These numbers are split according to whether they have been issued by an absolute, country, or 
sector specialist, or a generalist. In panel A, the statistics are reported country by country, based on the location of the firm’s headquarters. In panel B they are reported sector by sector, 
according to the sector firms are active in. Year-by-year statistics appear in panel C. The total number of analysts in my sample is the sum of the number of analysts in each of the four 
specialization groups. The sum of firms followed by absolute specialists, country specialists, sector specialists, and generalists does not equal the total number of firms, since a given 
firm is usually followed by more than one type of specialist.
Absolute 
Special.
Country 
Special.
Sector 
Special. General.
Absolute 
Special.
Country 
Special.
Sector 
Special. General.
Absolute 
Special.
Country 
Special.
Sector 
Special. General.
Austria 8 41 20 33 42 11 382 187 429 1009 5 49 122 204 328
Belgium 26 99 34 77 100 89 2680 723 1169 4661 18 152 332 383 747
Denmark 68 121 64 107 128 416 1853 774 1810 4853 56 130 268 386 673
Finland 66 135 45 97 135 224 4132 782 2028 7166 34 197 240 490 829
France 278 520 235 386 521 2996 21991 4520 9475 38982 277 783 1036 1587 2836
Germany 187 395 178 338 406 1644 10452 3225 7182 22503 251 643 791 1311 2370
Ireland 34 64 27 58 65 317 714 322 649 2002 37 73 128 154 306
Italy 92 177 73 108 181 1547 4351 1449 1758 9105 125 250 434 641 1258
Netherlands 93 203 98 168 204 642 11191 2211 3667 17711 99 404 695 889 1706
Norway 79 136 56 111 139 560 3010 701 1338 5609 69 208 254 325 712
Portugal 16 57 22 39 57 115 973 371 550 2009 19 104 138 196 376
Spain 90 139 76 122 140 622 5329 1416 3093 10460 99 261 421 691 1199
Sweden 131 224 105 207 227 679 4422 1753 4138 10992 110 320 460 775 1357
Switzerland 101 179 75 137 181 861 6070 1859 2151 10941 85 280 554 649 1297
UK 724 1042 505 714 1074 8774 17751 6404 9335 42264 689 837 1033 1358 2857
Basic Ind. 137 291 141 220 292 788 9140 3089 5175 18192 139 1926 266 984 2786
Cap. Goods 347 669 241 493 670 1564 23436 1870 9659 36529 248 2693 214 1450 3733
Cons. Discr. 17 88 16 57 88 96 3373 256 2156 5881 27 878 41 438 1205
Cons. Non-D. 203 352 145 255 354 1427 10648 2054 4351 18480 175 1685 164 755 2280
Cons. Serv. 381 706 297 551 714 4152 20047 3579 9252 37030 405 2735 348 1507 3948
Energy 43 88 54 79 89 234 2697 1060 2422 6413 39 635 108 411 1015
Finance 461 516 372 349 551 9240 7914 10961 2490 30605 696 1257 580 525 2456
Health Care 129 176 131 161 188 773 4113 1835 3414 10135 120 929 227 533 1456
Public Util. 61 127 81 115 127 418 3806 1456 3943 9623 77 1044 233 758 1739
Technology 156 416 94 334 426 441 7212 240 4133 12026 99 1399 97 966 2129
Transport. 59 105 45 93 107 380 2926 313 1802 5421 52 764 41 332 1026
Panel B: Summary Statistics By Sector
Panel A: Summary Statistics By Country
Total No. 
Forecasts
No. of Analysts Total No. 
Analysts
No. of Firms Followed by Total No. 
Firms
No. of Forecasts Issued by
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(Table 2.1 continued)
1994 167 650 215 352 672 317 3797 453 850 5417 57 393 61 98 609
1995 384 1070 301 648 1105 869 7219 751 1830 10669 152 743 112 238 1245
1996 590 1505 371 798 1558 1607 10462 1109 2246 15424 253 1064 150 265 1732
1997 710 1772 496 898 1831 2301 12862 1629 2350 19142 349 1338 206 283 2176
1998 768 1922 548 1001 1982 2406 13271 1877 2733 20287 391 1416 264 344 2415
1999 837 1886 659 1178 1962 2437 11155 2441 4291 20324 422 1348 374 572 2716
2000 752 1742 735 1221 1843 2146 8854 2724 4776 18500 403 1232 487 686 2808
2001 767 1646 818 1328 1780 2094 7139 3603 6153 18989 386 1085 582 883 2936
2002 709 1625 758 1422 1778 1950 6991 4319 8274 21534 369 1016 729 1154 3268
2003 641 1501 754 1346 1679 1817 6891 4109 8283 21100 324 923 670 1118 3035
2004 615 1475 686 1264 1643 1653 7027 3809 7250 19739 281 906 619 967 2773
Total 2027 3617 1652 2773 3701 19597 95668 26824 49036 191125 1892 4371 2043 2979 8101
Panel C: Summary Statistics By Year
The maximum distance of 17704 kilometers between analysts and the firms they cover 
reminds us that European firms are also followed by some overseas analysts. Nevertheless, 
panel B of Table 2.2 reveals that they are in fact very few. Only 1.8% of analysts following 
European firms are located in the US. An additional 0.7% are located outside the fifteen 
European countries included in the sample. In fact, research on European firms is mainly 
centered in the UK, where almost half of the analysts are located. Research is also extensively 
performed in France and Germany. These two countries house respectively 12.6% and 9.8% 
of analysts following European firms. A significant amount of research is also performed in 
Sweden and the Netherlands, where a total of almost 10% of analysts is located. The rest of 
the research is divided between the ten remaining European countries, with smaller markets 
having fewer analysts.
Panel C of Table 2.2 reports statistics on the average characteristics of analysts from different 
specialization groups. It shows that the average number of countries (sectors) followed by 
country (sector) specialists does not equal 1. It is respectively 1.07 and 1.18. This feature 
comes from the use of the Herfindahl-based measure for analyst specialization, which allows 
analysts to be considered as country (sector) specialists as long as they spend most of their 
time following firms headquartered (active) in a single country (sector).
An interesting output from Panel C relates to the organizational structures of brokerage 
houses of different sizes. Large brokerage houses rely more on sector-by-sector organizational 
structures. The reverse is true for small- and medium-sized brokerage houses. Only 39.7% of 
country specialists, but more than 75% of sector specialists, worked for large brokerage 
houses on average over the sample period.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics – Analysts and Analysts’ Location
This table reports summary statistics on financial analysts’ locations and characteristics, split according to analyst 
specialization. The very first row indicates the total number of analysts in each specialization group. Panel A reports 
measures of analysts’ locations relative to the firms they follow. The first row indicates the percentage of analysts located in 
the same country as the firms they follow. The second to fourth rows respectively report the average, minimum, and 
maximum distance between analysts and the firms they follow. The last row in this panel gives the percentage of analysts 
located less than 100 km away from the firms they follow. Panel B reports the percentage of analysts based in each of the 
fifteen countries in my sample. As research on European firms is also done outside Europe, the two last rows indicate the 
percentages of analysts following European firms from the U.S. and other countries worldwide. Panel C reports average 
characteristics of financial analyst earnings forecasts. The last two rows in this panel add up to 100%. They reveal how the 
different analyst specializations are distributed across large and small/medium brokerage houses.
Absolute 
Spec.
Country 
Spec. Sector Spec. Generalists All Analysts
Total Number of Analysts 1892 4371 2043 2979 8101
Perc. of within country (Local) 91.2% 93.1% 34.3% 47.2% 66.8%
Av. Distance 211 185 676 530 393
Min. Distance 0 0 0 0 0
Max. Distance 9440 17074 17040 17704 17704
Perc. of < 100km 60.0% 57.4% 25.2% 31.4% 43.1%
UK 52.5 30.0 65.9 49.4 46.5
France 9.2 14.6 9.8 13.8 12.6
Germany 9.2 12.0 6.3 10.0 9.8
Sweden 4.4 6.3 3.1 4.9 4.9
Netherlands 4.5 6.7 2.5 3.9 4.7
Spain 3.4 5.1 1.9 3.7 3.8
Switzerland 3.7 6.1 0.7 2.1 3.5
Italy 4.6 4.2 0.3 0.8 2.5
Norway 2.3 4.1 0.9 1.0 2.2
Belgium 0.6 2.6 0.6 2.1 1.7
Denmark 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.8 1.7
Finland 0.7 3.1 0.2 0.9 1.5
Ireland 1.0 1.3 0.3 1.4 1.1
Portugal 0.5 1.1 0.4 0.9 0.8
Austria 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2
USA 1.0 0.5 4.1 2.1 1.8
Others 0.5 0.2 1.4 1.0 0.7
No. of Countries followed 1.07 1.07 4.09 3.80 2.20
No. of Sectors followed 1.16 4.20 1.18 3.16 3.20
No. of Firms followed 8.59 13.26 9.04 10.40 11.45
Forecast Age (Days) 109.8 105.3 104.0 103.7 105.2
Firm Experience (Years) 2.31 2.31 2.54 2.46 2.38
General Experience (Years) 3.27 3.56 4.06 4.12 3.74
Specialization Experience (Years) 1.89 2.70 2.15 2.17 2.40
Perc. of Analysts in Large Brokerage 57.3% 39.7% 75.9% 60.1% 51.8%
Perc. of Analysts in Small/Medium Brokerage 42.7% 60.3% 24.1% 39.9% 48.2%
Panel A: Analyst-Firm Characteristics
Panel B: Analyst Location (%)
Panel C: Analyst Average Characteristics
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2.4.2 Tests of H1
2.4.2.1 Main Results
Tests of analysts’ forecast accuracy are based on equation (1). More precisely, the following 
model is estimated, with all or subsets of the control variables:
(2)
, , , , , , , 1 ,
2 , 3 , , 4 , , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , , , ,
a j t y j y ABS a y COS a y SES a y a y
a y a j t a j y a y a y
a y a y a y a y a j t y
PDAFA ABS COS SES NBCO
NBSE AGE FEXP GEXP SPEXP
SPCHG BSIZE FREQ AvPercRank
a b b b g
g g g g g
g g g g e
= + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
Table 2.3a reports the results. Whatever the specification, the coefficient on the country 
specialists’ dummy is positive and highly statistically significant, which implies that the 
accuracy of financial analysts specialized by countries is superior. Financial analysts 
specializing by sectors are less accurate on average, as their related coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant in every specification. The difference in accuracy between country and 
sector specialists ranges from 5.80% to 7.33%. In the most comprehensive model, the 
difference is 5.84%. It is highly statistically significant, as indicated by the zero p-value 
reported in the last row but three of the table. This underlines the superiority of country-
specialized analysts over sector-specialized analysts.
All significant control variables are of the expected sign. FREQ does not significantly impact 
the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts, while the AGE of the forecast is by far the most 
influential variable. As previously documented in the literature, the number of countries and 
sectors followed by financial analysts is negatively related to forecast accuracy. It should be 
emphasized that the coefficient on country specialization is statistically significant above and 
beyond the simple fact that the analysts’ task is rendered more complex when they follow a 
large number of countries. Indeed, the coefficient on country specialization is significantly 
positive even when the number of countries is included as a control variable. This highlights 
how important it is for analysts to concentrate on a single country. It is also consistent with 
the existence of informational advantages due to proximity or to a good knowledge of 
country-specific factors.
65
Table 2.3a: Forecast Accuracy Regressions
Each column reports the coefficients estimated from a specific subset of the regression equation:
, , , , , , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , ,
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , , , ,
a j t y j y ABS a y COS a y SES a y a y a y a j t a j y
a y a y a y a y a y a y a j t y
PDAFA ABS COS SES NBCO NBSE AGE FEXP
GEXP SPEXP SPCHG BSIZE FREQ AvPercRank
a b b b g g g g
g g g g g g e
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
PDAFA is the proportional demeaned absolute forecast accuracy defined in Section 2.2. It measures the accuracy of analyst 
a’s earnings forecast on firm j released at date t of fiscal year y. ,j ya is a firm-year fixed-effect. ABS, COS, and SES are 
dummy variables that take the value 1 if analyst a is respectively an absolute, a country, or a sector specialist in year y. NBCO
is the number of countries followed by analyst a over year y. NBSE is the number of sectors followed by analyst a over year 
y. AGE is the number of days between the date t at which analyst a released her forecast on firm j and the date at which 
actual earnings were released. FEXP is the number of years analyst a has been following firm j. GEXP is the number of years 
analyst a has been in the I/B/E/S database. SPEXP is the number of successive years analyst a has been classified in her 
current specialization group. SPCHG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a was in another specialization group over 
the preceding year ( )1y - . BSIZE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a works for one of the brokerage houses in the 
top size decile. FREQ is the number of forecasts issued by analyst a over fiscal year y. AvPercRank is as defined in Section 
2.3. It is a measure of analyst a’s past accuracy computed over the previous fiscal year ( )1y - . All coefficients have been 
multiplied by 100. Heteroscedastic consistent White t-statistics appear below their related coefficient. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are marked ***, ** and * respectively. In the last four rows of the table, “Diff. Cou.-Sec.” 
reports the difference between the coefficients on country and sector specialization. The statistical significance of this 
difference is given by the p-value reported just below. The adjusted-R2 and the number of observations are indicated in the 
last two rows.
2.5 ** 4.01 *** 2.06 * 1.52 1.63
(2.51) (4.09) (1.82) (1.33) (1.43)
4.69 *** 4.86 *** 4.19 *** 3.25 *** 3.45 ***
(7.59) (7.99) (5.25) (3.94) (4.19)
-2.64 *** -2.25 ** -3.1 *** -2.55 *** -2.39 ***
(-2.93) (-2.53) (-3.36) (-2.74) (-2.58)
-0.38 ** -0.25 -0.38 **
(-2.06) (-1.29) (-1.97)
-0.53 *** -0.74 *** -0.58 ***
(-3.64) (-4.13) (-3.21)
-0.18 *** -0.19 *** -0.19 *** -0.19 ***
(-60.76) (-60.88) (-60.87) (-60.86)
1.08 *** 1.04 ***
(6.45) (6.24)
-0.59 *** -0.56 ***
(-4.39) (-4.16)
0.31 * 0.33 *
(1.65) (1.78)
0.91 1.08
(1.27) (1.5)
-4.46 *** -4.46 ***
(-9.62) (-9.63)
0.02 0.02
(0.58) (0.62)
0.28 ***
(18.34)
Diff. Cou.-Sec. 7.33 7.11 7.29 5.80 5.84
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj-R2 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Nb Obs. 142178 142178 142178 142178 142178
AvPercRank
ABS
COS
FEXP
NBSE
AGE
NBCO
GEXP
SPEXP
SES
(6)
FREQ
BSIZE
SPCHG
(1) (4)(3)(2)
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Forecast accuracy increases with firm experience. The coefficient on this control variable 
allows a meaningful comparison. It will be recalled that firm experience (FEXP) is defined as 
the number of years the analyst has been issuing earnings forecasts for a particular firm. It is a 
surrogate for the “learning-by-doing” effect. It may also proxy for analysts having easier 
access to private information through the relationships they may have forged with the firm’s 
management over the years. The coefficient on FEXP is 1.04%. This means that every 
additional year of “firm experience” produces a 1.04% reduction in average forecast error. By 
comparison, the difference in accuracy between country and sector specialists is 5.84%. That 
is, more than five years (i.e., 5.84/1.04) of “firm experience” are needed to achieve a 
differential comparable to the superiority of country- over sector-specialized analysts.
The negative coefficient on the brokerage size variable (BSIZE) may appear surprising at first 
sight. Analysts working for large brokerage houses should be in a position to produce more 
accurate earnings forecasts since they have wider access to resources. Also, large brokers 
have the financial resources to attract and hire the most skilled analysts. However, this 
astonishing negative relationship is a recurrent outcome in the literature on the accuracy of 
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts in Europe. Bolliger (2004) investigates two potential 
explanations. First, analysts working for large brokerage houses may be at a disadvantage 
relative to their peers working for small brokerage houses because the latter have a local 
advantage. Another possible explanation is conflicts of interest from the involvement of large 
brokers in investment banking. Bolliger’s (2004) results indicate that the local disadvantage 
explains part of the bad performance of large brokerage houses, while conflicts of interest are 
irrelevant.
AvPercRank is highly significant, with a t-statistic of 18.34. It indicates a strong persistence in 
the performance of financial analysts in Europe. More importantly, the inclusion of this 
variable in the model does not impact the coefficient estimates on analyst specializations. This 
suggests that the difference in performance between country and sector specialists is not a 
result of skilled analysts’ being concentrated in the country specialization group. Endogeneity 
due to a possible causal relationship between analysts’ past performance and organizational 
design is indeed a concern. This issue is considered in section 2.4.3.3.
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2.4.2.2 Country-By-Country and Sector-By-Sector Estimates
According to Kini et al. (2003), the structure of financial research departments is related to the 
strength of country- and sector-specific factors. In an attempt to gain synergies and produce 
high quality forecasts, financial analysts tend to specialize by countries in markets with strong 
national influences. Similarly, the likelihood of analysts’ specializing by sector increases with 
the strength of industry factors. Thus, results so far may very well depend on each particular 
country or sector. If Kini et al. (2003) are correct, sector specialists should outperform 
country specialists in sectors with strong industry-specific influences. We should also find 
that country specialists perform better than average only in countries with relatively strong 
national factors.
Therefore, I re-estimate regression equation (2) independently for each country and each 
sector. Table 2.3b reports country-by-country regression results. Country specialists tend to 
issue more accurate forecasts than sector specialists in all countries except one. The exception 
is Austria, where the coefficient on the sector specialist dummy is higher than for country 
specialists. This difference is not statistically significant, however, as indicated by the p-value 
of 0.4845. In the fourteen countries where country specialists show higher forecast accuracy, 
the difference between the two types of analysts is statistically significant in six countries: 
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands (marginally significant), Norway, and Spain. In these 
countries, the difference in accuracy between country and sector specialists ranges from 
6.77% (Netherlands) to a high of 16.49% (Belgium).
Overall, these results show a general comparative advantage for country specialists.25 Table 
2.3c reports sector-by-sector results. Country-specialized analysts perform better in nine out 
of eleven sectors. This superior performance is statistically significant in five sectors: basic 
industries, consumer non-discretionary, consumer services, finance, and health care. In the 
two industries in which sector specialists have a coefficient larger than country-specialized 
  
25 If one assumes that this advantage is mostly due to country specialists being located in the same country as the 
firms they follow, this result contradicts Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2006), who find no local advantage for most of the 
countries investigated here. However, they focus on a very specific time-period. I re-estimated the model in 
Table 3b over their restricted sample period (2001-2003) and found no significant superiority among country 
specialists in any of the 15 European countries. While consistent with Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2006), this result 
shows that the absence of local advantages reported by Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2006) for these countries is sample-
specific. Results are available from the author on request.
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analysts (viz. consumer discretionary and technology) the difference is not statistically 
significant.
Overall, even though the superiority of country over sector specialists may be concentrated in 
a subset of countries and sectors, sector specialists are never significantly more accurate than 
country specialists. In none of the investigated countries or sectors is the coefficient on sector 
specialists significantly higher than the coefficient on country specialists. Country specialists, 
on the other hand, perform statistically significantly better in almost half of the countries and 
sectors. This makes it impossible to confirm Kini et al.’s (2003) conjecture that the choice 
between country and sector specialization is made with the aim of enhancing forecast 
accuracy.
2.4.2.3 Firms’ Characteristics
It is often argued that multinational firms are likely to be insensitive – or at least less sensitive 
than domestic firms – to their home-country-specific factors. Nokia, for instance, would not 
be considered as a Finnish entity. As a consequence, such firms are better followed by global 
sector-specialized analysts. If this is correct, the superior performance of country specialists 
should be concentrated in firms with low levels of foreign activity. I rely on foreign sales and 
assets, and to a lesser extent market capitalizations, as proxies for the level of firms’ 
international activities. This information is extracted from the Worldscope database and the 
following model is estimated:
(3)  
1
4 1 4
1 4
, , , , , , , , , 1
, , 4 , , 1 , , 4
, , 1 , , 4 1 , 2 ,
3 , , 4 , , 5
a j t y j y ABS a y COS a y SES a y ABS Q a y
ABS Q a y COS Q a y COS Q a y
SES Q a y SES Q a y a y a y
a j t a j y
PDAFA ABS COS SES ABS Q
ABS Q COS Q COS Q
SES Q SES Q NBCO NBSE
AGE FEXP GE
a b b b b
b b b
b b g g
g g g
= + + + + ´
+ ´ + ´ + ´
+ ´ + ´ + +
+ + + , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10 , , , ,
a y a y a y
a y a y a y a j t y
XP SPEXP SPCHG
BSIZE FREQ AvPercRank
g g
g g g e
+ +
+ + + +
where Q1 (Q4) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm belongs to the highest (lowest) 
firm-level variable quartile and 0 otherwise. I estimate the model independently for each of 
the three firm-level variables.
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Table 2.3b: Country-By-Country Forecast Accuracy Regressions
Each row reports the coefficients estimated from the following regression equation estimated on a country-by-country basis:
, , , , , , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , ,
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , , , ,
a j t y j y ABS a y COS a y SES a y a y a y a j t a j y
a y a y a y a y a y a y a j t y
PDAFA ABS COS SES NBCO NBSE AGE FEXP
GEXP SPEXP SPCHG BSIZE FREQ AvPercRank
a b b b g g g g
g g g g g g e
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
PDAFA is the proportional demeaned absolute forecast accuracy defined in Section 2.2. It measures the accuracy of analyst a’s earnings forecast on firm j released at date t of fiscal year y. ,j ya is a 
firm-year fixed-effect. ABS, COS, and SES are dummy variables that take the value 1 if analyst a is respectively an absolute, a country, or a sector specialist in year y. NBCO is the number of countries 
followed by analyst a over year y. NBSE is the number of sectors followed by analyst a over year y. AGE is the number of days between the date t at which analyst a released her forecast on firm j and 
the date at which actual earnings were released. FEXP is the number of years analyst a has been following firm j. GEXP is the number of years analyst a has been in the I/B/E/S database. SPEXP is the 
number of successive years analyst a has been classified in her current specialization group. SPCHG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a was in another specialization group over the preceding 
year ( )1y - . BSIZE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a works for one of the brokerage houses in the top size decile. FREQ is the number of forecasts issued by analyst a over fiscal year y
AvPercRank is as defined in Section 2.3. It is a measure of analyst a’s past accuracy computed over the previous fiscal year ( )1y - . All coefficients have been multiplied by 100. Heteroscedastic 
consistent White t-statistics appear below their related coefficient. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are marked ***, ** and * respectively. In the last four columns of the table, “Diff. 
Cou.-Sec.” reports the difference between the coefficients on country and sector specialization. The statistical significance of this difference is given by the p-value reported in the next column. The 
adjusted-R2 and the number of observations are indicated in the last two columns.
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Diff. Cou.-
Sec.
p-value Adj-R2
Nb. 
Obs.
73.36 ** 0.62 11.74 0.99 3.16 -0.22 *** 1.31 -2.29 -6.24 -24.6 * -9.05 0.2 0.11
(2.07) (0.06) (0.96) (0.45) (1.04) (-3.93) (0.46) (-1.01) (-1.63) (-1.93) (-1.1) (0.22) (0.58)
-4.24 7.31 -9.18 -1.74 -1.19 -0.11 *** 0.39 0.2 1.01 -3.27 -2.52 0.18 0.08
(-0.37) (1.39) (-1.59) (-1.5) (-1.13) (-5.92) (0.32) (0.23) (0.71) (-0.67) (-0.81) (0.79) (0.92)
-4.2 -2.61 -2.75 -1.2 -1.18 -0.21 *** 2.32 ** -1.93 ** -0.53 -2.72 -3.01 0.1 0.26 ***
(-0.71) (-0.7) (-0.51) (-1.06) (-1.14) (-11.6) (2.13) (-1.97) (-0.43) (-0.66) (-1.11) (0.38) (3.09)
23.42 *** 11.88 *** 9.81 ** 0.01 1.51 * -0.32 *** 0.8 -0.11 0.96 -0.07 -4.93 ** -0.61 ** 0.15 **
(2.79) (3.3) (2.13) (0.01) (1.76) (-20.78) (0.94) (-0.15) (0.99) (-0.02) (-2.1) (-2.25) (2.09)
5.91 ** 7.82 *** -2.32 0.22 -0.74 * -0.13 *** 0.76 ** -1.13 *** 1.68 *** 4.97 *** -1.19 -0.09 0.37 ***
(2.24) (3.83) (-0.98) (0.44) (-1.94) (-20.91) (2.19) (-3.79) (4.41) (2.95) (-1.32) (-1.02) (11.43)
-12.67 *** -2.33 -3.04 -0.78 0.24 -0.2 *** 0.79 * -0.44 0.49 2.22 -7.25 *** -0.19 0.19 ***
(-3.13) (-1.05) (-1.14) (-1.46) (0.41) (-20.34) (1.65) (-1.13) (0.88) (1.11) (-5.08) (-1.63) (4.6)
-8.32 -9.54 * -16.49 ** 0.03 0.27 -0.16 *** 2.58 * -2.33 ** 0.98 3.22 -16.83 *** -0.71 0.12
(-0.94) (-1.72) (-2) (0.01) (0.16) (-5.82) (1.77) (-2.19) (0.62) (0.57) (-3.09) (-1.6) (0.79)
21.69 *** 12.08 ** -1.5 0.66 -0.99 -0.11 *** -0.82 0.17 1.08 3.48 -10.39 *** 0.6 *** 0.31 ***
(3.71) (2.33) (-0.33) (0.7) (-1.25) (-7.97) (-0.98) (0.26) (1.27) (0.82) (-4.79) (3.29) (4.64)
14.87 *** -0.15 -6.92 ** -0.39 0.3 -0.2 *** 1.83 *** -1.16 ** -0.9 -1.19 -3.4 ** -0.07 0.15 ***
(3.13) (-0.05) (-2.13) (-0.55) (0.58) (-19.12) (2.94) (-2.22) (-1.27) (-0.44) (-2.17) (-0.91) (2.77)
4.23 11.97 *** -1.09 0.42 -1.55 -0.31 *** 0.6 0.76 -1.04 -7.03 * -3.06 0.54 * 0.36 ***
(0.65) (2.75) (-0.23) (0.46) (-1.36) (-17.51) (0.63) (0.89) (-0.93) (-1.72) (-1.13) (1.77) (4.73)
-11.29 1.77 -2.19 1.85 -7.17 ** -0.1 *** 4.07 -1.05 -10.32 ** -12.65 -38.56 *** -0.82 0.41 ***
(-0.65) (0.22) (-0.22) (1) (-2.51) (-2.85) (1.57) (-0.47) (-2.53) (-1.42) (-5.67) (-0.9) (2.67)
-3.19 3.85 -8.65 * -1.22 -1.96 ** -0.11 *** 1.71 * -1.81 ** 2.09 ** 9.37 *** -10.65 *** 0.14 0.94 ***
(-0.56) (0.98) (-1.86) (-1.58) (-1.97) (-8.58) (1.93) (-2.06) (2.08) (2.59) (-5.17) (0.73) (9.97)
-11.67 ** 3.54 2.49 -1.65 ** -1.56 * -0.29 *** 0.41 -0.63 -0.85 -4.33 -3.05 0.39 0.2 ***
(-2.18) (1.28) (0.63) (-2) (-1.68) (-21.91) (0.51) (-1.12) (-0.96) (-1.49) (-1.47) (1.57) (3.41)
4.52 4.03 -1.36 0.2 -1.83 * -0.23 *** 0.88 -0.47 0.01 -0.38 -10.9 *** 0.23 0.19 ***
(0.83) (0.99) (-0.34) (0.19) (-1.8) (-16.61) (1.19) (-0.78) (0.01) (-0.12) (-4.77) (0.88) (2.82)
0.91 1.15 -1.37 0.36 -0.52 -0.17 *** 1.08 *** 0.15 -0.11 0.74 0.47 0.18 *** 0.12 ***
(0.44) (0.65) (-0.79) (0.92) (-1.25) (-29.31) (3.5) (0.6) (-0.3) (0.55) (0.44) (2.72) (4.26)
7170.040.4845
16200.050.4005
35790.050.9820
34600.0210
296220.030.0004
52960.130.6919
13028
165310.040.8202
62570.030.0318
0.14
16.49
-11.12
0.040.0984
6.95
0.71
10.14
2.07
0.02
3.96
13.06
6.77
13.58
2.52
5.39
1.05
12.5
Denmark
Austria
Belgium
Ireland
France
Germany
Finland
Portugal
Norway
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
44040.110.0153
12850.070.7431
74580.040.0262
77670.090.8197
82910.050.2667
328630.030.2291
NBCOSESCOSABS NBSE AGE FEXP GEXP AvPercRankFREQSPEXP SPCHG BSIZE
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Table 2.3c: Sector-By-Sector Forecast Accuracy Regressions
Each row reports the coefficients estimated from the following regression equation estimated on a sector-by-sector basis:
, , , , , , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , ,
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , , , ,
a j t y j y ABS a y COS a y SES a y a y a y a j t a j y
a y a y a y a y a y a y a j t y
PDAFA ABS COS SES NBCO NBSE AGE FEXP
GEXP SPEXP SPCHG BSIZE FREQ AvPercRank
a b b b g g g g
g g g g g g e
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
PDAFA is the proportional demeaned absolute forecast accuracy defined in Section 2.2. It measures the accuracy of analyst a’s earnings forecast on firm j released at date t of fiscal year y. ,j ya
is a firm-year fixed-effect. ABS, COS, and SES are dummy variables that take the value 1 if analyst a is respectively an absolute, a country, or a sector specialist in year y. NBCO is the number 
of countries followed by analyst a over year y. NBSE is the number of sectors followed by analyst a over year y. AGE is the number of days between the date t at which analyst a released her 
forecast on firm j and the date at which actual earnings were released. FEXP is the number of years analyst a has been following firm j. GEXP is the number of years analyst a has been in the 
I/B/E/S database. SPEXP is the number of successive years analyst a has been classified in her current specialization group. SPCHG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a was in 
another specialization group over the preceding year ( )1y - . BSIZE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a works for one of the brokerage houses in the top size decile. FREQ is the 
number of forecasts issued by analyst a over fiscal year y. AvPercRank is as defined in Section 2.3. It is a measure of analyst a’s past accuracy computed over the previous fiscal year ( )1y - .
All coefficients have been multiplied by 100. Heteroscedastic consistent White t-statistics appear below their related coefficient. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are 
marked ***, ** and * respectively. In the last four columns of the table, “Diff. Cou.-Sec.” reports the difference between the coefficients on country and sector specialization. The statistical 
significance of this difference is given by the p-value reported in the next column. The adjusted-R2 and the number of observations are indicated in the last two columns.
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Diff. Cou.-
Sec. p-value Adj-R
2 Nb. 
Obs.
6.92 6.61 ** -3.73 0.7 -0.03 -0.27 *** 0.86 -1.04 ** 1.07 * -0.67 -2.07 -0.12 0.26 ***
(1.3) (2.5) (-1.37) (1.2) (-0.05) (-25.82) (1.58) (-2.22) (1.69) (-0.27) (-1.28) (-1.03) (5.17)
3.52 -0.91 -2.11 -2.19 *** 0.13 -0.18 *** 0.72 * -0.72 ** 0.42 -0.84 -4.46 *** -0.16 ** 0.36 ***
(1.07) (-0.46) (-0.77) (-3.95) (0.33) (-26.78) (1.83) (-2.21) (1) (-0.5) (-4.35) (-2.01) (9.6)
-31.77 -7.47 1.9 -2.84 * 1.16 -0.22 *** 1.45 * -0.76 0.92 -2.87 -2.06 -0.47 ** 0.34 ***
(-1.48) (-1.51) (0.26) (-1.77) (1.24) (-13.47) (1.79) (-1.05) (0.99) (-0.6) (-0.89) (-2.45) (4.45)
4.63 5.13 * -1.48 -0.14 -1.16 ** -0.16 *** 1.47 *** -0.5 1.08 * 8.62 *** -4.32 *** 0.16 0.21 ***
(1.24) (1.89) (-0.51) (-0.18) (-2.07) (-16.91) (2.86) (-1.31) (1.88) (3.82) (-3.02) (1.63) (4.4)
-2.72 1.48 -6.89 *** -1.6 *** -0.73 * -0.14 *** 0.71 * -0.37 0.55 3.41 ** -5.58 *** 0.08 0.31 ***
(-1.13) (0.76) (-2.93) (-3.25) (-1.94) (-21.19) (1.94) (-1.28) (1.38) (2.13) (-5.42) (1.19) (9.17)
-11.98 2.48 -2.88 0.17 -2.02 * -0.23 *** 0.07 0.37 0.02 -0.67 -7.29 *** 0.18 0.4 ***
(-1.14) (0.53) (-0.67) (0.24) (-1.95) (-13.87) (0.08) (0.55) (0.02) (-0.16) (-2.75) (0.83) (4.12)
4.86 * 9.41 *** 0.32 -0.16 -1.87 *** -0.18 *** 1.63 *** -0.6 -1.32 *** -3.74 ** -5.84 *** 0.27 *** 0.2 ***
(1.69) (3.41) (0.12) (-0.39) (-3.31) (-24.01) (3.79) (-1.53) (-2.61) (-2.12) (-4.91) (2.88) (5.59)
-2.27 6.95 * -2.13 1.7 * -1.11 -0.18 *** 1.08 -0.29 0.96 -1.09 -3.59 0.02 0.13 *
(-0.4) (1.75) (-0.64) (1.66) (-1.2) (-12.58) (1.46) (-0.51) (0.96) (-0.35) (-1.61) (0.1) (1.95)
8.44 6.58 * 5.72 0.62 1.75 * -0.12 *** 1.07 -0.9 1.04 5.05 -6.72 *** -0.44 ** 0.32 ***
(1.35) (1.84) (1.52) (0.87) (1.94) (-9.26) (1.3) (-1.43) (1.23) (1.62) (-3.04) (-2.33) (4.63)
-3.81 -0.52 3.14 -1.46 -0.47 -0.26 *** 1.44 ** -0.16 0.3 4.08 0.13 0.03 0.23 ***
(-0.62) (-0.17) (0.34) (-1.37) (-0.71) (-20) (2.02) (-0.29) (0.38) (1.51) (0.08) (0.17) (4.53)
0.02 -2.22 -9.71 -0.25 0.35 -0.21 *** 1.21 -0.39 -0.85 -6.13 1.3 0.06 0.25 ***
(0) (-0.56) (-1.48) (-0.26) (0.36) (-11.72) (1.39) (-0.55) (-0.75) (-1.45) (0.48) (0.32) (2.97)
AvPercRank
Transport.
Health Care
Finance
Public Util.
Cons. Serv.
Basic Ind.
Cap. Goods
Techno.
Energy
Cons. D.
Cons. N.D.
NBCOSESCOSABS FREQSPEXP SPCHG BSIZENBSE AGE FEXP GEXP
7.49
-3.66
0.86
9.08
9.09
5.36
8.37
6.61
22210
-9.37
1.2
10.34
0.3592
0.0019
0.0650
0.2768
0.7018
0.0030
4097
9067
6856
7447
4870
28163
14356
4488
27360
13264
0.05
0.07
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.06
0.04
0.07
0.2935
0.7005
0.8652
0.0524
0.0002
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Results are reported in Table 2.4. The first column reports results relative to estimations based 
on quartiles constructed from market capitalizations. It shows that, if we control for firms’ 
market capitalization, country specialists outperform sector specialists. Moreover, this result 
contradicts the hypothesis that the superiority of country specialists should be concentrated in 
small capitalization firms. In fact the reverse is true. Country specialists perform significantly 
worse when they issue earnings forecasts on small rather than medium or large capitalization 
firms. Overall, this first column reveals no obvious relationship between firms’ market 
capitalizations and the relative performance of country- and sector-specialized analysts. 
Taking market capitalization as an indicator of the multinationality of a firm, one would 
expect country-specialized analysts to perform better with regard to low market cap firms. 
There is however no evidence for this. Therefore, the general premise that financial analysts 
should concentrate on sectors rather than countries because of the increasing level of cross-
border activities appears to be incorrect.
Of course, firms’ market capitalization is not a perfect measure of a firm’s international 
activity. Therefore, I consider foreign sales in proportion to total sales and foreign assets in 
proportion to total assets as proxies for firms’ multinational dimensions. Results are reported 
in the second and third columns of Table 2.4. Here again, coefficients on country 
specialization are higher than coefficients on sector specialization for both measures of 
foreign activity. The difference between the performances of the two types of analyst also 
remains statistically significant. Moreover, no relationship is apparent between the level of 
firms’ foreign activity and the relative performance of country and sector specialists. This 
again confirms the superiority of country-specialized analysts, whatever the level of 
international activity of the firms they follow.
Results in this section also reveal a very important feature of my general conclusions. Just as 
analysts’ specialization may be endogenously determined, so may location. Bae, Stulz, and 
Tan (2006) hypothesize that the local advantage could be higher in countries where foreign 
ownership and capital flows are lower, since the demand by foreign investors for analyst 
services, and therefore the resources allocated to foreign analysts, should be lower for such 
countries. As a consequence, country specialists would outperform sector specialists not 
because they benefit from an informational advantage, but simply because of lower demand
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Table 2.4: Forecast Accuracy Regressions – Market Cap, Foreign Sales, and Foreign Assets
This table reports the coefficients estimated from the following regression:
1
4 1 4
1 4
, , , , , , , , , 1
, , 4 , , 1 , , 4
, , 1 , , 4 1 , 2 ,
3 , , 4 , , 5
a j t y j y ABS a y COS a y SES a y ABS Q a y
ABS Q a y COS Q a y COS Q a y
SES Q a y SES Q a y a y a y
a j t a j y
PDAFA ABS COS SES ABS Q
ABS Q COS Q COS Q
SES Q SES Q NBCO NBSE
AGE FEXP GE
a b b b b
b b b
b b g g
g g g
= + + + + ´
+ ´ + ´ + ´
+ ´ + ´ + +
+ + + , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10 , , , ,
a y a y a y
a y a y a y a j t y
XP SPEXP SPCHG
BSIZE FREQ AvPercRank
g g
g g g e
+ +
+ + + +
Q1 (Q4) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm belongs to the highest (lowest) firm-level variable quartile and 0 
otherwise. Three firm-level variables are considered: the firm’s market capitalization, the ratio of foreign sales to total 
sales, and the ratio of foreign assets to total assets. The model was estimated independently for each of these three firm-
level variables. The results reported in the first column refer to quartiles constructed from market capitalizations. The 
second column refers to the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. The third column refers to the ratio of foreign assets to 
total assets. PDAFA is the proportional demeaned absolute forecast accuracy defined in Section 2.2. It measures the 
accuracy of analyst a’s earnings forecast on firm j released at date t of fiscal year y. ,j ya is a firm-year fixed effect. ABS, 
COS, and SES are dummy variables that have the value 1 if analyst a is respectively an absolute, a country, or a sector 
specialist in year y. NBCO is the number of countries followed by analyst a over year y. NBSE is the number of sectors 
followed by analyst a over year y. AGE is the number of days between the date t at which analyst a released her forecast 
on firm j and the date at which actual earnings were released. FEXP is the number of years analyst a has been following 
firm j. GEXP is the number of years analyst a has been in the I/B/E/S database. SPEXP is the number of successive years 
analyst a has been classified in her current specialization group. SPCHG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a
was in another specialization group over the preceding year ( )1y - . BSIZE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a
works for one of the brokerage houses in the top size deciles. FREQ is the number of forecasts issued by analyst a over 
fiscal year y. AvPercRank is as defined in Section 2.3. It is a measure of analyst a’s past accuracy computed over the 
previous fiscal year ( )1y - . All coefficients have been multiplied by 100. Heteroscedastic consistent White t-statistics 
appear below their related coefficient. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are marked ***, ** and *
respectively In the last four rows of the table, “Diff. Cou.-Sec.” reports the difference between the coefficients on country 
and sector specializations. The statistical significance of this difference is given by the p-value reported just below. The 
adjusted-R2 and the number of observations are indicated in the last two rows.
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3.61 ** 1.68 2.04
(2.19) (0.71) (0.66)
4.24 *** 1.58 1.24
(3.81) (1.24) (0.61)
0.75 -4.17 ** -3.36
(0.55) (-2.5) (-1.47)
-2.8 -1.62 -6.02
(-1.05) (-0.4) (-1.01)
-7.33 *** 4.06 -0.51
(-2.62) (1.28) (-0.12)
-1.53 2.53 -1.35
(-0.9) (1.4) (-0.46)
-4.14 *** 0.67 -3.84
(-2.63) (0.35) (-1.33)
-4.93 ** 5.06 * -8.11 **
(-2.36) (1.87) (-2.04)
-9.16 *** 4.15 2.44
(-2.83) (1.45) (0.63)
-0.35 -0.35 -0.02
(-1.58) (-1.36) (-0.05)
-0.74 *** -0.29 -0.82 *
(-3.61) (-1.23) (-1.96)
-0.19 *** -0.19 *** -0.19 ***
(-55.22) (-47.39) (-31.16)
0.99 *** 1.11 *** 1.6 ***
(5.51) (5.36) (5.15)
-0.55 *** -0.72 *** -0.87 ***
(-3.82) (-4.29) (-3.48)
0.42 ** 0.58 ** 0.32
(2.11) (2.48) (0.85)
1.54 ** 1.47 1.69
(1.96) (1.58) (1.2)
-4.78 *** -4.26 *** -3.71 ***
(-9.2) (-6.96) (-3.55)
0.06 -0.02 0.1
(1.52) (-0.36) (1.16)
0.28 *** 0.29 *** 0.22 ***
(16.89) (14.61) (6.95)
Diff. Cou.-Sec. 3.49 5.75 4.60
p-value 0.0205 0.0021 0.0789
Adj-R2 0.04 0.04 0.04
Nb Obs. 115722 83256 35083
SES ´ Q4 (Low)
SES ´ Q1 (High)
COS ´ Q4 (Low)
FEXP
NBSE
AGE
NBCO
COS ´ Q1 (High)
ABS ´ Q4 (Low)
SES
ABS
COS
Foreign AssetsForeign SalesMarket Cap.
AvPercRank
ABS ´ Q1 (High)
SPCHG
BSIZE
FREQ
GEXP
SPEXP
76
for analyst services in some countries because investors are home biased. The results in Table 
2.4 tell against this hypothesis. Because the firms with the highest levels of foreign activities 
should garner the most foreign interest, one would expect large foreign resources to be 
expended on covering them, and this should prevent country specialists from significantly 
outperforming sector specialists with regard to these firms. This is not what I observe, 
however. Rather, my results are a further indication that location may provide analysts with a 
strong comparative advantage. Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2006) come to the same conclusion. 
Thus, while our methodological approaches are different, the results from the two studies are 
perfectly consistent, reinforcing the idea that local advantage can confidently be interpreted as 
an information asymmetry explanation.26
Overall, results indicate that specializing by country rather than sector brings considerable 
benefits in terms of forecast accuracy. Individual country-specialized analysts tend to issue 
more accurate forecasts than sector-specialized ones. This result is highly significant in 
approximately half of the countries and sectors considered in the sample. Moreover, in no 
country or sector is the accuracy of sector-specialized analysts superior to that of country 
specialists. This marked superiority of country specialists can be interpreted as an 
informational advantage. Potential sources of this informational advantage are investigated 
below.
2.4.3 Robustness Checks
2.4.3.1 Analysts’ Following
Country-specialized financial analysts may concentrate on firms whose earnings are, for some 
reason, easier to forecast than the earnings of firms mainly followed by sector-specialized 
analysts. As a first check, I re-estimate equation (2), restricting the sample to firms followed 
by at least one country- and one sector-specialized analyst. If the former really outperform the 
latter, there should be no difference between the results reported above and the results from 
this restricted sample. Nor should there be any difference if firm-year differences were 
accurately controlled for. Results, reported in Table 2.5, are indeed extremely similar to those 
  
26 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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in Table 2.3a. Here again, the p-values indicate that the difference between country and sector 
specialist coefficients is highly significant in all cases.
2.4.3.2 Timeliness
The forecast accuracy measure considered up to this point cannot be used in isolation to 
appraise financial analysts’ performance. It could easily give an impression of skill in inferior 
analysts who herd on the forecasts released by their accurate peers. I therefore employ the 
timeliness measure, called “Leader-to-Follower ratio” (LFR), developed by Cooper et al. 
(2001). This allows me to verify that the superiority of country-specialized analysts, as so far 
documented, is not in fact due to herding behavior among analysts.
High values of the LFR statistics are indicative of skilled analysts. Follower analysts have 
lower LFR values.27 Cooper et al. (2001) consider analysts who have a LFR ratio statistically 
greater than 1 to be “leader analysts” and others “follower analysts.” I choose not to impose 
this arbitrary threshold. Instead, I compare the median LFR levels across analysts’ 
specializations. Moreover, as LFR distributions are highly skewed, a rank sum test is 
performed. Table 2.6 reports the results.
The LFR difference between country-specialized and sector-specialized analysts produces 
reassuring results. Neither the median nor the mean LFR for country and sector specialists is 
statistically different. Interestingly, the LFR difference appears significantly related to one 
type of analyst only. Indeed, both the median and mean LFR on generalists are in all cases 
significantly smaller than for other types of analysts. Herding behavior may therefore exist 
among the European financial analyst community, but applies only to generalists, who follow 
firms in different countries and sectors. It does not explain the difference in accuracy between 
country and sector specialists documented above.
  
27 Interested readers may refer to the Appendix for a presentation of the timeliness measure.
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Table 2.5: Accuracy Regressions – Firms Followed by both Country and Sector Specialists
The sample is restricted to firms followed by at least one country and one sector specialist. Each column reports the 
coefficients estimated from a specific subset of the regression equation:
, , , , , , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , ,
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , , , ,
a j t y j y ABS a y COS a y SES a y a y a y a j t a j y
a y a y a y a y a y a y a j t y
PDAFA ABS COS SES NBCO NBSE AGE FEXP
GEXP SPEXP SPCHG BSIZE FREQ AvPercRank
a b b b g g g g
g g g g g g e
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
PDAFA is the proportional demeaned absolute forecast accuracy as defined in Section 2.2. It measures the accuracy of 
analyst a’s earnings forecast on firm j released at date t of fiscal year y. ,j ya is a firm-year fixed-effect. ABS, COS, and 
SES are dummy variables that take the value 1 if analyst a was respectively an absolute, a country, or a sector specialist 
in year y. NBCO is the number of countries followed by analyst a over year y. NBSE is the number of sectors followed by 
analyst a over year y. AGE is the number of days between the date t at which analyst a released her forecast on firm j and 
the date at which actual earnings were released. FEXP is the number of years analyst a has been following firm j. GEXP
is the number of years analyst a has been in the I/B/E/S database. SPEXP is the number of successive years analyst a has 
been classified in her current specialization group. SPCHG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a was in another 
specialization group over the preceding year ( )1y - . BSIZE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a works for one 
of the brokerage houses in the top size deciles. FREQ is the number of forecasts issued by analyst a over fiscal year y. 
AvPercRank is as defined in Section 2.3. It is a measure of analyst a’s past accuracy computed over the previous fiscal 
year ( )1y - . All coefficients have been multiplied by 100. Heteroscedastic consistent White t-statistics appear below 
their related coefficient. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are marked ***, ** and * respectively. In the 
last four rows of the table, “Diff. Cou.-Sec.” reports the difference between the coefficients on country and sector 
specialization. The statistical significance of this difference is given by the p-value reported just below. The adjusted-R2
and the number of observations are indicated in the last two rows.
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2.91 ** 4.73 *** 3.77 ** 2.68 * 2.78 *
(2.08) (3.43) (2.35) (1.65) (1.71)
5.04 *** 5.67 *** 6.56 *** 4.91 *** 5.26 ***
(5.39) (6.16) (5.48) (3.99) (4.28)
-3.09 *** -2.49 ** -3.74 *** -3.2 *** -3.05 ***
(-2.93) (-2.39) (-3.35) (-2.84) (-2.71)
0.08 0.17 0.03
(0.36) (0.71) (0.14)
-0.73 *** -1.13 *** -0.96 ***
(-2.99) (-3.76) (-3.2)
-0.18 *** -0.18 *** -0.18 *** -0.18 ***
(-40.26) (-40.27) (-40.27) (-40.22)
1.18 *** 1.1 ***
(4.87) (4.58)
-0.76 *** -0.69 ***
(-3.94) (-3.56)
0.46 0.46
(1.61) (1.63)
1.12 1.31
(1.07) (1.25)
-5.75 *** -5.51 ***
(-7.94) (-7.62)
0.05 0.07
(0.91) (1.27)
0.31 ***
(13.09)
Diff. Cou.-Sec. 8.13 8.16 10.30 8.11 8.31
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj-R2 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Nb Obs. 63843 63843 63843 63843 63843
GEXP
SPEXP
(1) (5)(4)(3)(2)
SES
ABS
COS
FEXP
NBSE
AGE
NBCO
FREQ
BSIZE
SPCHG
AvPercRank
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2.4.3.3 Endogeneity
Endogeneity is potentially a serious concern in this context. It may arise from a potential 
causal relationship between analyst performance and specialization. For instance, the most 
skilled analysts may be given their choice of specialization. As nobody wants to travel further 
than they have to, these analysts may choose to specialize by country so they can cover their 
home country’s firms. Inferior analysts would then have no choice other than to follow firms 
scattered over many different places or countries.28 If this is the case, the superiority of 
country specialists would not be due to informational advantages, but simply to their superior 
skill. I investigate this issue in three different respects.
First, while the control variable for analysts’ past accuracy (AvPercRank) can be seen as a 
measure of their skills, it also implicitly controls for this potential endogeneity problem. As 
the results in Table 2.3a indicate, AvPercRank is highly significant, but it does not affect the 
coefficient estimates.29
Second, in order to explicitly take endogeneity into account, I build on the methodology 
developed by Heckman (1979). I compute the inverse Mills’ ratio from the estimate of a 
probit model where the probability of being a country specialist is modeled as a function of 
the analyst’s past accuracy, the size of the brokerage house, the average total capitalization 
weight of the countries followed by the analyst, and the number of firms followed by the 
analyst. This Mills’ ratio is then included as an additional control variable in all of the tests. 
Unreported results confirm that this does not change the coefficient estimates, nor does it 
change their statistical significance. Moreover, the Mills’ ratio is never significantly different 
from zero.30
  
28 I am grateful to the Editor for this suggestion, and for showing me a way of testing its validity.
29 Note that the persistence of financial analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy is highly significant in the countries 
studied here. Researchers working in this field should be aware of this important feature of the European market 
for financial analysis.
30 As robustness checks, I also consider the probability of following a single (or restricted) number of countries 
against that of being a country specialist. Specifically, the left-hand side variable of the probit model is 
Prob(Absolute or Country specialist) instead of Prob(Country specialist). I also estimate the probit model on a 
year-to-year basis, including as control variables as many Mills’ ratios as there are years in the sample; see 
Wooldridge (1995). In all cases, results remain unchanged. The consideration of endogeneity through the 
inclusion of Mills’ ratios in the model never affects the coefficient estimates.
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Table 2.6: Forecast Timeliness – Leader-to-Follower Ratios
This table reports non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for the difference in forecast timeliness measures across different specialization groups. For each analyst a, who releases a 
forecast on firm j’s earnings over fiscal year y, timeliness is measured by the LFR (Leader-to-Follower Ratio), which is computed as 
0
, ,
, , 1
, ,
a j y
a j y
a j y
T
LFR
T
= , with 0 0, , , , , ,
1 1
K M
a j y a j m k y
k m
T t
= =
= åå and
1 1
, , , , , ,
1 1
K M
a j y a j m k y
k m
T t
= =
= åå . 0T and 1T are respectively the cumulative lead- and follow-times for the K forecasts made by analyst a for firm j over fiscal year y. 0, , , ,a j m k yt ( 1, , , ,a j m k yt ) denotes the 
number of days by which forecast m precedes (follows) the k-th forecast made by analyst a for firm j. K is the number of forecasts made by analyst a for firm j over fiscal year y. M is the 
number of forecasts made by other analysts that preceded or followed the release of the k-th forecast by analyst a. LFR ratios are computed for each analyst and each firm for which they issue 
forecasts. They are therefore firm-analyst specific measures. Mean and Median LFRs of the first (1) and second (2) mentioned specializations are given in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8. The difference 
and the p-value for the statistical significance of this difference appear in columns 5, 6, 9 and 10.
Median (1) Median (2) (1) - (2) Prob Mean (1) Mean (2) (1) - (2) Prob
Wicoxon-Mann-Whitney Normal Mean Difference
Absolute Sp. - Country Sp. 0.99 0.98 0.0124 0.2028 1.26 1.21 0.0496 0.1415
Absolute Sp. - Sector Sp. 0.99 0.99 0.0071 0.2303 1.26 1.23 0.0311 0.1475
Absolute Sp. - Generalist 0.99 0.96 0.0344 0.0259 1.26 1.21 0.0503 0.0239
Country Sp. - Sector Sp. 0.98 0.99 -0.0052 0.4606 1.21 1.23 -0.0185 0.5001
Country Sp. - Generalist 0.98 0.96 0.0221 0.0461 1.21 1.21 0.0007 0.0827
Sector Sp. - Generalist 0.99 1.21 0.0192 0.08700.96 0.0273 0.0406 1.23
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Third, based on the idea that analysts do not want to travel further than they have to, I 
compute the total distance between each analyst and the set of firms she follows and form 
deciles from this measure. The model is then estimated separately for each decile. If skilled 
analysts do indeed concentrate in the country specialization group, there should be no 
difference between the performance of country and sector specialists once total distance is 
controlled for. Unreported results contradict this hypothesis as country specialists outperform 
sector specialists in most deciles.
Overall, these three tests confirm that the documented superiority of country over sector 
specialists is not due to skilled analysts specializing by country. This further reinforces the 
idea that country specialists issue more accurate earnings forecasts because they benefit from 
a strong informational advantage. The following section investigates potential sources of this 
advantage.
2.4.4 Proximity and Institutional Factors
This section conducts tests of H2 and H3. Two potential sources of financial analysts’ 
informational advantage are examined. First, “proximity” – whether or not analysts are 
located close to the firms they follow. Analysts are classified in one of two groups, depending 
on whether they are located fewer or more than 100 kilometers away from the firms for which 
they issue earnings forecasts.31 Second, “country-specific factors” – whether analysts are 
benefiting from an informational advantage due to a better than average knowledge of 
country-specific factors. As previously argued, country-specialized analysts ought logically to 
benefit from this particular advantage.
Data on the geographical location of financial analysts is taken from successive editions –
from 1994 to 2004 – of Nelson Information’s Directory of Investment Research. This is a 
yearly reference book containing the addresses and phone numbers of financial analysts 
worldwide. Data on the geographical location of each firms’ headquarters is taken from the 
Worldscope database. The latitudes and longitudes needed to compute the distance between 
  
31 Other thresholds, such as 50, 150, and 200 kilometers were implemented, but do not change any of the 
conclusions.
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analysts and the firms they follow are extracted manually from the website www.heavens-
above.com. For each forecast reported in the I/B/E/S database, I compute the distance 
between the analyst who issued the forecast and the firm for which the forecast was issued.32
The following regression model is estimated:
(4)
, , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , ,
1
P P D D P P D D
a j t y j y ABS a j y ABS a j y COS a j y COS a j y
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SES a j y SES a j y l a j l t y a j t y
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b b g e
=
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+ + + +å
The P (D) superscript stands for Proximate (Distant) analysts. Thus , ,
P
a j yCOS is a dummy 
variable that equals one if analyst a is a country-specialized analyst located close to (i.e., less 
than 100 km away from) firm j. , ,
D
a j yCOS is a dummy variable that equals one if the analyst is 
a country-specialized analyst located more than 100 km away (distant) from firm j. , ,
P
a j ySES , 
, ,
D
a j ySES , , ,
P
a j yABS , and , ,
D
a j yABS are similarly defined for “proximate” and “distant” sector 
and absolute specialists. The L control variables (z’s) are the same as in previous tests.
Results are presented in Table 2.7. The coefficients in the first column show that, consistent 
with the previous results, sector-specialized analysts tend to issue less accurate forecasts than 
country-specialized analysts. The difference is statistically significant, as indicated by the zero 
p-value.
Results from equation (4) are consistent with hypothesis H2. That is, proximity is a source of 
informational advantage. Indeed, country specialists who are located close to the firms tend to 
issue more accurate forecasts than those who are not. Proximate sector specialists tend to 
issue more accurate forecasts than more distant sector specialists. The two differentials 
amount to 3.08% and 9.09% respectively. Both are statistically significant with p-values of 
0.0123 and 0.
  
32 The formula used to compute the distance (Dist) between to cities A and B is:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )arccos sin sin cos cosA B A B ADist R latitude latitude latitude longitude longitude= × + -é ùë û
where 6378 kmR = is the radius of the earth.
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Table 2.7: Forecast Accuracy Regressions – Proximity and Country Institutional Factors
The first column reports the coefficients estimated from the standard regression equation (2):
, , , , , , ,
1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , , , ,
a j t y j y ABS a y COS a y SES a y
a y a y a j t a j y a y a y a y a y a y a y a j t y
PDAFA ABS COS SES
NBCO NBSE AGE FEXP GEXP SPEXP SPCHG BSIZE FREQ AvPercRank
a b b b
g g g g g g g g g g e
= + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + +
The second column reports the coefficients estimated from:
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9
P P D D P P D D P P D D
a j t y j y ABS a j y ABS a j y COS a j y COS a j y SES a j y SES a j y
a y a y a j t a j y a y a y a y a y
PDAFA ABS ABS COS COS SES SES
NBCO NBSE AGE FEXP GEXP SPEXP SPCHG BSIZE FREQ
a b b b b b b
g g g g g g g g g
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + , 10 , , , ,a y a y a j t yAvPercRankg e+ +
PDAFA is the proportional demeaned absolute forecast accuracy defined in Section 2.2. It measures the accuracy of analyst a’s earnings forecast on firm j released at 
date t of fiscal year y. ,j ya is a firm-year fixed-effect. ABS
P, COSP, and SESP are dummy variables that take the value 1 if analyst a is located less than 100 
kilometers away from firm j (i.e. is a proximate analyst) and is respectively an absolute, a country, or a sector specialist in year y. ABSD, COSD, and SESD are dummy 
variables that take the value 1 if analyst a is located more than 100 kilometers away from firm  j (i.e. is a distant analyst) and is respectively an absolute, a country, or 
a sector specialist in year y. NBCO is the number of countries followed by analyst a over year y. NBSE is the number of sectors followed by analyst a over year y. 
AGE is the number of days between the date t at which analyst a released her forecast on firm j and the date at which actual earnings were released. FEXP is the 
number of years analyst a has been following firm j. GEXP is the number of years analyst a has been in the I/B/E/S database. SPEXP is the number of successive 
years analyst a has been classified in her current specialization group. SPCHG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a was in another specialization group over 
the preceding year ( )1y - . BSIZE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst a works for one of the brokerage houses in the brokerage houses in the top size decile. 
FREQ is the number of forecasts issued by analyst a over fiscal year y. AvPercRank is as defined in Section 2.3. It is a measure of analyst a’s past accuracy computed 
over the previous fiscal year ( )1y - . All coefficients have been multiplied by 100. Heteroscedastic consistent White t-statistics appear below their related coefficient. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are marked ***, ** and * respectively. Coefficients and t-statistics from the first equation are reported in the first 
column. The p-value reported below indicates the statistical significance of the difference between COS and SES. Coefficients and t-statistics from the second 
equation are reported in the second column. The p-values of the difference between coefficients of interest in this second model estimate are reported at the right-
hand side of the table. The coefficients on the control variables are not reported but are of the same order of magnitude as in previous estimations.
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Prox. C. 
Special.
Dist. C. 
Special.
Prox. S. 
Special.
Dist. S. 
Special.
4.49 ***
(4.02)
6.12 ***
(4.92)
3.04 **
(2.32)
-2.7 **
(-2.23)
3.95 **
(2.2)
-5.14 ***
(-3.8)
p-value 0.0000
Adj-R2 0.04 0.04
Nb Obs. 71569 71569
--- 0.0000
Dist. S. Special. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ---
Sector Special.
Prox. S. Special. 0.2733 0.6664
0.2733 0.0000
Dist. C. Special. 0.0123 --- 0.6664 0.0000
Country Special.
Prox. C. Special. --- 0.0123
Pooled 94-04 p-value
Equation [6] Equation [7]
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The country-specific factors explanation is convincing as well. As stated in hypothesis H3, if 
knowledge of country-specific factors is a source of informational advantage, one would 
expect distant country specialists to significantly outperform distant sector specialists and, to 
some extent, proximate country specialists to significantly outperform proximate sector 
specialists. The results support H3. The two coefficients on proximate and distant country 
specialists are both larger than their respective counterparts (i.e., proximate and distant sector 
specialists). When distant country specialists are compared to distant sector specialists, the 
difference is highly significant. For the differential accuracy between proximate country and 
proximate sector specialists, the p-value (0.2733) indicates that, while the coefficient on 
proximate country specialists is higher than that on proximate sector specialists, this 
difference is not statistically significant. As previously discussed, local and proximate sector 
specialists can be expected to have a reasonably good knowledge of their home country. 
Proximate country specialists issue statistically significantly more accurate forecasts than 
more distant sector specialists (p-value: 0), whereas the reverse is not true (p-value: 0.6664). 
Overall, these results indicate that proximity and a better knowledge of each country’s 
specific factors provide convincing explanations for the superiority of country specialists over 
sector specialists.
2.4.5 Evolution through Time
2.4.5.1 Organization of Research Departments
Over the last decade, financial analysis departments have been refocused from country- to 
industry-based structures. Indeed, more and more brokerage houses now seem to favor sector-
based approaches to financial research. This is apparent from Figure 2.2, which shows the 
percentage of country- relative to sector-specialized analysts for each of the 15 countries at 
two different points in time.
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of the percentage of country- relative to sector-specialized analysts 
from 1995 to 2004
For each of the 15 European countries in the sample, the figure shows the proportion of country- relative to 
sector-specialized analysts. This proportion is indicated on the vertical axis. The solid bars correspond to the 
proportion computed in 1995. The dashed bars correspond to the proportion computed in 2004.
Figure 2.2 shows that, for every single European country, the number of country-specialized 
analysts decreased relative to the number of sector-specialized analysts between 1995 and 
2004. This effect is more pronounced for some countries than for others. In 1995, French, 
Portuguese, and German firms were mainly followed by country specialists. There were 
respectively 77.6%, 75%, and 73.5% of country- relative to sector-specialized analysts. These 
percentage values dropped to respectively 25.4%, 27.1%, and 30.5% in 2004. In other 
countries, such as the UK and Belgium, there were, even in 1995, approximately as many 
sector as country specialists, or even more: the respective ratios were 48.8% and 41.2%. In 
these countries that were already dominated by more sector-oriented structures, the respective 
ratios decreased to 33.3% and 18.1% in 2004.33
  
33 Unreported results show that the trend towards more sector-oriented organizations is highly significant in most 
European countries. Specifically, the following yearly time-series regression was estimated for each individual 
country:
, , 1, ,10c t c c c tPCS t ta b e= + × + = K
where ,c tPCS is the percentage of country- relative to sector-specialized analysts in country c over fiscal year t. 
These estimations returned highly significant negative slope coefficients in 13 of the 15 countries. Slope 
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2.4.5.2 Forecast Accuracy
Country factors are important determinants of the comparative advantage of country- over 
sector-specialized analysts. Thus, the relative decrease in the strength of country factors 
compared to sector factors, documented in the literature, may explain the observed tendency 
to reorganize research on sector lines.34 Indeed, brokerage houses may have been trying to 
take advantage of economies of scale in the acquisition and production of information offered 
by the growing importance of commonalities among firms in the same economic sector.
If this is so the relative advantage of country- over sector-specialized financial analysts should 
tend to decrease over time, as a consequence of the decrease in the importance of country 
factors relative to sector factors. To test this hypothesis, I re-estimate equation (2) on a year-
by-year basis from 1995 to 2004. However, if the difference in performance between country 
and sector specialists has indeed decreased, such a test would not tell us why. Generalist 
analysts were used as the reference group in previous estimations. If the performance of this 
group of analysts was not constant over the sample period, we would be unable to decide 
whether it was the performance of country specialists that deteriorated or the performance of 
sector specialists that improved. Hence, following Suits (1984) and Kennedy (1986), a 
constraint is imposed on the set of specialization coefficient estimates. This constraint is 
formally defined as:
,
, 0
s y
s y
s y
N
N
b =å
where s refers to the analyst’s specialization (i.e., Absolute, Country, Sector, or Generalist), 
,s yN is the total number of earnings forecasts released by analysts of particular specialization 
s over year y, and yN is the overall number of earnings forecasts issued over fiscal year y. 
Essentially, this approach makes it possible to alter the coefficients so that they can be 
interpreted as deviations from the overall mean instead as deviations from the “Generalist” 
reference group.
    
coefficients were also negative, though statistically not significant, in Norway and Finland. Rank regressions 
delivered similar results. Results are available on request.
34 See, e.g., Cavaglia et al. (2000) and Baca et al. (2000).
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The results in Table 2.8 support the view that the difference between the performances of 
country and sector specialists has decreased over time. The difference in accuracy is large and 
highly significant in all years up to and including 2000, but decreases subsequently. While the 
difference continues to favor country specialists in all years – except 2001, when sector 
specialists outperformed country specialists – it drops to insignificance after 2001. Moreover, 
this decline in the differential performance is mostly due to sector specialists’ becoming more 
accurate, while the performance of country specialists remained the same.
As pointed out by Barber et al. (2003), 2000 and 2001 were “disasters” for the financial 
analyst profession. Focusing on stock recommendations, they show that analysts were unduly 
optimistic about stocks that turned out to perform extremely badly and vice versa. Barber et 
al. argue this was chiefly due to analysts’ favoring small capitalization growth stocks. 
Extrapolating this evidence to earnings forecasts emphasizes the need to interpret results over 
this two-year period with great care. Nonetheless, it remains true that even after this atypical 
period, earnings forecasts issued by country and sector specialists were not as different as they 
had been in 1994–1999.
The sample period used in the present study does not indicate whether this decline in the 
superior accuracy of country specialists is permanent or only temporary. The conclusions 
presumably are related to those in the literature on the relative importance of country and 
sector factors in stock returns. The consensus of this stream of research is that both the 
nationality and the industry in which firms are active are important determinants of stock 
returns; see, e.g., Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995), Beckers et al. (1996), and Griffin 
and Karolyi (1998). A more recent result, first reported by Cavaglia et al. (2000) and Baca et 
al. (2000), is that industry factors are becoming more significant owing to global sector 
convergence rather than a weakening of country factors.
A few points are worth mentioning here. First, even if industry factors grew to be as important 
as country factors in the late 1990s, it is hard to tell whether this change is permanent or not. 
Brooks and Del Negro (2002) show that it is probably mainly due to the impact of the 
Information Technology “bubble”. Adjaouté and Danthine (2003) show that the strength of 
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both industry and country factors follows cycles;35 see also Catao and Timmermann (2003). 
Bekaert et al. (2005) show that this growing influence of industry relative to country factors 
mainly results from an increase in underlying factor volatilities: globalization has not altered 
the domination of country factors over sector factors. All these results suggest that the 
decrease in the relative importance of country over sector factors is only temporary.
If the comparative advantage of country-specialized financial analysts is mainly due to their 
ability to take advantage of economies of scale linked to the relative strength of these factors, 
research organized along country lines should continue to outperform sector-based research in 
the future. Moreover, even if country-specific influences continue to diminish, my view is that 
financial research organized along country lines should still be beneficial. Accounting 
standards have still not been fully harmonized, even at the European level. There also remain 
significant differences among European countries’ regulations. Moreover, proximity is an 
important determinant of financial analysts’ performance. This is confirmed by analysts’ 
behavior. Sector specialists, who should by definition hold internationally diversified 
portfolios, tend to bias their research efforts towards firms headquartered within their home 
countries. Country specialists should therefore still be able to take advantage of the 
comparative advantages provided by country-specific institutional factors and geographical 
location.
The relative decline in the superiority of country specialists may owe something to the 
evolution of research departments into more sector-oriented organizational structures. It may 
be that analysts who left the country specialization group were, on the whole, the most skilled 
of the country specialists, perhaps because it was the larger and more attractive brokerage 
houses that reorganized their research departments into more sector-oriented structures. 
Assuming that only the most talented analysts get jobs in such institutions, it may have been 
only skilled country specialists who gradually changed specialization over time. This would 
have left only inferior analysts in the country specialists’ group, which could explain why its 
performance as a group has declined.
  
35 See Adjaouté and Danthine (2003), figure 4.15, p. 45.
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Table 2.8: Accuracy Regressions – Year-by-Year Analysis
Each row reports the coefficients on COS and SES from the following regression equation estimated on a 
year-by-year basis:
, , , , , , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , ,
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , , , ,
,
,
 
. . 
a j t y j y ABS a y COS a y SES a y a y a y a j t a j y
a y a y a y a y a y a y a j t y
s y
s
y
PDAFA ABS COS SES NBCO NBSE AGE FEXP
GEXP SPEXP SPCHG BSIZE FREQ AvPercRank
N
s t
N
a b b b g g g g
g g g g g g e
b
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
0y
s
=å
where s is analyst type (i.e. Absolute, Country, Sector, Generalist), ,s yN is the total number of earnings 
forecasts released by analysts with a particular specialization s over year y, and yN is the overall number of 
earnings forecasts issued over fiscal year y. PDAFA is the proportional demeaned absolute forecast accuracy as 
defined in Section 2.2. It measures the accuracy of analyst a’s earnings forecast on firm j released at date t of 
fiscal year y. ,j ya is a firm-year fixed effect. ABS, COS, and SES are dummy variables that have the value 1 if 
analyst a was, respectively, an absolute, a country, or a sector specialist in year y. NBCO is the number of
countries followed by analyst a over year y. NBSE is the number of sectors followed by analyst a over year y. 
AGE is the number of days between the date t at which analyst a released her forecast on firm j and the date at 
which actual earnings were released. FEXP is the number of years analyst a has been following firm j. GEXP is 
the number of years analyst a has been in the I/B/E/S database. SPEXP is the number of successive years 
analyst a has been classified in her current specialization group. SPCHG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
analyst a was in another specialization group over the preceding year ( )1y - . BSIZE is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if analyst a works for one of the brokerage houses in the top size decile. FREQ is the number of 
forecasts issued by analyst a over fiscal year y. AvPercRank is as defined in Section 2.3. It is a measure of 
analyst a’s past accuracy computed over the previous fiscal year ( )1y - . All coefficients have been multiplied
by 100. Heteroscedastic consistent White t-statistics appear below their related coefficient. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is marked ***, ** and * respectively. The coefficients on the control 
variables are not reported but are of the same order of magnitude as in previous estimates. The first column 
reports the coefficient on COS. The second column reports the coefficient on SES. The third column computes 
the difference between COS and SES. The fourth column indicates the p-value for the statistical significance of 
this difference. The last column reports the adjusted-R2 of the regression.
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p-value Adj-R2
2.87 ** -11.90
(2.21) (-1.16)
3.31 *** -13.75
(3.14) (-1.5)
0.74 -4.94 **
(0.29) (-2.24)
1.52 -6.21
(1.04) (-1.45)
3.63 *** -9.07
(5.92) (-1.22)
2.51 -6.82
(1.56) (-1.11)
-1.70 2.06
(-1.58) (1.21)
0.98 -3.64
(0.01) (-1.19)
1.17 -0.43
(0.04) (-0.15)
1.59 -2.68
(0.48) (-1.28)
1.97 *** -4.57 ***
(3.89) (-2.72)
1998
1997
COS SES
1996
1995 14.76
17.06
5.68
Pooled
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
7.73
12.70
9.33
-3.76
0.05
0.3260
0.8785
0.1762
0.0129
0.0000
0.0296
0.0291
0.02
0.03
6.54 0.0000 0.04
4.62
1.59
4.27
***
0.05
***
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.07
0.1073
0.0397
0.06
Diff. Cou.-Sec.
0.0012
**
**
**
**
***
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However, additional unreported tests do not support this view.36 First, the re-organization 
from country- towards more sector-oriented structures is not specific to large brokers. This 
evolution has been similar for both large and smaller brokerage houses. What makes these 
two groups different is that the former have always had relatively more sector specialists, 
while the latter had almost exclusively country specialists and still rely heavily on country-by-
country structures. Second, if my hypothesis is valid, country specialists who have never 
changed specialization (i.e., analysts who remained country specialists from the very 
beginning to the very end of their presence in the database) should not be performing well, 
since good performers should be concentrated among country specialists who changed 
specialization at some point in time. Estimating the model on a restricted sample, retaining as
country specialists only those who remained such throughout their presence in the database, 
returns results that contradict the hypothesis. These “all-time” country specialists behave very 
like the overall sample of country specialists in terms of forecast accuracy. Unreported results 
suggest that “all-time” country specialists may even perform better than their peers who 
changed specialization. This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that I failed to find 
any cross-sectional relationship between the declining superiority of country specialists and 
the declining proportion of country relative to sector specialists.37
2.5 Conclusion
Financial research is usually performed either by countries or by sectors. In Europe, both 
specializations co-exist. In today’s environment, in which firms compete on an international 
basis, the issue of how financial research departments should be structured has become of 
critical importance. While there has been a general tendency over the last decade to switch 
from country-based to more sector-oriented structures, there is no consensus about which 
approach is best.
  
36 Results are available from the author on request.
37 I performed different tests in order to check for the existence of such a relationship. Most notably, I ran cross-
sectional regressions of the differential performance of country and sector specialists (evaluated country-by-
country on a year-to-year basis) on the proportion of country and sector specialists in each country (also 
evaluated on a year-to-year basis). Results are unreported but are available from the author on request.
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This paper compares the accuracy of earnings forecasts issued by country-specialized and 
sector-specialized financial analysts. The results show that country specialists issue far more 
accurate earnings forecasts than sector-specialized financial analysts. Moreover, sector 
specialists did not significantly outperform country specialists in any of the eleven sectors or 
the fifteen European countries considered over the period 1994–2004. This last result 
invalidates the conjecture that organizational structures are decided upon with the aim of 
producing high quality research.
Large multinational companies have to be evaluated in a global context. As a consequence, it 
is often argued that such firms should be followed by sector- rather than country-specialized 
financial analysts. Results reported in this paper refute this assertion. Indeed, no relationship 
is apparent between the relative accuracy of country and sector specialists and firms’ 
characteristics such as the firms’ market capitalizations or their level of international 
activities. Finally, this paper brings evidence that country specialists’ informational advantage 
is drawn from both geographical proximity and a good knowledge of country-specific factors, 
such as language, culture, and accounting rules.
Overall, these results suggest that the reorganization of financial analysis departments towards 
more sector-oriented structures may have been driven by other objectives than the desire to 
boost the accuracy of earnings forecasts. Other explanations are possible. First of all, an 
organization structured along sector lines is likely to make the acquisition and production of 
information less costly, since it enables financial analysis to be centralized in a single 
location. Marketing considerations may have induced brokerage houses to specialize by 
sectors in order to meet the needs of portfolio managers, who now seem to care more about 
industry than international diversification; see Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001).
Whatever the underlying reason, one may wonder why brokerage houses continue to organize 
research in a way that reduces earnings forecast accuracy. The results indicate a diminution in 
the relative outperformance of country specialists over time. If this change were to be 
permanent, brokerage houses would simply be slightly ahead of the curve in their research 
reorganization efforts.38 Conversely, several influences, like differences in cultural and 
  
38 This hypothesis was suggested by an anonymous referee.
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institutional factors, or the advantage brought by proximity, suggest that this change may only 
be temporary. If this is so, country specialists will continue to outperform sector specialists in 
the future. These competing hypotheses call for further exploration.
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Appendix: Timeliness Measure
Cooper et al. (2001) argue that forecast revisions by skilled analysts, which they call leader 
analysts, should be followed closely by forecasts made by other analysts, called follower 
analysts. There are mainly two reasons for this. First, skilled analysts have an incentive to 
release forecasts before competing analysts since part of their revenue is based on the trading 
volume generated by their research. Second, analysts’ compensation is also based on the 
accuracy of their forecasts39. Less skilled or less informed analysts may therefore wait for the 
release of forecasts made by skilled analysts to beneficiate from the superior information of 
the latter in order to increase the accuracy of their own forecasts. To the contrary, skilled 
analysts have no incentive to issue forecast revisions in response to forecasts released by other 
analysts. Therefore, Cooper et al. (2001) propose to proxy for financial analysts' performance 
by a measure of the timeliness of their earnings’ forecasts. They develop the “Leader-to-
follower ratio” test statistics (which they denote LFR)
0
, ,
, , 1
, ,
a j y
a j y
a j y
T
LFR
T
=
for analyst a, who releases forecasts on firm j’s earnings over fiscal year y. This ratio is 
therefore firm-analyst specific. 0T and 1T are respectively the cumulative lead- and follow-
times for the K forecasts made by analyst a on firm j over fiscal year y. They are formally 
defined by:
0 0
, , , , , ,
1 1
K M
a j y a j m k y
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= åå
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a j y a j m k y
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0
, , , ,a j m k yt (
1
, , , ,a j m k yt ) denotes the number of days by which forecast m precedes (follows) the k-th 
forecast made by analyst a for firm j. K is the number of forecasts made by analyst a for firm j
over fiscal year y. M is the number of forecasts made by other analysts that precede and 
  
39 Remark that while this assumption is well suited for the U.S. market, it might not necessarily be true in 
Europe.
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follow the release of the k-th forecast by analyst a. LFR ratios are computed for each analyst 
and each firm for which they issue forecasts. Cooper et al. (2001) compute the average ratio 
across all the firms a particular analyst follows. They consider analysts having a ratio 
statistically significantly bigger than 1 as leader analysts and others as follower analysts.
Chapter 3: The Value of Analysts’ Recommendations and the Organization 
of Financial Research
(in collaboration with Carolina Salva)
Abstract
Brokerage houses usually organize their research activities along country or economic sector 
dimensions. We evaluate which research structure provides most value to investors. To this 
end, we study the relative information content of stock recommendations issued by country-
specialized analysts versus those issued by sector-specialized analysts. Our findings reveal
that the former issue more valuable recommendations. The strength of country-specific 
commonalities explains at least part of the out performance of country-specialized financial 
analysts. Surprisingly, while analysts’ geographical location has been shown in the literature 
to be a determinant of earnings forecast accuracy, it is not a source of a comparative 
advantage when it comes to stock recommendations.
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3.1 Introduction
Brokerage houses usually organize their research activities along country or economic sector 
dimensions. Units of production are financial analysts who dedicate their time and effort to 
issue earnings forecasts and stock recommendations on the set of firms they follow. There are 
probably different forces at work that shape how analysts’ research is structured.
Commonalities across firms, the information environment, customer needs, and cost 
considerations are such factors. No matter what drives analyst specialization, huge amounts of 
money are invested every day on the basis of analysts’ recommendations. This makes it
important to understand which organization structure provides investors with most value.
The information environment and the existence of commonalities across firms are significant 
determinants that shape the structure and quality of financial research.40 The quality of 
analysts’ recommendations is influenced by the availability and quality of information and by 
the models that are used to interpret this information. Information complementarities can 
facilitate the process of analyzing firms and contribute to a better understanding of firms’ 
economics. It provides a rationale for why analysts tend to specialize and choose portfolios of 
firms that share certain commonalities. According to Kini et al. (2003), analysts tend to cover 
single-country portfolios in countries where national influences are strong, and specialize in 
firms that belong to a single economic sector in industries where common economic forces 
are prominent. As they argue, this is consistent with the objective of taking advantage of 
economies of scale in information acquisition and production in an attempt to produce high 
quality research.
The importance of adapting financial research to customer needs is emphasized in Rubino 
(2003).41 Customer needs refers to the way fund managers structure their investment process. 
Investors who consider that financial markets are segmented try to profit from international 
diversification. They mostly need country-specific research. For instance, they are willing to 
know the future top-performing firms within each country. Investors who, on the contrary, are 
convinced that financial markets have reached a high level of integration rely on sector 
diversification. For that purpose, they tend to privilege global sector-based approaches. 
  
40 Berger et al. (2002), Petersen and Rajan (2001), and Stein (2002) focus on the importance of the information 
environment in the organization of financial intermediaries.
41 John Rubino, “The New Global Industry Analysis”, CFA Magazine, July-August 2003.
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Sector-by-sector analysis is more appropriate in order to meet the specific needs of these fund 
managers.
The forces and constraints that shape how financial research is organized may impact 
brokerage houses in different ways. In this paper, we evaluate which research structure 
provides most value to investors. We explore whether stock recommendations issued by 
country-specialized analysts contain more information than recommendations issued by 
sector-specialized analysts, or vice versa.42 We focus our analysis on financial research 
performed on European equities, for which both country-based research and sector-based 
research coexist.43
Our findings show that stock recommendations issued by country specialists contain more 
information than those released by sector specialists. Interestingly, the market does not seem
to recognize the informational advantage of country specialists. At the time of the 
recommendation release, the stock price reaction is similar when the recommendation is 
issued by a country or a sector specialist. The additional information brought by country 
specialists is slowly incorporated into prices, with a drift lasting up to 120 trading days
(approximately 6 calendar months). Conversely, there is no drift after recommendations 
issued by sector specialists. We interpret this delayed price reaction as evidence of greater 
information content since it is related to the type of analyst, not to the type of firm. Risk 
shifting, for example, is not a plausible explanation, as for any given firm the drift is stronger 
after a recommendation issued by a country specialist than after a recommendation issued by 
a sector specialist.
We explore whether the comparative advantage of country specialists results from 
information complementarities and economies of scale in gathering and processing 
information, such as country factors, governance regimes, financial disclosure environments 
and geographical proximity to the firm. Commonalities across firms may stem from shared 
country of domicile. Firms within a country share the same reporting and governance systems 
  
42 From now on, we interchangeably call country-specialized analysts “country specialists” and sector-
specialized analysts “sector specialists”.
43 Financial research on U.S. equities is mostly organized along sector lines and for Asian equities country-based 
research is most preferred. See Reuters Institutional Investor Survey, Institutional Investor Research Group 
(2002) also mentioned in Kini et al. (2003). To the contrary, research on European firms, even though biased 
towards country-based structures, is performed by both country and sector specialists. Approximately 30%, 
respectively 70%, of the 6587 analysts considered in our sample where sector, respectively country, specialists.
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and are subject to similar economic forces. High quality institutional structures (i.e. high 
quality disclosure, good governance, which translates into more transparency) have a positive 
impact on the information environment and may require less country-specific knowledge. 
Also, with an enhanced information environment, the role of geographical and cultural 
proximity may be less important. For these reasons, we explore whether the information 
advantage of country specialists is stronger in countries with lower quality institutional 
structures. Our results suggest that the disclosure environment and the quality of legal 
protection of shareholders hardly explain the country specialists’ advantage.
Country specialists’ advantage may result from a geographical advantage. These analysts are 
on average based closer to the firms they follow and may therefore have a better access to 
private information. They are also in general based within the same country as the set of firms 
they follow, thus increasing cultural and institutional proximity. Though, none of these two 
dimensions of proximity is a source of a comparative advantage. Our results indicate that 
neither being located close, or being located within the same country as the firm constitutes an 
important determinant of the additional information contained in stock recommendations 
issued by country-specialized analysts.
We then investigate whether country specialists draw their comparative advantage from 
recommendations issued on firms headquartered in countries with strong common economic 
forces. Results indicate that part of the additional information conveyed by country 
specialists’ stock recommendations can be explained by this factor. Country-specific variables
therefore appear as important determinants. Sector specialists, who may need to summarize
these variables when valuing firms from different locations are at a disadvantage as they may 
lose valuable of information.
Even though we perform a battery of tests to check the robustness of our results, we are aware 
of potential limitations of this study. Some of the variables considered as potential 
explanations for the differences in the relative information content of recommendations issued 
by country and sector specialists are quite highly correlated. This makes it hard to disentangle 
the individual effect of each of them. For instance, countries with low accounting standards 
are likely to be those with low shareholder protection. They are also likely to be the smallest 
national markets in the sample. Therefore, our tests should not be viewed as an unequivocal 
explanation per se of the comparative advantage of country specialists. Instead, our results 
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may more likely indicate under which conditions country specialists bring more information 
than their sector peers. All of these conditions may not be mutually exclusive.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a brief review of the extant literature 
on the value of stock recommendations. In section 3.3, we discuss the objectives and 
constraints that shape brokerage houses’ organization of research on European equities. 
Section 3.4 introduces the data and the methodology. In section 3.5, we focus on financial 
analysts. We analyze their portfolio characteristics, how they tend to specialize and whether 
there is an informational advantage linked to specialization. Section 3.6 is devoted to 
explanations of the comparative advantage that country specialists seem to have over sector 
specialists. We conclude in section 3.7.
3.2 The value of stock recommendations and its determinants
Stock recommendations constitute a final output of analyst research and reflect analysts’ 
overall opinion about the value of stocks relative to their market price. Elton, Gruber, and 
Gultekin (1986) highlight the unequivocal piece of information constituted by analyst 
recommendations. They write: “Stock recommendations clearly and unambiguously indicate 
whether financial analysts consider any given security as under- or over-valued”. In contrast, 
earnings forecasts represent an intermediate number that is further used as input when issuing 
stock recommendations. As Schipper (1991) emphasizes, analyst earnings forecasts are just 
one more ingredient when evaluating the investment potential of a stock. Thus, stock 
recommendations may incorporate further country- and sector-specific analysis and 
judgments beyond what is included in one-year-ahead earnings forecasts. For that, we focus 
on analysts’ stock recommendations.44
There is limited evidence on the value of analyst recommendations in Europe. In the U.S., 
however, various studies show that analysts’ recommendations convey valuable information 
to investors. Womack (1996), Francis and Soffer (1997), Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004), and 
Asquith et al. (2005) among others document a positive relationship between recommendation 
upgrades and downgrades and stock prices. Those studies show that significant price reactions 
occur both at the time recommendations are released and in the months after. Womack (1996) 
  
44 See also e.g. Asquith et al. (2005). They explore additional information pieces contained in financial analysts’ 
reports, such as target price revisions, and the strength of the quantitative and qualitative arguments.
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finds that the drift appears to last up to six months after recommendation downgrades, 
whereas it is shorter-lived when stocks are upgraded. All of these studies focus on 
recommendations issued on U.S. equities. A notable exception is Jegadeesh and Kim (2003) 
who extend the investigation to the G7 countries. They report that, although abnormal returns 
are highest in the U.S., recommendation changes significantly impact prices in all G7 
countries. They also find that prices continue to drift in the direction of the recommendation 
change over the following two to six months in all of the countries.
Despite the importance that both academics and practitioners attach to the information content 
of stock recommendations, there is limited evidence on what factors determine the value of 
those recommendations. Stickel (1995) is among the few authors who analyze the short- and 
long-term price performance of analysts’ recommendations and identifies some contributing 
factors. He shows that the stock price reaction is positively related to the strength of the 
recommendation, the size of the brokerage house issuing the recommendation and the analyst 
reputation. And it is negatively related to the size of the firm. Asquith et al. (2005) report a 
similar result and show that the price reaction around recommendations’ releases is negatively 
related to the number of analysts following the firm. Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) show that 
the stock price reaction is weaker when recommendations are released immediately after 
earnings announcement dates. They conclude that financial analysts add more value through 
gathering information than through the interpretation of this information. Boni and Womack 
(2004) are supportive of this evidence, as they show that price reactions to analyst 
recommendations generally increase with time from the last scheduled earnings 
announcement. Loh and Mian (2006) results are consistent with the notion that the value of 
analysts recommendations is founded in economic rationale and not on other ad hoc firm 
characteristics.45 The common theme of the above mentioned studies is that stock 
recommendations are valuable because analysts enjoy superior information with respect to the 
market as a result of their gathering or interpretation skills.
Other studies focus on the analysis of the information content of earnings forecasts. These 
studies reveal additional variables that can explain the differential information content of 
analysts’ output. Some of these variables are related to geographic factors. In the context of 
  
45 A confronting view is that offered by Jegadeesh et al. (2004), Cornell (2001), and Bradshaw (2004) who argue 
that the market reaction to analysts’ recommendations is related to heuristic firm characteristics rather than 
founded in economic analysis or stock picking ability.
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European markets, Orpurt (2003) shows that financial analysts located within the same 
country as the firms they follow issue on average more accurate earnings forecasts than 
analysts based abroad. Enlarging the investigation to a sample of 32 countries, Bae et al. 
(2005) confirm this finding. Malloy (2005) examines another geographical dimension; that of 
physical distance. Building on the work by Coval and Moskowitz (2001) on fund managers, 
Malloy (2005) computes the “fly of bird” distance between analysts and the firms they cover. 
He reports a strong out-performance of proximate over further away located analysts. Physical 
proximity, as well as being located within the same country as firms’ headquarters may 
therefore also play an important role in the value that analysts deliver to investors.
We further hypothesize that the composition of analysts’ portfolios and particularly analysts’ 
specialization may be important in determining the relative level of information contained in 
stock recommendations. In the next section, we discuss potential explanations that could 
support this hypothesis.
3.3 The organization of research departments: country versus sector specialization
The quality of analysts’ recommendations is influenced by the availability and quality of 
information and by the models or skills that are used to process this information. These are 
broadly the two sources of value in analysts’ recommendations. Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) 
show that the dominant source of analysts’ value lies in the quality of information used as 
input rather that the interpretation that is done of it.
To exploit economies of scale in gathering information, Kini et al. (2003) show that analysts 
tend to specialize and choose portfolios of firms that share certain commonalities. 
Commonalities across firms may stem from sector or country specific factors. If analysts 
think that firms’ earnings and value are largely driven by common factors within an economic 
sector of activity, they may choose to follow only companies within a sector. Similarly, 
country specialists will tend to follow only firms located in the same country and for which 
national forces may be the most significant factor driving future earnings.
The organization of research may also be shaped by other forces and constraints. Actually, 
despite Kini et al. (2003) predictions, when we look at analysts’ portfolios, we find that firms 
are often followed by both country and sector specialists. That is, there are sector specialists 
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following firms which have important country factor commonalities and vice versa. It is 
probable that analysts’ weigh forces and constraints beyond economies of scale in gathering 
and interpreting information when choosing their portfolios.
If some analysts have portfolios that are more focused in benefiting from the information 
environment than others, then it is plausible that the quality of their forecasts and the value 
they deliver to investors differ. Actually, we expect that recommendations issued by analysts 
whose portfolios benefit most from the existence of commonalities across firms are those that 
are more informative of the true value of the firm. For example, if the earnings of a given firm 
are largely driven by country economic forces, we would expect country specialists to benefit 
from economies of scale in using country-specific information and issue superior forecasts 
and recommendations. In Chapter 2, we showed that country specialists issue on average 
more accurate earnings forecasts. Yet, better accuracy needs not necessarily translate into 
more informative recommendations.46 In our example, sector specialists could be at a 
disadvantage in terms of economies of scale in gathering and using information; however, 
they could benefit from using a valuation model that captures well the economics of the sector 
they follow. Indeed, Demirakos et al. (2004) remark that analysts tailor their valuation 
methodology to the industry in which the firms operate. They also note that the focus depends 
on the industry.47 It is also possible that less accurate earnings forecasts translate into more 
informative stock recommendations because recommendations may include additional pieces 
of information in addition to the information attached to forecasts. For example, 
recommendations follow with a justification on the part of analysts for their view while 
forecasts do not. Also, focusing on recommendations allows us to evaluate whether and how 
investors recognize the informational advantage that analysts may have.
It is well documented that complexity affects analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy because 
there is information that is excluded or simplified due to processing limitations and time 
constraints. So it may well be that it also has implications for the value of stock 
recommendations; see Plumlee (2003), Haw et al. (1994), Lang and Lundhom (1996), Duru 
  
46 Loh and Mian (2006) document a positive association between the value of recommendations and the quality 
of forecasts for U.S. equities. Relying on their findings, they argue that stock picking ability is founded on
economic rationale and not on ad hoc firm-specific characteristics. See Jegadeesh et al. (2004). Cornell (2001) 
and Bradshaw (2004).
47 The analysis of strategic issues and R&D projects is the critical part of the valuation process in the 
pharmaceuticals industry, whereas the brand strength, and innovative skills and competence in technology are 
the center of attention respectively in the beverages and electronics industries.
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and Reeb (2002), Clement (1999), Clement et al. (2003). An important source of complexity 
for country specialists lies in the fact that they follow different sectors. Therefore there may 
be a limit to the sector-specific information that they can process. For sector analysts, 
complexity arises from following firms from different countries. They need to obtain country-
specific information for each country represented in their portfolio. Before using this 
information, they need to standardize it across firms. This standardization process may lead to 
a loss of information value that may be larger when country-specific factors are more 
important. If country-specific information appears to be more important to assess the 
investment potential of a firm than sector specific information then sector specialists may be 
at a disadvantage.
Several studies provide evidence that country factors are important. These studies stress that 
there still exists numerous divergences among national markets. Since the mid-nineties and 
the works by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995), there has been a lot of work devoted to 
the relative impact of industry and country factors on stock returns. Heston and Rouwenhorst 
(1994, 1995), Beckers et al. (1996), and Griffin and Karolyi (1998), among many others, 
conclude that country factors are more important determinants of stock returns than sector 
factors. More recently, Cavaglia et al. (2000) and Baca et al. (2000) reveal a growing 
influence of industry factors. Moreover, their results lead to the impression that sector factors 
may even have become more important than country factors at the end of the nineties. 
However, as is apparent in the work by Adjaouté and Danthine (2003), the relative influence 
of country and sector factors in stock returns appears to follow cycles. The Cavaglia et al. 
(2000) and Baca et al. (2000) studies would very likely have returned the same results if they 
had been carried out in the mid-seventies. Our reading of this literature is that country-specific 
factors still exist and may even have strong impacts on firms’ earnings and stock prices. Thus, 
these studies suggest that country commonalities across firms are important; therefore, 
country specialists could draw an advantage with respect to sector specialists.
Despite of the overwhelming evidence that country-specific factors may still play an 
important role, professional circles currently seem to favor a global sector based approach. 
Focusing on international fund managers, Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003) report the results 
from a survey conducted on behalf of Merrill Lynch which shows that in year 2000, 75% of 
surveyed fund managers answered that sector diversification was their primary objective. And 
only 10% gave priority to the international diversification approach. If investor needs are 
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important in shaping analysts’ portfolios then their preferences may tend to influence the 
structure of financial research. 
3.4 Data and Experiment Design
3.4.1 Data
The construction of our sample starts with all recommendations on European firms issued 
during the period 1994-2003, regardless of the location of the analysts who issue the 
recommendation. We focus on the 15 major European markets. Namely, these are Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.. As we already discussed, our choice to restrict the 
analysis to European markets stems from the fact that the organization of financial research 
departments along country or sector lines is mainly a European phenomenon. Therefore, our 
focus on these markets provides us with a large cross-section of country- and sector-
specialized analysts.48
Financial analysts’ stock recommendations are extracted from the I/B/E/S International and 
U.S. Recommendation History databases. The I/B/E/S Identification File is also used to obtain 
the country of origin of each firm, as well as the industry sector where each firm operates. 
Eleven sectors are defined: Finance, Health Care, Consumer Non-Durables, Consumer 
Services, Consumer Durables, Energy, Transportation, Technology, Basic Industries, Capital 
Goods, and Public Utilities. We exclude from the sample firms for which I/B/E/S does not 
provide us with a country, an industry or the name of the analyst that issues the 
recommendation.
Market data such as stock prices, dividends, risk-free interest rates, and firms’ market 
capitalization is taken from the Thomson Financial Datastream database. From this database, 
we also obtain the market index SP350 Europe (Euro currency) that we use as a benchmark. 
The availability of market data for each firm imposes additional restrictions in our final 
sample which includes only firms with available price and recommendations data in both 
I/B/E/S and Datastream databases.
  
48 In general, analysts following Japanese firms are country specialists, whereas research on U.S. firms tends to 
be structured according to sectors.
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Other sources are used to obtain further relevant data and control variables that we introduce 
in following sections. The Worldscope database provides us with data relative to the 
geographical location of firms’ headquarters. Financial analysts’ addresses are found in 
different editions – from 1994 to 2003 – of the Nelson Information’s Directory of Investment 
Research. Latitude and longitude data needed to compute the distance between analysts and 
the firms they follow are extracted manually from the website www.heavens-above.com. 
Finally, we obtain the country-specific variables relative to accounting standards and 
shareholder protection used by La Porta et al. (1998) from the Center for International 
Financial Analysis and Research.
3.4.2 Analysts’ Specialization
As a next step, we classify all analysts according to their specialization. To this end, we 
compute the Herfindahl Index (HI), a concentration ratio which is generally used as an 
indicator of the amount of competition among firms in an industry. This ratio allows us to 
classify as sector (country) specialists those analysts that concentrate in following firms 
within the same sector or industry (country). It is possible that sector (country) specialists 
issue also recommendations for firms that belong to other sectors (countries) but this activity 
is marginal. The advantage of using this measure to classify analysts according to their 
specialization is that it is based on concentration. For example, it allows us to classify as 
sector specialist an analyst who follows 10 firms in the same sector and 1 firm in a different 
sector. An alternative classification could consist in defining sector (country) specialists only 
those analysts following firms in a single sector (country). But this measure would be much 
more restrictive and would not consider the analyst in our example to be a sector specialist.
For each analyst, we compute both a sector and a country HI as follows 
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where •c = Nc,a,y / Na,y and •s = Ns,a,y / Na,y . Nc,a,y (Ns,a,y) is the number of firms in country c 
(sector s) for which analyst a issued forecasts over fiscal year y. Na,y is the total number of 
firms followed by analyst a over fiscal year y.
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A country HI takes a value of 1 (i.e., its maximum value) when the analyst follows firms that 
are all headquartered within one single country. Similarly, a sector HI takes value of 1 when 
the analyst follows firms that are active in one single sector. Analysts who follow also few 
firms in other countries (sectors), but who devote most of their attention to firms within a 
single country (sector) will have a country (sector) HI close to one. HI values go towards zero 
as analysts’ portfolio diversification increases.
Each analyst is classified as country specialist if her country HI is larger than 0.90 and her 
sector HI is smaller than 0.90. Each analyst is classified as sector specialist if her sector HI is 
larger than 0.90 and her country HI is smaller than 0.90.49 For the purpose of our analysis we 
only take analysts that are either country or sector specialists. We drop analysts that follow 
many countries and many sectors and analysts that mainly follow only one sector in one 
country.
3.4.3 Event Study
To evaluate the information content of analysts’ recommendations, we compute abnormal 
returns around the day that an analyst issues a recommendation. For that, we follow standard 
event study methodology as in Brown and Warner (1985). The event day is the day the 
recommendation is issued as reported by I/B/E/S. Following existing literature, we define the 
estimation period to be the interval [-200,-11] with respect to the announcement date. 
Abnormal returns are the prediction errors from the one-factor WLS market model calculated
over the estimation period, where the explanatory factor is the market index SP350 Europe. 
Both stock returns and the market index are log-differences computed in euros.
Our sample includes some small firms that are thinly traded. Infrequent trading can be 
problematic as it can induce autocorrelation in stock returns. To appropriately account for that 
possibility, we follow Maynes and Rumsey (1993) ‘trade-to-trade’ approach. They show that 
the use of ‘trade-to-trade’ returns leads to correct estimations for all levels of trading 
frequency.
  
49 The choice of 0.90 as a threshold is somewhat arbitrary. Though, a closer look at the data suggests that it 
accurately depicts analysts’ specialization. Results remain unchanged with thresholds of 0.80, 0.85, and 1.
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The trade-to-trade approach uses multiperiod returns computed as
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where nt is defined as the length of the non-trading interval ending at date t. , ti nP is the last 
quoted price before the non-trading interval, in Euro currency. The abnormal return is 
computed as the difference between the actual return and the expected return over the event 
window as follows:
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where , tm nR is the market index return over the nontrading period that matches the stock 
return. , ti na and b are the WLS coefficients calculated over the estimation window. The 
errors from the ‘trade-to-trade’ adjusted one-factor model are heteroskedastic with variance 
2
t ins . In order to correct for heteroskedasticity, the data is divided by the square root of nt
(weights).
Once we have obtained abnormal returns we cumulate them over the following intervals [–
1,+1], [+2,+20], [+21,+60] and [+61,+120] and we obtain CABNRET, CABNRET20, 
CABNRET60 and CABNRET120 correspondingly. CABNRET will allow us to evaluate the 
market reaction at the time stock recommendations are issued. The other measures will 
provide us with some insight on whether there is a price drift that follows recommendation 
issuances.
3.4.4 Cross-sectional regression tests
This section introduces the approach that we follow to examine the relation between the price 
reaction, recommendations and the structure of analysts’ portfolios. We consider that the price 
reaction is related to the direction and the magnitude of the recommendation change. For that, 
we define two variables. RECCHG is a dummy variable indicative of whether the newly 
issued recommendation is an upgrade or a downgrade relative to the last recommendation 
previously released by the same analyst on the same firm. In some instances, analysts 
discontinue their coverage of a firm for quite long periods of time. Given that, a 
recommendation is included in the final sample only if there is a previous recommendation 
issued by the same analyst on the same firm that is no more than 360 days old. While brokers 
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usually rely on home-made classifications for stock recommendations, I/B/E/S translates 
recommendations in a unique five-scale grouping. The values 1 to 5 are respectively assigned 
to Strong Buys, Buys, Hold, Sell, and Strong Sell recommendations. The difference between 
the new and old recommendations can therefore take discrete values that range from –4 to +4.
Our second variable, MAGNIT, is aimed at capturing the influence of the magnitude of the 
recommendation change. It is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the absolute value of 
this difference is greater or equal to 3. Our baseline regression model is as follows:
(1) [ ]0 1 1 2;t tCABNRET RECCHG MAGNIT Controlsb b g e= × + × + × +
If recommendation changes convey information that impact stock prices, we expect either or 
both 1b and 2b to be significantly different from zero. As both coefficients are dummies, they 
are expected to be positive in the case of recommendation upgrades, and negative in the case 
of recommendation downgrades. Also, as we estimate our model separately for upgrades and 
downgrades, it turns out that RECCHG is the constant term in the regression model.
In order to test whether country-specialized financial analysts issue more informative stock 
recommendations, we expand our baseline regression model and estimate the following cross-
sectional equation:
(2) [ ]0 1 1 1;
2 2
t tCABNRET RECCHG RECCHG COUNTRYSP
MAGNIT MAGNIT COUNTRYSP Controls
b d
b d g e
= × + × ×
+ × + × × + × +
where COUNTRYSP equals 1 if the analyst is a country specialist and 0 otherwise. This
specification allows us to test whether there is any difference in the information that country 
and sector specialists convey to the market. If there is no additional information brought by 
country specialists, neither 1d nor 2d should statistically differ from zero. Our null hypothesis 
is therefore stated as 0 1 2:  0H d d= = . However, if country specialists benefit from an 
informational advantage, these coefficients are expected to be significantly positive for 
upgrades and negative for downgrades. Formally, this would imply the following alternative 
hypothesis: 1 2:  0, 0aH d d> > .
Empirical studies on stock recommendations motivate the use of several control variables. 
Thus we define the following characteristics: broker size, number of analysts covering the 
firm, days relative to the earnings announcement date, and firm market capitalization. As 
country specialists follow far smaller firms than their sector-specialized peers, we also 
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consider the Amihud illiquidity measure as an additional control. The first three are 
constructed from the information made available by I/B/E/S. Firms’ market capitalization and 
the Amihud illiquidity measures are computed with data taken from TF Datastream.
Stickel (1995) argues that large brokerage houses have the resources to disseminate more 
efficiently stock recommendations to investors. Also, in large brokerage houses, analysts have 
more resources to gather and process information. It is therefore likely that their outputs may 
be of higher quality and as a consequence have a stronger impact on stock prices. Stickel 
(1995) indeed shows that the stock price reaction to recommendation releases is larger when 
recommendations are issued by analysts working for large brokerage houses. The number of 
analysts employed by brokerage houses over a given year is used as a surrogate for marketing 
ability. We follow Stickel (1995) in that we consider two dummy variables: SMALLBRK is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the broker is in the lowest size deciles and 0 
otherwise. LARGEBRK is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the broker is in the highest size deciles 
and 0 otherwise.
Large firms are in general more actively followed by financial market participants. Therefore, 
the marginal information brought to the market by recommendations issued on large firms is 
likely to be of lesser investment value compared to the recommendations issued on less 
frequently investigated firms. Stickel (1995) motivates the use of the firms’ market 
capitalization as a proxy for their information environment. Another measure that is 
commonly used as a surrogate for a firm’s information environment is the number of analysts 
following the firm. In fact, as is noted by Asquith et al. (2005), both variables proxy for the 
firm specific information environment that less actively followed firms may have compared to 
more widely followed firms. We consider both of them. For each recommendation, NUMANA
is the number of analysts who issued at least one recommendation on the firm over the 360 
days preceding the recommendation release. We follow Stickel (1995) in our definition of the 
firm size variable and compute two dummies. SMALLCAP takes the value 1 if the firm is in 
the lowest capitalization deciles and 0 otherwise. LARGECAP is equal to 1 if the firm is in the 
largest capitalization deciles and 0 otherwise.
Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) show how the price reaction depends on whether the 
recommendation precedes or follows the earnings announcement date and also on how close 
the recommendation is issued with respect to the earnings announcement date; see also Boni 
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and Womack (2004). We include a set of three dummy variables to account for the 
differential information content of recommendations issued before and after earnings 
announcements. First, PAGE (i.e. “Precedes” an earnings announcement) equals 1 if the 
recommendation is issued within the 10 days preceding an earnings announcement date and 
zero otherwise. FAGE (i.e. “Follows” an earnings announcement) equals 1 if the 
recommendation was issued within the 10 days following an earnings announcement date. 
Finally, the variable CAGE (i.e. “Contemporaneous” to an earnings announcement) is set 
equal to 1 if the recommendation was released on the same day as the earnings 
announcement. The use of these three control variables has a double objective. They are 
aimed at controlling for the varying level of information content of recommendations reported 
by Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) and Boni and Womack (2004). They also have the objective 
of avoiding the possibly confounding effect of earnings announcements and recommendation 
releases that occur within the same couple of days.
Country specialists tend to follow smaller firms. While our sample is biased towards large 
capitalization stocks due to data availability requirements, low trading activities among small 
firms may impact our results. Therefore we include an additional variable to control for this 
potential drawback. This variable, ILLIQ, is the Amihud illiquidity measure. It is an average 
of the ratio of the absolute value of daily stock return to daily trading volume. For each stock i
in year y, it is formally given by:
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where iyD is the number of trading days for which data is available for stock i in year y, iydR
is the stock i’s return on day d of year y, and iydVOLD is the day d volume in dollars of stock 
i. We refer the reader to Amihud (2002, p. 34) for a detailed description of the measure.
3.5 Descriptive Statistics and Basic Results
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 reports key sample statistics. The first column refers to the whole sample. The 
second and third columns refer to country and sector specialists correspondingly. This allows 
us to compare the main characteristics of the portfolios of these two types of analysts. This 
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table shows that the average number of firms followed by each type of analysts is very similar 
across specializations. On average, both country and sector specialists follow approximately 8 
firms. To the same extent, the average number of yearly recommendations is equivalent for 
both types of analysts. Country and sector specialists issue respectively an average of 17.1 
and 18.2 recommendations per year. However, the focus seems to be different across 
specializations. Sector specialists focus on more actively followed firms. The average number 
of analysts following firms analyzed by sector specialists is 27.2, which is indeed superior to 
the average of 16 for country specialists.
The fifth row of the table indicates that country specialists follow on average 1.04 countries. 
In fact, a country specialist may follow up to four countries. This gives support to our 
definition of specialization. That is, the use of Herfindahl Indices allows us to consider as 
country specialists analysts who spend most of their time analyzing firms headquartered in 
one single country, but who may also follow a small number of foreign firms. The same 
remark holds true for sector specialists who follow an average of 1.09 sectors. In fact, there 
are sector specialists following up to 6 industries over a given year but who concentrate their 
efforts in firms within a single sector.
The average number of sectors followed by country specialists is 3, which is equivalent to the 
average number of countries followed by sector specialists. This is surprisingly low. Even 
though sector and country specialists may follow up to 25 countries and 11 sectors 
respectively, these figures may indicate that brokerage houses try, in many instances, to 
specialize with respect to both the country and the sector dimension.
A noticeable difference between the portfolios of country and sector specialists is the size 
characteristics of the covered firms. Country specialists follow on average far smaller firms 
than their sector counterparts. Figure 3.1 provides additional evidence on the size distribution 
of firms followed by each type of analysts. It confirms that country specialists focus on 
smaller firms. The distribution for sector specialists is clearly shifted to the right, which 
indicates that larger firms are more actively followed by this type of analysts.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents average values of various characteristics of analysts’ portfolios and research activities, 
depending on specialization. We include all analysts following European firms regardless of their location. That 
is, analysts may be located anywhere in the world, while firms are headquartered within Europe. However, to 
reach a clear picture of analyst portfolios’ characteristics, a worldwide sample of firms is considered in some 
instances. The reason is that sector specialists do not (always) restrict to European firms and the comparison with 
country specialists would be worthless if one considered European firms only. “Av. number of firms”, “Av. 
number of recommendations”, “Av. number of countries”, and “Av. number of sectors” respectively indicate the 
average number of firms each specialization type of analysts follows, the average number of recommendations 
issued by analysts, and the average number of countries and sectors followed by analysts. All of these variables 
are computed on a yearly basis from a worldwide sample of firms. The rest of the table refers to a sample 
restricted to European firms. “Av. number of analysts per firm” is an indication of the average number of 
analysts who follow a given firm on a yearly basis. “Av. firm size” is the average market capitalization of firms 
in analysts’ portfolios. “Av. market size” is the average size of the national markets followed by analysts. ACTG
is a measure of the quality of accounting standards. ANTIDIR can take values ranging between 0 and 5 and is a 
measure of the strength of laws and regulations in each country, which aim is to protect minority shareholders. 
“Av. distance” is the average number of kilometers between analysts and the firms they follow. “Local” stands 
for analysts located within the same country as the firms they follow. By contrast, “foreign” analysts are based 
abroad. “Large brokers” are those in the top broker size-decile. “Small and medium brokers” constitute the 
remaining. The percentage of analysts in large and small/medium brokerage houses indicates for which type of 
brokers financial analysts work (i.e. large or small/medium). On the contrary, “brokerage structure”, which is
reported in the last two rows of the table, indicates which type of analysts large and small/medium brokerage 
houses tend to employ.
Stat All Analysts Country Specialists
Sector 
Specialists
Av. number of firms 8.1 8.4 7.9
Av. number of recommendations 17.0 17.1 18.2
Av. number of countries 1.60 1.04 3.33
Av. number of sectors 2.69 3.22 1.09
Av. number of analysts per firm 18.7 16.0 27.2
Av. firm size  (millions EUR) 7818.9 4911.0 17152.0
Av. market size (billions EUR) 867 869 864
Av. ACTG 69.3 69.2 69.3
Av. ANTIDIR 3.0 3.0 2.9
Av. distance (kilometers) 307 176 595
Perc. of local analysts 65.4% 87.8% 41.3%
Perc. of foreign analysts 34.6% 12.2% 58.7%
Perc. of analysts in large brokerage 60.0% 51.3% 81.1%
Perc. of analysts in small/medium brokerage 40.0% 48.7% 18.9%
Large brokers' structure 100.0% 58.4% 41.6%
Small/medium brokers' structure 100.0% 85.1% 14.9%
Geographical location is also among the key determinants that differentiate country and sector 
specialists. Country specialists are on average located closer to the firms they follow. The 
average distance of 176 kilometers is mainly due to the fact that country specialists are mostly 
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based within their country of expertise. Indeed, 87.8% of them are located within the same 
country as the firms they follow. Perhaps more interestingly, the percentage of local sector 
specialists reveals that 41.3% of the recommendations issued by sector specialists relate to 
local firms. Although they follow more than three countries on average, sector specialists 
seem to tilt their activities towards domestically headquartered firms.
The type of brokerage houses country and sector specialists work for also delivers interesting 
insights. Whereas country specialists are almost equally spread across large and 
small/medium brokerage houses (51.3% of them are working for large brokerage houses), 
81.1% of sector specialists belong to large brokerage houses. An interesting statistic is 
provided by the two last rows of the table. These lines show how brokers organize research in 
general. It indicates that small- and medium-sized brokerage houses are mainly country-
focused. On average, 85.1% of the analysts employed by these institutions are country 
specialists. In large brokerage houses, the country dimension is less pronounced with 
approximately only half of the analysts being country specialists.
Table 3.2 Panel A presents the main statistics of interest on a country-by-country basis. Panel 
B presents the same statistics by sectors. Surprisingly, Panel A shows that the percentage of 
recommendations issued by country relative to sector specialists is similar across countries. 
On average, between 69.3% and 83.3% of the recommendations are issued by country 
specialists. The only exception is Ireland, where the total number of recommendations spreads 
out equally between country and sector specialists. We are therefore unable to confirm the 
Kini et al. (2003) prediction according to which financial analysts are more likely to 
specialize by country in countries were national commonalities are largest. These percentages 
are more widely dispersed in the sector-by-sector analysis of panel B. The percentages of 
country relative to sector specialists range from 68.8% in the Health Care sector to 96.5% in 
the Technology sector. An exception is the Financial sector, which is mostly followed by 
sector specialists. The very high proportion of country specialists in the Technology sector is 
surprising. A potential explanation may rely in the fact that firms in the technology sector are 
mostly small capitalization stocks. As small firms tend to be more actively followed by 
country specialist, this may indeed explain why country specialists so sturdily dominate in the 
technology sector.
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Table 3.2 also gives strong support to the firm size characteristic already reported at the 
global level. Indeed, the small firm bias of country relative to sector specialists is not peculiar 
to a specific country or sector. Country specialists follow smaller firms than sector specialists 
in every single country and sector. On average, firms followed by country specialists are three 
times smaller than firms followed by sector specialists.
Figure 3.1: Market cap distribution of firms followed by country and sector specialists
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The country-by-country average distance for sector specialists ranges from 334 to a high 1349 
kilometers. The average distance between sector specialists and the firms they follow is 
highest for Austria, Finland, and Portugal. Also, the percentage of local sector specialists is 
relatively low in these countries, as it is below 3.1%. To the contrary, the average distance for 
sector specialists in large markets such as France, Germany, and the U.K. is respectively 385, 
668, and 353 kilometers. The percentage of local sector specialists is also far more important 
than in small markets. Altogether, this may reveal the fact that large brokerage houses are 
reluctant to implement business branches in small markets.
In table 3.3, we report the distribution of recommendations. We first remark that the 
conclusions are not much different than what is reported in studies on the U.S. market. In 
European countries as in the U.S. market, analysts are reluctant to issue strong sell 
recommendations. This type of recommendations yet occurs slightly more often in Europe 
than in the U.S. as they represent 6.3% of the total number of recommendations issued over 
the sample period.
Our aim in constructing this table was to check whether there were significant differences in 
the behavior of both types of country and sector specialists. It could be that potential conflicts 
of interest may affect country and sector specialists differently, or that one group is more 
optimistic than the other. If country analysts have a better access to private information, they 
may be tempted to issue positively biased forecasts in order to preserve their privileged 
relationships with firms’ management. On the other hand, sector specialists could be those 
who are the most affected by conflicts of interest, as this type of analysts generally work for 
larger banks and brokerage houses, which are more likely to be active in the investment 
banking industry.
Table 3.3 indicates that there does not seem to be a difference in the behavior of the two 
groups of analysts. In fact, country specialists tend to issue more extreme recommendations 
than sector specialists. They issue on average a higher percentage of strong buy, as well as a 
higher percentage of strong sell recommendations. As is shown by the F-statistics for the 
difference in means, both differences are statistically significant, even though they do not 
appear to be economically large. Sector specialists, on the other hand, seem to rely more 
heavily on hold recommendations than their country specialist peers.
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Table 3.2: Country-by-country and sector-by-sector descriptive statistics
This table reports statistics of interest on a country-by-country (panel A) and a sector-by-sector (panel B) basis. In both panels, the second column reports the total number of analysts having issued 
recommendations on firms headquartered in the corresponding country (panel A) or sector (panel B) over the period the period 1994 – 2003. Columns 3 to 6 give the total number and percentage of 
recommendations issued by country and sector specialists over the whole sample period in the corresponding country or sector. Columns 7 and 8 report the average size of firms in respectively
country and sector specialists’ portfolios. Columns 9 and 10 indicate the average distance (in kilometers) that separates respectively country and sector specialists and the firms they follow. The last 
two columns report the percentage of local analysts (i.e. based within the same country as firms) having issued recommendations on firms in the corresponding country (panel A) or sector (panel B).
Panel A
Ctry 
Spec. (%)
Sect. 
Spec. (%)
Ctry 
Spec.
Sect. 
Spec.
Ctry 
Spec.
Sect. 
Spec.
Ctry 
Spec.
Sect. 
Spec.
Austria 189 1423 71.0 582 29.0 759.8 1649.8 507 1349 55.6 0.0
Belgium 516 5399 78.1 1510 21.9 2222.1 9594.8 43 357 84.5 2.3
Denmark 401 4130 73.2 1515 26.8 9279.8 32966.9 190 629 67.9 11.3
Finland 413 6278 82.4 1337 17.6 2820.3 7501.1 138 1212 88.8 1.8
France 1816 38980 83.3 7817 16.7 3627.4 14069.1 169 385 90.6 22.2
Germany 1510 21929 76.1 6893 23.9 4829.8 14516.0 283 668 82.1 15.6
Ireland 205 598 48.7 629 51.3 1791.5 6462.1 165 531 52.2 4.1
Italy 748 8874 73.5 3198 26.5 2907.0 8413.2 225 982 84.9 2.6
Netherlands 1097 18923 82.2 4095 17.8 5560.1 17168.4 98 334 81.1 10.6
Norway 439 4918 77.6 1419 22.4 10641.7 26369.0 182 895 91.0 10.1
Portugal 259 2690 75.4 880 24.6 1234.0 5265.1 1014 1338 72.1 3.1
Spain 710 9139 72.6 3441 27.4 2967.1 11083.8 250 1101 84.5 9.7
Sweden 785 7273 69.3 3222 30.7 23873.2 48257.4 173 974 89.7 19.1
Switzerland 804 8013 69.7 3482 30.3 10336.2 41192.2 154 760 88.0 2.9
U.K. 2017 51390 79.8 13046 20.2 2425.5 11445.1 126 353 97.8 82.0
All countries 6587 189957 78.2 53066 21.8 4911.0 17152.0 176 595 87.8 41.3
Perc. of local 
analysts (in %)Total nb 
of Anal.Country
Av. distance (in 
kilometers)
Av. firm size (in 
mio EUR)Total nb of recommendations
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Panel B
Ctry 
Spec. (%)
Sect. 
Spec. (%)
Ctry 
Spec.
Sect. 
Spec.
Ctry 
Spec.
Sect. 
Spec.
Ctry 
Spec.
Sect. 
Spec.
Finance 1892 15987 41.5 22540 58.5 7565.1 18205.4 153 586 89.0 41.3
Health Care 1179 8239 68.8 3732 31.2 8411.9 28476.7 199 562 87.0 40.4
Cons. Non-Dur. 1863 21144 84.4 3919 15.6 3346.0 11843.8 185 338 86.4 46.3
Cons. Services 3108 40121 85.8 6667 14.2 3479.6 7838.9 162 416 91.0 48.5
Cons. Durables 1014 7078 94.1 444 5.9 10328.1 21250.6 232 874 88.9 25.9
Energy 777 5154 72.8 1930 27.2 22322.0 54528.3 128 572 89.3 41.9
Transportation 771 5489 85.5 930 14.5 2345.3 2901.0 180 575 94.7 44.9
Technology 1539 15165 96.5 544 3.5 978.8 1118.4 170 917 91.6 39.0
Basic Industries 2311 19013 75.3 6247 24.7 3279.9 7509.3 168 871 89.4 39.8
Capital Goods 3032 44456 92.9 3397 7.1 3865.2 17580.7 178 597 89.2 39.6
Public Utilities 1285 8111 74.9 2716 25.1 13846.7 33823.5 237 993 90.0 26.5
All sectors 6587 189957 78.2 53066 21.8 4911.0 17152.0 176 595 87.8 41.3
Av. distance (in 
kilometers)
Perc. of local 
analysts (in %)
Sector Total nb of Anal.
Total nb of recommendations Av. firm size (in mio EUR)
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Table 3.3: Recommendations’ distribution
This table reports the distribution of stock recommendations for each type of analysts’ specialization. It indicates 
the percentages of Strong Buys, Buys, Hold, Sell, and Strong Sell recommendations issued by all analysts 
(irrespective of specialization), country, and sector specialists. The last but one column reports the difference 
between the percentage of each recommendation type issued by country and sector specialists. The p-value for 
the statistical significance of this difference appears in the last column.
Recommendation 
(%) All Analysts
Country 
Spec.
Sector 
Spec.
Diff. C.-
S. Spec. p-value
Strong Buy 18.9 20.1 15.1 5.0 0.0000
Buy 26.4 25.9 27.9 -2.0 0.0000
Hold 37.2 36.4 39.9 -3.5 0.0000
Sell 11.3 11.1 11.7 -0.6 0.0683
Strong Sell 6.3 6.5 5.4 1.1 0.0000
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 -
3.5.2 Does the information content of recommendations depend on specialization?
Before going through the investigation of whether the information content of recommendation 
depends on analysts being country or sector specialists, it is crucial to confirm that stock 
recommendations on European firms do contain valuable information. This has been shown to 
be the case within the U.S. market, but we have limited knowledge about the value of stock 
recommendations in Europe. To this end, we first estimate regression equation (1).
Results are presented in Table 3.4. Panel A refers to upgrades, while panel B reports results 
for downgrades. This table reveals the important need to control for broker size, firm size, the 
firms’ information environment, and whether earnings announcements have been made 
around the recommendation release. As reported in the context of the U.S. market, the initial 
stock price reaction and the subsequent drift are positively related to recommendation 
upgrades and negatively to downgrades. The patterns are quite different, though, if one refers 
to upgrades or downgrades. For the former, there is an initial stock price reaction of 0.26% 
due to the direction of the recommendation change but no drift is apparent. To the contrary, 
the magnitude of the recommendation change does not appear to have any initial impact, but 
shows a highly significant positive abnormal return from the third to sixth month after the 
recommendation is issued. For recommendation downgrades, the direction seems to convey a 
122
lot of information, which is only slowly incorporated into prices. Surprisingly, there is no 
significant reaction at the time of the recommendation release, but the cumulative abnormal 
returns in the periods [2;20], [21;60], and [61;120] are respectively –1.47%, –2.08%, and  
–1.23%. Consistent with large brokerage houses having more marketing resources, the initial 
stock price reaction is relatively stronger when the recommendation is released by an analyst 
working for such an institution. This confirms Stickel (1995)’s results in the context of the 
U.S. market. However, there is a noticeable mean reverting effect in the long run in the case 
of recommendation upgrades. Controlling for firm size and, to a lesser extent the number of 
analysts, is extremely important. For these two variables, the drift is strong and highly 
statistically significant. This supports the notion that the firms’ information environment may 
play a role in the strength of market participants’ reaction to newly issued recommendations. 
Also, there is statistically more information in recommendations that just precede earnings 
announcement dates. As is apparent in panel A, the market does not seem to trade on this 
information. The initial price reaction is nil, but there is a significant drift over the three 
months subsequent to the recommendation release. Among the variables aimed at capturing 
differences due to contemporaneous earnings announcements, CAGE appears to be the most 
significant one. Indeed, recommendations issued on the same day as earnings announcement 
look as if they conveyed significantly more information than recommendations issued at other 
times. Most probably, this result reinforces the idea that one has to control for 
contemporaneous earnings announcements in order to avoid the confounding effects of these
two simultaneous pieces of information brought to the market.
Overall, Table 3.4 confirms that recommendations on European firms, as in the U.S. market, 
do convey valuable information. Also, most of the characteristics considered, which have 
been shown to significantly impact the information content of recommendations within the 
U.S. market, turn out to be significant in the European context as well. In all the regression 
models that we estimate in the rest of the paper, we include all of these variables as controls.
We previously discussed that analysts’ portfolios were shaped by the information 
environment and the existence of common forces driving firm’s earnings. We also argued that 
there were other forces at work affecting how analysts define their portfolios. If this is the 
case, the composition of analysts’ portfolios and particularly analysts’ specialization may be 
important in determining the relative level of information contained in stock 
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Table 3.4: Stock Price Reaction
This table reports the results relative to the estimation of the following model, with and without control variables:
[ ]0 1 1 2;t tCABNRET RECCHG MAGNIT Controlsb b g e= × + × + × +
The first 4 columns report results relative to the estimation of the model without control variables. The subsequent 4 columns relate to estimations including the whole set of control variables. 
All coefficients are expressed as percentages. [ ]0 1;t tCABNRET is the cumulative abnormal return computed over different time windows, with values of 0t and 1t expressed in days. The model 
is successively estimated for [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]1; 1 1; 20 21; 60 61; 120, , , and CABNRET CABNRET CABNRET CABNRET- + + + + + + + . It is also estimated separately for recommendation upgrades and downgrades.
RECCHG is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the recommendation is an upgrade or a downgrade relative to the previously issued recommendation by the same analyst on the same 
firm. Since the model is estimated separately for upgrades and downgrades, this variable acts as a constant term. MAGNIT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the absolute value of the 
difference between the recommendation grade and the grade of the previously issued recommendation by the same analyst on the same firm is greater or equal to 3. The set of control
variables includes: SMALLBRK and LARGEBRK. SMALLBRK is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the brokerage house the analyst works for is in the lowest size deciles and 0 
otherwise. LARGEBRK is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the brokerage house is in the largest size deciles and 0 otherwise. SMALLCAP and LARGECAP are similarly defined for evaluated 
firms. SMALLCAP takes the value 1 if the firm is in the lowest capitalization deciles and 0 otherwise. LARGECAP is equal to 1 if the firm is in the largest capitalization deciles and 0 
otherwise. NUMANA is the number of analysts having issued recommendations on the recommended firm over the last 360 days. PAGE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
recommendation ‘P’recedes an earnings announcement’s date by less than 10 days and 0 otherwise. FAGE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the recommendation ‘F’ollows an 
earnings announcement’s date by less than 10 days and 0 otherwise. CAGE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the recommendation is issued contemporaneous (i.e. on the same 
day), to an earnings announcement. ILLIQ is the Amihud illiquidity measure. It is computed as in Amihud (2002, p. 34). We also report in the bottom of the table the p-value for the statistical 
test of the joint hypothesis: 1 2 0b b= = . t-statistics are reported into parenthesis below their corresponding coefficient. For readability, we also mention statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels with respectively ***, **, and *.
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Panel A: UPGRADES
Dep. Variable
RECCHG 0.43 *** 0.32 *** 0.42 *** -0.05 0.26 *** 0.36 0.37 -0.16
(13.31) (4.2) (3.63) (-0.32) (2.4) (1.4) (0.87) (-0.28)
MAGNIT 0.06 0.07 0.49 2.15 *** 0.13 0.14 0.34 2.48 ***
(0.37) (0.22) (0.95) (3.13) (0.78) (0.4) (0.63) (3.37)
SMALLBRK -0.12 0.07 -0.02 -0.58
(-1.1) (0.28) (-0.05) (-1.08)
LARGEBRK 0.26 *** 0.33 ** 0.15 -1.07 ***
(3.68) (2.04) (0.6) (-3.21)
SMALLCAP -0.12 0.55 3.87 *** 6.57 ***
(-0.53) (1.05) (4.54) (6.01)
LARGECAP -0.12 -0.63 *** -1.79 *** -2.33 ***
(-1.44) (-3.43) (-6.17) (-6.16)
Ln(NUMANA) 0.05 0.01 0.33 * 0.81 ***
(0.92) (0.07) (1.75) (3.41)
PAGE -0.09 1.62 *** 1.24 * -1.55
(-0.42) (3.5) (1.65) (-1.6)
FAGE 0.64 *** 0.27 0.06 -0.94
(3.87) (0.72) (0.1) (-1.32)
CAGE 1.33 *** 1.97 ** 2.19 * -1.99
(2.52) (2.27) (1.87) (-1.28)
ILLIQ 0.08 * -0.07 -0.12 -0.35 *
(1.77) (-0.66) (-0.72) (-1.68)
p-value (b 1=0, b 2=0) 0.0369 0.3386 0.5449 0.0034
Adj-R2 -0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 0.06% 0.33% 0.23% 0.67% 0.98%
Nb Obs. 15068 15061 14876 14453 14076 14069 13884 13461
CABNRET CABNRET20 CABNRET60 CABNRET120CABNRET CABNRET20 CABNRET60 CABNRET120
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Panel B: DOWNGRADES
Dep. Variable
RECCHG -0.34 *** -0.37 *** -0.26 ** -0.10 -0.11 -1.47 *** -2.08 *** -1.23 *
(-10.62) (-4.67) (-2.12) (-0.64) (-0.99) (-4.85) (-4.13) (-1.79)
MAGNIT -0.07 -0.19 -0.44 -0.21 -0.05 -0.30 -0.60 -0.50
(-0.39) (-0.47) (-0.65) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.71) (-0.84) (-0.59)
SMALLBRK 0.10 0.28 0.18 -0.10
(0.96) (0.98) (0.44) (-0.18)
LARGEBRK -0.18 *** -0.16 -0.13 -0.63 *
(-2.5) (-0.94) (-0.48) (-1.8)
SMALLCAP -0.03 2.23 *** 4.87 *** 8.95 ***
(-0.14) (4.05) (5.57) (7.99)
LARGECAP 0.13 * -0.44 ** -1.21 *** -2.08 ***
(1.68) (-2.19) (-3.7) (-4.76)
Ln(NUMANA) -0.10 ** 0.59 *** 1.03 *** 1.09 ***
(-2.09) (4.44) (4.6) (3.59)
PAGE 0.09 0.38 1.38 * -1.25
(0.38) (0.72) (1.87) (-1.25)
FAGE -0.20 0.93 *** 1.01 -0.14
(-1.05) (2.36) (1.54) (-0.16)
CAGE 0.15 -0.74 1.83 -5.34 ***
(0.27) (-0.7) (1.51) (-2.74)
ILLIQ -0.03 -0.16 -0.17 -0.73 ***
(-0.61) (-1.57) (-1.05) (-3.62)
p-value (b 1=0, b 2=0) 0.5779 0.0000 0.0001 0.1486
Adj-R2 -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.05% 0.35% 0.60% 1.17%
Nb Obs. 15610 15604 15486 15086 14572 14568 14450 14049
CABNRET CABNRET20 CABNRET60 CABNRET120 CABNRET CABNRET20 CABNRET60 CABNRET120
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recommendations. Actually, we expect that recommendations issued by analysts whose 
portfolios benefit most from the existence of commonalities among firms are those that are 
more informative of the true value of the firm. Having shown that European stock 
recommendations significantly impact prices, we now turn to the analysis of whether 
recommendations issued by country and sector specialists provide investors with differing 
levels of information.
In order to test for the information content of recommendations depending on analysts’ 
specialization, we estimate regression equation (2). Table 3.5 panels A and B presents the 
results for upgrades and downgrades respectively. These two panels show that, in both cases 
of upgrades and downgrades, the initial stock price reaction does not depend on whether the 
recommendation was issued by a country or a sector specialist. Thus, the market does not 
react significantly differently to recommendations issued by country and by sector specialists 
at the time of the recommendation release. However, we observe that the price continues to 
drift only for recommendations that are issued by country specialists. For upgrades, the 
magnitude of the recommendation change seems to be driven by the additional information 
brought by country specialists. In the case of downgrades, the only statistical difference 
relates to the direction of the revision. Economically, the additional drift related to the 
magnitude of recommendation downgrades issued by country specialists is large. Though, it is 
not statistically significant.50
Country specialists bring additional information that is not incorporated into prices at the time 
of the recommendation release. We interpret this finding as evidence that the price drift is 
related to the information advantage of country specialists. That is, recommendations issued 
by country specialists contain more information, which is slowly incorporated into prices. 
This delayed price response could be due to traders failing to assimilate the information 
provided by country specialists. It could also be explained by the existence of transaction 
costs that exceed the potential gains that one could draw from exploiting the information. It is 
not possible for us to distinguish between these two possible explanations and it is beyond the 
scope of the paper. What we rule out is the possibility that the price drift is due to a change in
  
50 All of our results hold when the regressions are estimated using a Jacknife procedure, which we implemented 
as a robustness check.
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Table 3.5: Country versus Sector Specialization and Stock Price Reaction
This table reports the results relative to the estimation of the following model:
[ ]0 1 1 1;
2 2
t tCABNRET RECCHG RECCHG COUNTRYSP
MAGNIT MAGNIT COUNTRYSP Controls
b d
b d g e
= × + × ×
+ × + × × + × +
All the coefficients reported in the table are expressed as percentages. [ ]0 1;t tCABNRET is the cumulative abnormal 
return computed over different time windows, with values of 0t and 1t expressed in days. The model is successively 
estimated for [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]1; 1 1; 20 21; 60 61; 120, , , and CABNRET CABNRET CABNRET CABNRET- + + + + + + + . It is also estimated separately 
for recommendation upgrades and downgrades. RECCHG is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
recommendation is an upgrade or a downgrade relative to the previously issued recommendation by the same analyst 
on the same firm. Since the model is estimated separately for upgrades and downgrades, this variable acts as a constant 
term. MAGNIT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the absolute value of the difference between the recommendation 
grade and the grade of the previously issued recommendation by the same analyst on the same firm is greater or equal 
to 3. COUNTRYSP is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the analyst is a country-specialized financial analyst 
and zero otherwise. The set of control variables includes: SMALLBRK and LARGEBRK. SMALLBRK is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the brokerage house the analyst works for is in the lowest size deciles and 0 otherwise. 
LARGEBRK is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the brokerage house is in the largest size deciles and 0 otherwise.
SMALLCAP and LARGECAP are similarly defined for evaluated firms. SMALLCAP takes the value 1 if the firm is in 
the lowest capitalization deciles and 0 otherwise. LARGECAP is equal to 1 if the firm is in the largest capitalization 
deciles and 0 otherwise. NUMANA is the number of analysts having issued recommendations on the recommended 
firm over the last 360 days. PAGE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the recommendation ‘P’recedes an 
earnings announcement’s date by less than 10 days and 0 otherwise. FAGE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if the recommendation ‘F’ollows an earnings announcement’s date by less than 10 days and 0 otherwise. CAGE is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the recommendation is issued contemporaneous (i.e. on the same day), to an 
earnings announcement. ILLIQ is the Amihud illiquidity measure. It is computed as in Amihud (2002, p. 34). We also 
report in the bottom of the table the p-value for the statistical tests of the joint hypotheses: 1 2 0b b= = and 
1 2 0d d= = . t-statistics are reported into parenthesis below their corresponding coefficient. For readability, we also 
mention statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with respectively ***, **, and *.
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Panel A: UPGRADES
Dep. Variable
RECCHG 0.39 *** 0.24 0.21 0.18
(2.66) (0.73) (0.39) (0.25)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.11 0.10 0.12 -0.35
(-1.33) (0.51) (0.41) (-0.89)
MAGNIT -0.17 -0.55 -1.70 * -0.68
(-0.54) (-0.81) (-1.88) (-0.48)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP 0.38 0.87 2.60 *** 4.01 ***
(1.03) (1.1) (2.34) (2.42)
SMALLBRK -0.10 0.05 -0.06 -0.56
(-0.98) (0.2) (-0.14) (-1.04)
LARGEBRK 0.24 *** 0.35 ** 0.18 -1.13 ***
(3.22) (2.09) (0.69) (-3.23)
SMALLCAP -0.12 0.56 3.88 *** 6.56 ***
(-0.54) (1.06) (4.55) (6)
LARGECAP -0.13 -0.61 *** -1.75 *** -2.36 ***
(-1.62) (-3.24) (-5.91) (-6.16)
Ln(NUMANA) 0.04 0.02 0.35 * 0.80 ***
(0.75) (0.17) (1.85) (3.32)
PAGE -0.09 1.61 *** 1.21 -1.58
(-0.43) (3.48) (1.62) (-1.63)
FAGE 0.64 *** 0.26 0.06 -0.95
(3.86) (0.72) (0.1) (-1.34)
CAGE 1.33 *** 1.98 ** 2.20 * -1.96
(2.52) (2.28) (1.89) (-1.27)
ILLIQ 0.08 * -0.07 -0.12 -0.35 *
(1.79) (-0.67) (-0.74) (-1.67)
p-value (b 1=0, b 2=0) 0.0289 0.5862 0.1699 0.8753
p-value (d 1=0, d 2=0) 0.3087 0.4112 0.0397 0.0496
Adj-R2 0.33% 0.23% 0.68% 1.00%
Nb Obs. 14076 14069 13884 13461
CABNRET CABNRET20 CABNRET60 CABNRET120
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Panel B: DOWNGRADES
Dep. Variable
RECCHG -0.04 -0.99 *** -1.20 ** -0.76
(-0.3) (-2.69) (-2.03) (-0.97)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.06 -0.43 ** -0.80 *** -0.42
(-0.69) (-2.13) (-2.66) (-1.08)
MAGNIT 0.48 0.54 1.41 -0.04
(1.32) (0.69) (1.08) (-0.02)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP -0.64 -1.00 -2.40 -0.53
(-1.51) (-1.08) (-1.55) (-0.27)
SMALLBRK 0.11 0.34 0.32 -0.03
(1.07) (1.21) (0.75) (-0.06)
LARGEBRK -0.19 *** -0.25 -0.29 -0.72 **
(-2.56) (-1.4) (-1.04) (-1.97)
SMALLCAP -0.03 2.23 *** 4.87 *** 8.95 ***
(-0.14) (4.05) (5.57) (7.98)
LARGECAP 0.12 -0.54 *** -1.39 *** -2.16 ***
(1.44) (-2.59) (-4.16) (-4.85)
Ln(NUMANA) -0.11 ** 0.55 *** 0.96 *** 1.05 ***
(-2.18) (4.16) (4.31) (3.48)
PAGE 0.09 0.38 1.39 * -1.25
(0.39) (0.73) (1.88) (-1.25)
FAGE -0.19 0.94 *** 1.03 -0.14
(-1.03) (2.38) (1.56) (-0.16)
CAGE 0.15 -0.74 1.84 -5.33 ***
(0.27) (-0.69) (1.52) (-2.74)
ILLIQ -0.03 -0.16 -0.17 -0.73 ***
(-0.6) (-1.54) (-1.01) (-3.6)
p-value (b1=0, b 2=0) 0.4120 0.0250 0.0869 0.6218
p-value (d 1=0, d 2=0) 0.1922 0.0333 0.0038 0.4993
Adj-R2 0.06% 0.37% 0.66% 1.16%
Nb Obs. 14572 14568 14450 14049
CABNRET CABNRET20 CABNRET60 CABNRET120
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the underlying risk since the delayed price reaction is related to the type of analyst and not to 
the type of firm. Indeed, results remain similar when one restricts the sample to the subset of 
firms that are followed by both country and sector specialists.
3.6 Explaining the differential information content
In the previous section, we documented that country specialists issue more valuable 
recommendations than sector specialists. This result could be attributed to the existence of 
commonalities across firms that are followed by country analysts. It could also be due to 
economies of scale that they draw when evaluating country factors. In particular, country 
factors may stem from particularities in institutional, accounting, fiscal, legal, or cultural 
aspects that make countries to differ. Advantages linked to geographical location could also 
provide country specialists with the opportunity of producing higher quality 
recommendations. In what follows, we explore these possibilities.
In order to do so, we expand our initial model in the following way:
[ ]0 1 1;
1 1
2
2 2
t tCABNRET RECCHG
RECCHG COUNTRYSP RECCHG COUNTRYSP FACTOR
MAGNIT
MAGNIT COUNTRYSP MAGNIT COUNTRYSP FACTOR
Controls
b
d z
b
d z
g e
= ×
+ × × + × × ×
+ ×
+ × × + × × ×
+ × +
where FACTOR relates to the different variables we will consider as potential explanatory 
factors. As in previous sections, we estimate the model separately for recommendation 
upgrades and downgrades. This approach allows us to test whether the comparative advantage 
of country specialists is most apparent in certain institutional settings, or relates to specific 
analyst characteristics. We hypothesize that country specialists may draw this advantage from 
recommendations on firms located in countries with poorer institutions, because they benefit 
from a physical location advantage, or because they focus on firms headquartered in countries 
with strong national-specific forces. One therefore states our null hypothesis as 
0 1 2:  0H z z= = .
131
3.6.1 Institutional Factors
High quality institutional structures (i.e. high quality disclosure and legal system, good 
governance, etc.) have a positive impact on the information environment and may require less 
country specific knowledge.51 A system with high quality institutions is consistent with 
improved corporate governance and greater disclosure and transparency. It could be that high 
quality institutions (quality disclosure and corporate governance) impact the economies of 
scale that can be drawn by specialization and a good understanding of country institutions. 
Another possibility is that better disclosure and governance implies a lower correlation of firm 
future earnings with the potential information and agency costs that arise with poor quality 
institutions. In poor governance settings, firm value may be affected to a largest extent by 
agency problems that are common to all firms subject to the same legal rules. In this setting, 
country specialists may be at an advantage to understand the extent to which agency problems 
affect value for this group of firms. This advantage disappears as agency costs are reduced 
through improved governance. Therefore better disclosure and governance may lead to lower 
commonalities across firms’ future earnings. There is still another possibility to explain why 
high quality institutions may lower the benefits from specialization. An enhanced information 
environment makes it less costly to acquire and process information not only for analysts but 
for investors in general. Potential economies of scale being less relevant, it could be that 
analysts’ information advantage relative to the market diminishes. If these institutional 
particularities play a role in the way that analysts can process information and benefit from 
economies of scale, then we expect to find that the information advantage of country over 
sector specialists occur only for firms located in countries with poorer disclosure standards 
and corporate governance.
In our analysis, we include country-level variables that allow us to explore whether corporate 
governance and the quality of disclosure play a role in the results that we have documented. 
Following the corporate governance literature, we define a variable PROT as a measure for 
the quality of legal protection offered to minority investors in a given country. It is the anti-
director rights index as presented in La Porta et al. (1998). The index ranges from 0 to 5 and it 
measures the strength of laws and regulations in each country that aim to protect minority 
shareholders. Following the disclosure literature, we also consider the ACTG index produced 
  
51 Ball et al. (2000), Morck et al. (2000), Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Chang et al. (2001) show how 
institutions impact the information environment.
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by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research and used by La Porta et al. 
(1998). It is a measure of the quality of accounting standards in the country where firms are 
incorporated.52 Specifically, we define a “low protection” (LOWPROT) dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the anti-director rights index is below the sample median value and 0 otherwise. 
We also define a dummy variable for low disclosure, LOWACTG, which equals 1 if the ACTG
index is below the sample median and 0 otherwise. Also, we consider total market 
capitalization as a proxy that captures the extent to which each specific country’s financial 
market is developed. This variable has been widely used to proxy for the quality of the 
information environment. We divide our sample into high and low national market 
capitalization, and set the dummy variable LOWMKTSIZE equal to 1 if market capitalization 
is below the median and zero otherwise. Therefore, we successively set FACTOR = 
LOWACTG, LOWPROT, and LOWMKTSIZE.
Results are presented in Table 3.6, panels A and B. Once again, panel A presents results 
relative to upgrades, while downgrades are apparent in panel B. Also, we do not report the 
coefficients on control variables to avoid presenting extensive tables. Referring to estimations 
relative to both accounting index and to anti-director rights, we first remark that the initial 
stock price reaction does not depend on whether recommendations are issued in high or low 
accounting index or anti-director right countries. In fact, the overall information content of 
stock recommendations issued by country specialists is similar in countries with high and low 
quality of institutions. Indeed, none of the coefficients on LOWACTG and LOWPROT is 
statistically significant in the post recommendation periods. Country specialists issue more 
valuable stock recommendations in both low accounting standards and low shareholder 
protection countries, and none of this outperformance can be explained on this dimension.
The last section in both panels focus on the breakdown according to the stock market 
capitalization of the country where the firm is located. This can be considered as an ad hoc 
check of whether the relative advantage of country specialists is concentrated in firms for 
which the information environment is poorer. In such markets, country-specialized analysts 
may drag benefits from commonalities that may supposedly be large. Results show that,
  
52 International Accounting and Auditing Trends (4th edition, 1997), Center for International Financial Analysis 
and Research, Princeton, New Jersey.
133
Table 3.6: Institutional Factors
This table reports the results relative to the estimation of the following model:
[ ]0 1 1 1 1;
2 2 2
t tCABNRET RECCHG RECCHG COUNTRYSP RECCHG COUNTRYSP FACTOR
MAGNIT MAGNIT COUNTRYSP MAGNIT COUNTRYSP FACTOR
Controls
b d z
b d z
g e
= × + × × + × × ×
+ × + × × + × × ×
+ × +
All the coefficients reported in the table are expressed as percentages. [ ]0 1;t tCABNRET is the cumulative abnormal return computed 
over different time windows, with values of 0t and 1t expressed in days. The model is successively estimated for 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]1; 1 1; 20 21; 60 61; 120, , , and CABNRET CABNRET CABNRET CABNRET- + + + + + + + . It is also estimated separately for recommendation 
upgrades and downgrades. RECCHG is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the recommendation is an upgrade or a 
downgrade relative to the previously issued recommendation by the same analyst on the same firm. Since the model is estimated 
separately for upgrades and downgrades, this variable acts as a constant term. MAGNIT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
absolute value of the difference between the recommendation grade and the grade of the previously issued recommendation by 
the same analyst on the same firm is greater or equal to 3. COUNTRYSP is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the analyst 
is a country-specialized financial analyst and zero otherwise. FACTOR is successively set equal LOWACTG, LOWPROT, and 
LOWMKTSIZE. The table is split into three parts, each of them relating to one of these three variables. LOWACTG is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the recommended firm is headquartered in a country with a level of accounting standards’ quality below 
its sample median (i.e. low quality accounting standards country). LOWPROT is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
recommended firm is headquartered in a country with a level of minority shareholder protection below its sample median (i.e. low 
protection countries). LOWMKTSIZE is a dummy variable equal to one if the recommended firm is headquartered in a country 
whose total market capitalization is below the sample median (i.e. smallest national markets) The whole set of control variables is 
included in the model, but results are not presented for succinctness. We also report in the bottom of every part of the table the p-
value for the statistical tests of the joint hypotheses: 1 2 0z z= = . t-statistics are reported into parenthesis below their 
corresponding coefficient. For readability, we also mention statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with
respectively ***, **, and *.
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Panel A: UPGRADES
Dep. Variable
Low Accounting Standards
RECCHG 0.38 *** 0.23 0.23 0.19
(2.62) (0.68) (0.43) (0.27)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.07 0.19 -0.04 -0.45
(-0.77) (0.94) (-0.11) (-1.1)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´LOWACTG -0.13 -0.28 0.46 0.32
(-1.55) (-1.45) (1.55) (0.81)
MAGNIT -0.18 -0.56 -1.69 * -0.68
(-0.55) (-0.82) (-1.87) (-0.47)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP 0.28 0.92 2.80 ** 3.85 **
(0.7) (1.08) (2.29) (2.17)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´LOWACTG 0.30 -0.15 -0.59 0.50
(0.79) (-0.19) (-0.45) (0.29)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.2681 0.3053 0.2968 0.6421
Low Shareholder Protection
RECCHG 0.39 *** 0.24 0.20 0.17
(2.66) (0.73) (0.38) (0.24)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.10 0.12 -0.01 -0.39
(-1.06) (0.58) (-0.02) (-0.97)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´LOWPROT -0.07 -0.06 0.44 0.17
(-0.76) (-0.32) (1.45) (0.42)
MAGNIT -0.17 -0.55 -1.69 * -0.68
(-0.55) (-0.81) (-1.86) (-0.48)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP 0.36 0.84 2.45 ** 3.88 **
(0.92) (1) (2.04) (2.22)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´LOWPROT 0.07 0.10 0.57 0.50
(0.18) (0.12) (0.42) (0.27)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.7485 0.9493 0.2637 0.8567
Small National Markets
RECCHG 0.34 *** 0.18 0.07 0.14
(2.35) (0.53) (0.12) (0.19)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.14 0.06 0.04 -0.39
(-1.61) (0.32) (0.15) (-0.99)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´LOWMKTSIZE 0.28 *** 0.42 0.88 ** 0.42
(2.35) (1.58) (2.13) (0.75)
MAGNIT -0.17 -0.54 -1.69 * -0.68
(-0.53) (-0.8) (-1.86) (-0.48)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP 0.30 0.69 2.22 * 4.48 ***
(0.8) (0.85) (1.95) (2.63)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´LOWMKTSIZE 0.51 1.16 2.51 -3.33
(0.96) (1.08) (1.39) (-1.58)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.0203 0.0953 0.0174 0.2694
CABNRET CABNRET20 CABNRET60 CABNRET120
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Panel B: DOWNGRADES
Dep. Variable
Low Accounting Standards
RECCHG -0.05 -1.03 *** -1.23 ** -0.78
(-0.35) (-2.77) (-2.07) (-0.98)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.02 -0.29 -0.70 ** -0.38
(-0.24) (-1.34) (-2.18) (-0.91)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´LOWACTG -0.10 -0.40 * -0.27 -0.12
(-1.22) (-1.89) (-0.82) (-0.28)
MAGNIT 0.48 0.54 1.41 -0.04
(1.32) (0.68) (1.08) (-0.03)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP -0.76 * -0.81 -1.71 -0.27
(-1.68) (-0.8) (-1.02) (-0.13)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´LOWACTG 0.33 -0.52 -1.87 -0.71
(0.71) (-0.52) (-1.11) (-0.36)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.4212 0.1084 0.3093 0.8772
Low Shareholder Protection
RECCHG -0.05 -1.00 *** -1.19 ** -0.76
(-0.31) (-2.7) (-2.02) (-0.96)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.04 -0.32 -0.80 *** -0.40
(-0.42) (-1.51) (-2.53) (-0.98)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´LOWPROT -0.07 -0.36 * 0.00 -0.09
(-0.79) (-1.66) (-0.01) (-0.19)
MAGNIT 0.48 0.53 1.41 -0.05
(1.32) (0.67) (1.08) (-0.03)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP -0.61 -0.65 -1.86 -0.15
(-1.38) (-0.66) (-1.14) (-0.07)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´LOWPROT -0.10 -1.17 -1.75 -1.24
(-0.2) (-1.11) (-0.98) (-0.59)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.6872 0.0843 0.6042 0.7977
Small National Markets
RECCHG -0.02 -0.97 *** -1.16 ** -0.79
(-0.15) (-2.64) (-1.99) (-1.02)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.04 -0.40 ** -0.77 *** -0.46
(-0.41) (-1.98) (-2.56) (-1.16)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´LOWMKTSIZE -0.22 * -0.23 -0.28 0.29
(-1.84) (-0.78) (-0.57) (0.44)
MAGNIT 0.48 0.54 1.41 -0.04
(1.31) (0.68) (1.07) (-0.02)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP -0.71 -1.24 -2.15 -0.26
(-1.63) (-1.3) (-1.37) (-0.13)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´LOWMKTSIZE 0.46 1.37 -1.25 -1.56
(0.8) (0.98) (-0.53) (-0.57)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.1654 0.5206 0.6857 0.8092
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mostly for upgrades, the information content of recommendations issued by country 
specialists is more pronounced in small markets. Interestingly, investors seem to rely more on 
recommendations issued by country specialists in these markets, as the initial stock price 
reaction is significantly more positive after a recommendation upgrade released by a country 
specialist in a small market. There is also some evidence of a post-recommendation drift, with 
a statistically significant coefficient of 0.88% in the [+21;+60] period.
Overall, these results suggest that institutional factors may explain part, but not all, of the 
informational advantage of country specialists over sector specialists. Results relative to the 
quality of accounting standards and shareholder protection do not show any significance. This 
should not come as a surprise. European markets are to some extent similar in this respect. 
For instance, all firms within European Union now have to produce their financial reports 
according to the IFRS standards. Yet, country specialists issue more informative 
recommendations in small countries. Overall, it does not provide a complete explanation for 
the comparative advantage of country specialists, as the information content of stock 
recommendations issued by country specialists remains higher than for sector specialists even 
in large markets.
3.6.2 Proximity Factors
A few papers study information asymmetries due to proximity in the context of financial 
analysis. Bae et al. (2005) report accuracy differences depending on whether analysts are 
based within the same country as the firms they evaluate. Relying on a sample of 32 
worldwide countries, their results show that local analysts issue on average more accurate 
earnings forecasts than their foreign peers.53 In the context of European markets, Orpurt 
(2003) reports a similar result. Malloy (2005) studies the difference of accuracy between 
analysts located close to the firms they follow and those located further away. He concludes 
that, within the U.S., geographically proximate analysts issue on average more accurate 
earnings forecasts. While Malloy focuses on physical proximity and uses measures that 
capture distance between analysts and firms, Bae et al. (2005) and Orpurt (2003) focus on 
different measures of proximity; that is, local versus foreign analysts. Being local reflects not 
  
53 While this is true on average for the 32 considered countries, their results are not supportive of a local 
advantage for the European countries in their sample. However, one cannot draw any conclusive evidence for 
this result as their sample is restricted to a very short and specific time-period: 2001-2003.
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only physical proximity but also other dimensions of proximity such as cultural, economic or 
institutional. These papers do not target to evaluate which dimension of proximity is relevant, 
probably because data availability on physical distance is hard and tedious to get.
In this paper, we capture these two dimensions of proximity. First, we compute the distance 
between analysts and the firms they follow. Second, we classify analysts as local or foreign, 
based on whether they are located within the same country as the firms they follow, or they 
are located abroad. These two geographical dimensions do not have the same implications in 
terms of sources of information advantage. In the first case, analysts may have a better access 
to private information, as they are located close to the firms’ headquarters. They can visit the 
firm on regular basis and build solid relationships with firms’ management. In the second 
case, the advantage that local analysts may have is more likely related to a better knowledge 
of country characteristics. One may think of language, fiscal policies, regulations, cultural, 
and institutional dimensions.
Therefore, we make a clear distinction between the advantage due to being local, as opposed 
to foreign, and the physical proximity advantage, as opposed to being located geographically 
far away from firms’ headquarters. In order to compute the variables that relate to these two 
geographical dimensions, we proceed as follows. We first take from I/B/E/S analysts’ names 
and the brokerage house they work for. Then, year by year, we search in different editions of 
the Nelson Information’s Directory and obtain the city in which each financial analyst is 
located. Finally, for each recommendation with available geographic information on the 
analyst and the firm, we compute the distance between the analyst who issued the forecast and 
the firm for which the forecast was issued.54 We define a dummy variable called LOWDIST
that equals 1 if the analyst is located less than 100 kilometers away from the firm and 0 
otherwise.55 From the same information set, we also determine whether analysts are located 
within the same country as the firms they follow. For each recommendation we compute 
LOCAL, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the analyst and the firm are located in the same 
country and 0 otherwise.
  
54 The formula used to compute the distance (Dist) between to cities A and B is given by
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )arccos sin sin cos cosA B A B ADist R latitude latitude latitude longitude longitude= + -é ùë û ,
where 6378 kmR = is the earth’s radius.
55 Results are unchanged with thresholds of either 50 or 200 kilometers.
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Results for upgrades and downgrades are reported in Table 3.7, panels A and B respectively. 
Surprisingly, within country location does not appear as a potential explanation for the 
outperformance of country specialists. At a first sight, it may even appear as a disadvantage. 
Indeed, results in panel A report a large negative drift of –2.45% over the time-window 
[+21;+60] related to the direction of the recommendation revision. Though, coefficients on 
the magnitude of recommendation revisions are economically large and of the expected sign 
in both the upgrade and downgrade case. They are respectively 0.67%, 1.87%, 1.17%, and 
5.38% over the four successive time-windows for upgrades and –0.56%, –0.18%, –2.68%, 
and –5.38% in the downgrade case. The lack of statistical significance of these results may 
come from the strong reduction in size of the sample, coupled with the fact that only a small 
proportion of country specialists are located abroad.
Results relative to proximity, as defined by analysts being located geographically close to the 
firms, also lack of statistical significance. They certainly suffer from the same data 
availability problem. As such, they do not seem to be a source of advantage. Both proximate 
and more distant country specialists outperform sector specialists. Also, the coefficients on 
these two types of country specialists are close to each other in all of the four time periods.
3.6.3 Country Factors
Country factors represent common economic forces driving firms’ future earnings beyond 
those only related to institutional factors. In this section, we test whether country factors 
explain the advantage of country over sector specialists. For that purpose, we follow Heston 
and Rouwenhorst (1994) and estimate from stock index returns “pure” country factors. This 
methodology returns, for each country in the sample, a time-series of country factors. We then 
compute, on an annual basis, the variance of each country factor. It is a proxy for the strength 
of national influences in the country. Countries with important national specificities have a 
high country factor variance. We then rank countries on the basis of their country factor 
variance. Recommendations issued on firms in countries with a country factor above the 
median country factor are classified as high country factor recommendations. The dummy 
variable HIGHFACTOR takes the value 1 for recommendations issued in these countries and 
0 otherwise.
139
Table 3.7: Proximity Factors
This table reports the results relative to the estimation of the following model:
[ ]0 1 1 1 1;
2 2 2
t tCABNRET RECCHG RECCHG COUNTRYSP RECCHG COUNTRYSP FACTOR
MAGNIT MAGNIT COUNTRYSP MAGNIT COUNTRYSP FACTOR
Controls
b d z
b d z
g e
= × + × × + × × ×
+ × + × × + × × ×
+ × +
All the coefficients reported in the table are expressed as percentages. [ ]0 1;t tCABNRET is the cumulative abnormal 
return computed over different time windows, with values of 0t and 1t expressed in days. The model is
successively estimated for [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]1; 1 1; 20 21; 60 61; 120, , , and CABNRET CABNRET CABNRET CABNRET- + + + + + + + . It is also 
estimated separately for recommendation upgrades and downgrades. RECCHG is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the recommendation is an upgrade or a downgrade relative to the previously issued 
recommendation by the same analyst on the same firm. Since the model is estimated separately for upgrades and 
downgrades, this variable acts as a constant term. MAGNIT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the absolute value 
of the difference between the recommendation grade and the grade of the previously issued recommendation by 
the same analyst on the same firm is greater or equal to 3. COUNTRYSP is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if the analyst is a country-specialized financial analyst and zero otherwise. FACTOR is successively set equal 
LOCAL and LOWDIST. The table is split into two parts, each of them relating to one of these two variables. 
LOCAL is a dummy variable equal to one if the analyst is located within the same country as the recommended 
firm. LOWDIST is a dummy variable equal to one if the analyst is located less than 100 kilometers away from 
the recommended firm. The whole set of control variables is included in the model, but results are not presented 
for succinctness. We also report in the bottom of every part of the table the p-value for the statistical tests of the 
joint hypotheses: 1 2 0z z= = . t-statistics are reported into parenthesis below their corresponding coefficient. For 
readability, we also mention statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with respectively ***, **, and *.
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Panel A: UPGRADES
Dep. Variable
Local Analysts
RECCHG 0.53 *** 0.36 -0.05 0.70
(2.53) (0.75) (-0.07) (0.66)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.02 0.16 2.62 *** -0.22
(-0.06) (0.22) (2.38) (-0.16)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´LOCAL -0.06 0.12 -2.45 ** -0.29
(-0.19) (0.17) (-2.21) (-0.21)
MAGNIT -0.17 -0.70 -1.12 -0.33
(-0.4) (-0.73) (-0.93) (-0.16)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP -0.50 -1.43 0.68 -0.39
(-0.4) (-0.52) (0.12) (-0.08)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´LOCAL 0.67 1.87 1.17 5.38
(0.56) (0.7) (0.21) (1.13)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.8548 0.7302 0.0850 0.5228
Proximate Analysts
RECCHG 0.45 ** 0.23 -0.31 0.29
(2.08) (0.47) (-0.38) (0.28)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.07 0.10 0.28 -0.31
(-0.45) (0.31) (0.54) (-0.46)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´LOWDIST 0.14 0.29 0.00 0.25
(1.08) (0.95) (0.01) (0.38)
MAGNIT 0.14 -0.83 -0.54 -0.56
(0.34) (-0.81) (-0.46) (-0.27)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP -0.62 -0.15 2.37 1.73
(-0.95) (-0.1) (1.18) (0.57)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´LOWDIST 0.69 0.79 -1.79 5.24 *
(1.09) (0.59) (-0.84) (1.84)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.2302 0.4533 0.6919 0.1319
CABNRET CABNRET20 CABNRET60 CABNRET120
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Panel B: DOWNGRADES
Dep. Variable
Local Analysts
RECCHG -0.18 -1.26 ** -0.82 -1.35
(-0.79) (-2.26) (-0.91) (-1.1)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.10 -0.49 -0.85 -1.39
(-0.37) (-0.67) (-0.87) (-1.05)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´LOCAL -0.02 0.13 -0.29 0.75
(-0.08) (0.18) (-0.3) (0.56)
MAGNIT 0.97 * 0.46 2.28 -0.17
(1.95) (0.42) (1.4) (-0.07)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP -0.47 -0.81 -1.91 4.14
(-0.45) (-0.4) (-0.82) (1.05)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´LOCAL -0.56 -0.18 -2.68 -5.38
(-0.57) (-0.1) (-1.25) (-1.52)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.8228 0.9837 0.2953 0.3161
Proximate Analysts
RECCHG -0.17 -1.24 ** -1.35 -1.10
(-0.72) (-2.1) (-1.41) (-0.84)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.13 -0.68 * -1.14 ** -1.34 *
(-0.87) (-1.93) (-2.06) (-1.84)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´LOWDIST 0.00 0.45 0.25 1.19 *
(-0.01) (1.33) (0.47) (1.66)
MAGNIT 1.02 * 1.10 1.81 -0.17
(1.9) (1.06) (1.08) (-0.07)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP -1.63 ** -0.80 -3.77 -2.51
(-2.19) (-0.55) (-1.52) (-0.8)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´LOWDIST 1.05 -1.52 -0.64 1.77
(1.57) (-1.04) (-0.25) (0.61)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.2766 0.3104 0.8851 0.1492
CABNRET CABNRET20 CABNRET60 CABNRET120
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Table 3.8: Country Factors
This table reports the results relative to the estimation of the following model:
[ ]0 1 1 1 1;
2 2 2
t tCABNRET RECCHG RECCHG COUNTRYSP RECCHG COUNTRYSP FACTOR
MAGNIT MAGNIT COUNTRYSP MAGNIT COUNTRYSP FACTOR
Controls
b d z
b d z
g e
= × + × × + × × ×
+ × + × × + × × ×
+ × +
All the coefficients reported in the table are expressed as percentages. [ ]0 1;t tCABNRET is the cumulative abnormal 
return computed over different time windows, with values of 0t and 1t expressed in days. The model is
successively estimated for [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]1; 1 1; 20 21; 60 61; 120, , , and CABNRET CABNRET CABNRET CABNRET- + + + + + + + . It is also 
estimated separately for recommendation upgrades and downgrades. RECCHG is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the recommendation is an upgrade or a downgrade relative to the previously issued 
recommendation by the same analyst on the same firm. Since the model is estimated separately for upgrades and 
downgrades, this variable acts as a constant term. MAGNIT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the absolute value 
of the difference between the recommendation grade and the grade of the previously issued recommendation by 
the same analyst on the same firm is greater or equal to 3. COUNTRYSP is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if the analyst is a country-specialized financial analyst and zero otherwise. FACTOR is here set equal 
HIGHFACTOR, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the recommended firm is headquartered in a country 
with a level of country-specific factors above the sample median value of country-specific factors. The whole set 
of control variables is included in the model, but results are not presented for succinctness. We also report in the 
bottom of every part of the table the p-value for the statistical tests of the joint hypotheses: 1 2 0z z= = . t-
statistics are reported into parenthesis below their corresponding coefficient. For readability, we also mention 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with respectively ***, **, and *.
Panel A: UPGRADES
Dep. Variable
High Country Factors
RECCHG 0.39 *** 0.25 0.21 0.15
(2.66) (0.74) (0.4) (0.21)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP -0.12 0.19 0.08 -0.55
(-1.34) (0.91) (0.25) (-1.33)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´HIGHFACTOR 0.02 -0.25 0.11 0.58
(0.25) (-1.3) (0.37) (1.48)
MAGNIT -0.17 -0.55 -1.70 * -0.67
(-0.54) (-0.81) (-1.88) (-0.47)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP 0.19 1.09 1.50 3.70 **
(0.47) (1.28) (1.21) (2.08)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´HIGHFACTOR 0.43 -0.47 2.54 * 0.62
(1.16) (-0.56) (1.96) (0.36)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.4443 0.2920 0.1044 0.2617
CABNRET CABNRET20 CABNRET60 CABNRET120
143
Panel B: DOWNGRADES
Dep. Variable
High Country Factors
RECCHG -0.04 -0.99 *** -1.18 ** -0.77
(-0.26) (-2.67) (-2) (-0.97)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP 0.03 -0.33 -0.55 * -0.42
(0.29) (-1.56) (-1.71) (-1.02)
RECCHG´COUNTRYSP´HIGHFACTOR -0.23 *** -0.26 -0.67 ** 0.00
(-2.81) (-1.25) (-2.11) (0)
MAGNIT 0.48 0.54 1.40 -0.04
(1.31) (0.68) (1.07) (-0.03)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP -0.81 * -1.55 -3.15 * -1.18
(-1.73) (-1.52) (-1.9) (-0.57)
MAGNIT´COUNTRYSP´HIGHFACTOR 0.45 1.39 1.96 1.58
(1.04) (1.4) (1.16) (0.8)
p-value(z 1=0, z 2=0) 0.0168 0.2335 0.0803 0.7173
CABNRET CABNRET20 CABNRET60 CABNRET120
We hypothesized that country specialists may draw their relative advantage from countries 
were commonalities among firms are large. If this is the case, recommendations issued by 
country specialists on firms in countries with high country factors should convey more 
information than recommendations issued by country specialists in countries with low country 
factors. Results are reported in Table 3.8. They hardly confirm our hypothesis. In the upgrade 
case, country specialists do significantly better in countries with high commonalities than in 
low country factor markets. The coefficient on recommendation direction for the periods 
[+21;+60] and [+61;+120] are respectively 0.83% and 0.84%. The latter, though, is only 
marginally statistically significant. Recommendation downgrades lead to the opposite 
conclusion. The only single case in which country specialists in high country factor markets 
differ from country specialists in low country factor markets is for recommendation 
magnitude over the period [+21;+60]. However, they return a surprising significantly worse 
2.43%, a result which is hard to reconcile with our hypothesis.
Similar to the institutional and geographical factors considered as potential explanations for 
the relative superiority of country over sector specialists, we also hardly find that pure country 
factors may provide even a partial explanation. Indeed, both recommendations issued for 
firms in countries with high country factors as well as those issued for firms in countries with 
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low country factors convey valuable information. And coefficients are rarely significantly 
larger when pure country factors are high.
3.7 Conclusion
Brokerage houses usually organize their European research departments along either country 
or sector lines. Their research activities aim to provide valuable information and advice to 
investors. Given that both structures coexist, our goal is to evaluate which organization 
provides most value to investors. In this paper, we document that the value contained in 
analysts’ stock recommendations is related to how analysts structure their portfolios and 
research activities. We compare the information content of stock recommendations issued by 
country and sector specialists. We show that the former outperform the latter, in the sense that 
their recommendations convey more information to the market.
We investigate potential sources of the information advantage that country specialists enjoy. 
Results show that the country-specific institutional setting provides a weak explanation for the 
outperformance of country specialists. Indeed, these analysts do not issue relatively more 
informative stock recommendations in countries with weak accounting standards and 
shareholder protection. Also, both geographical and cultural proximity do not provide analysts 
with any comparative advantage. On the other hand, our results suggest that country 
specialists extract their advantage from the recommendations they issue on firms 
headquartered in small national markets. This is consistent with another of our findings. The 
relative outperformance of country specialists is highest in countries with relatively strong 
country-specific factors.
The information advantage of country specialists is not only short-lived. There is an 
incomplete price reaction at the time the recommendation is released that continues to drift up 
to 60 days. This delayed price response could be due to traders failing to assimilate the 
information provided by country specialists. It could also be explained by the existence of 
transaction costs that exceed the potential gains that one could draw from exploiting the 
information. It is not possible for us to distinguish between these two possible explanations 
and it is beyond the scope of the paper. What we rule out is the possibility that the price drift 
is due to a change in the underlying risk since the delayed price reaction is related to the type 
of analyst and not to the type of firm.
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Conclusion
Financial research constitutes the core of the active management process. Arguably, the 
choice of structuring research along country or sector lines should be determined so as to 
maximize analysts’ ability to issue valuable forecasts. Whether value is highest when research 
is organized by sectors instead of countries is a question that has surprisingly received very 
little attention in the literature. In fact, academics usually rely on the study of the relative 
importance of country and sector factors in stock returns to advocate the way financial 
research departments should be structured.
This literature usually focuses on the risk structure of stock equities and brings extensive 
evidence that both country and industry factors remain determinant characteristics of stock 
returns’ variance. Though, the importance of industry factors has sharply increased relative to 
country factors over the late nineties. This recent rise in the relative importance of sector 
factors, however, appears mostly related to the atypical behavior of the Technology, Media,
and Telecommunication sectors at the turn of the millennium. The most recent results in the 
literature evidence that country factors remain probably stronger determinants of stock 
returns, while it may depend on the considered geographic region. In Europe for instance, it is 
hard to tell whether industry factors have surpassed country factors. I explored this issue in 
Chapter 1 and confirmed these results. That is, while the strength of country factors in Europe 
appears relatively low compared to non-European countries, it probably remains as high as 
the strength of industry factors on a statistical basis.
It is not clear, therefore, whether country-specific influences will remain the predominant 
source of stock return variation. But the documented rise in the relative importance of sectors 
led many authors to advocate the relevance of sector-based approaches for both portfolio 
diversification and financial analysis. Also, practitioners now consider industry, rather than 
country, as the most relevant characteristic. They attach importance to the industrial 
composition of their portfolios and demand brokerage houses for industry-by-industry 
research. The latter have acknowledged this demand and now tend to organize their activities 
along sector lines.
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I argue that the relative strength of country and sector factors in stock returns – while an 
evident proxy for the importance of commonalities among firms – is irrelevant to determine 
which of an organization of research along sector or country lines is more efficient in terms of 
analysts’ forecast quality. There are, for instance, important analyst characteristics that 
determine the accuracy and relevance of their forecasts that are completely neglected in the 
study of country and sector influences: analysts’ location is one such important factor. It is 
strongly linked to country versus industry analyst specialization. Indeed, country specialists 
are in general based within the same country as the set of firms they follow, while sector 
specialists are not, for the evident reason that they follow firms headquartered in different 
countries. But it is, to a large extent, unrelated to the notion of country- versus industry-
specific influences. 
Thus, it is not because country (sector)-specific influences are strongest that analysts 
specialized by countries (sectors) should outperform their sector (country)-specialized peers. 
As a consequence, I explicitly raised this issue in Chapters 2 and 3. In fact, I asked questions 
such as: Does earnings forecast accuracy differ across analyst specializations? Do stock 
recommendations issued by analysts of one particular specialization type provide investors 
with more valuable information? If analyst performance differences exist, what may 
potentially explain them: country-specific features, analyst location, or firms’ characteristics? 
Are investors aware of these differences? Do they react differently to forecasts issued by
country or sector specialists?
The results from Chapters 2 and 3 support the notion that organizing research departments 
along country lines enhances the quality of analysts’ forecasts. Country specialists issue both 
more accurate earnings forecasts and more informative stock recommendations. Moreover, 
country-specific factors in a broad sense explain at least part of this outperformance. The 
value conveyed by country specialists’ stock recommendations is highest in small countries 
and countries with relatively strong country-specific influences. Also, analysts benefit from a 
comparative advantage when located within the same country as the firms they follow.
Because brokerage houses continue reorganizing research along sector lines – which produces 
lower quality forecasts – one could think that my results may somehow hurt the brokerage 
industry’s reputation. This is not, however, the interpretation one should have out of these
results. First of all, brokerage houses may simply be ahead of the curve in their research 
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reorganization efforts, as sector specialists could become more accurate than country 
specialists in the future. As I argued in Chapter 2, there are reasons to believe that these 
results are time-varying. Indeed, I showed that the accuracy advantage of country specialists 
diminished over the last years of my sample. To the same extent that it is still hard to figure 
out whether the relative decrease in the importance of country factors is a temporary or a 
permanent phenomenon, more research is needed to determine whether country specialists 
will continue to outperform their sector-specialized peers in the future. One possible way to 
dealing with this issue – which would also constitute an interesting extension of my research –
would be to determine whether there exists a positive relationship between the relative 
strength of country-specific factors and the relative better accuracy of country specialists. 
Indeed, part of the forecast error may come from analysts being unable to accurately predict 
country- and sector-wide evolutions, as well as the idiosyncratic firm-specific part. Elton et al. 
(1984), for instance, examine the level of aggregation at which forecast errors are made. They 
report that analysts highly misestimate the differential performance of individual industries. 
Also, errors made at the individual firm level reflect analysts’ inability to predict how much a 
given firm earnings will differ from its industry average. Their results further indicate that 
errors made at the economy level are in fact rather small, as they explain less than 3% of the 
total forecast error. The largest proportion of error comes from the firm-specific component, 
which accounts for almost 70% of the total error. The forecast of industry-wide earnings also 
represent a significant part of earnings forecast errors, as it corresponds to roughly 30% of the 
total forecast error. An interesting extension would be to investigate whether forecast errors 
made by country and sector specialists occur at different levels in an international set up.
Second of all, there are presumably many additional determinants, above and beyond forecast 
quality, that shape the organization of financial research departments. One, and certainly the 
most influential one, is the shift in the asset allocation paradigm that as taken place over the 
last decade. If investors now demand for sector-by-sector analysis, brokerage houses 
undoubtedly have to supply sector-by-sector analysis. However, there are reasons to question 
whether this last remark could not rationally be taken the other way around. The benefits, in 
terms of risk reduction, of portfolio diversification across countries seem roughly equivalent 
as those allowed by sector-based diversification. In fact, academic researches usually 
conclude that diversifying both across countries and sectors yields the highest benefits in 
terms of risk reduction; see e.g. Ehling and Ramos (2006). Country-specific factors, however, 
appear as powerful determinants of analyst forecasts’ quality. Therefore, the question could 
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be: Shouldn’t portfolio managers still rely on the traditional top-down country-based 
approach, since financial analysis undertaken along country lines returns more accurate and 
informative forecasts?
Another direction that would deserve additional research is the fact that most of the value 
brought by country specialists seems to relate to small and presumably less actively followed 
firms. This may prevent investors from taking full advantage of analysts’ forecasts because of 
prohibitive transactions costs. Another issue, which is somehow related to the previously 
discussed question of whether analysts forecast more accurately earnings at the economy or 
the industry level, concerns analysts’ stock picking skills within countries or sectors. 
Specifically, are country (sector) specialists able to adequately pick subsequent outperforming 
and underperforming stocks within their country (sector) of expertise? Boni and Womack 
(2004) find that the informative value of stock recommendations on U.S. firms is highly 
enhanced when taking an industry perspective. That is, analysts appear as extremely skilled
stock pickers within their industry of expertise, while strategies constructed on the basis of 
their recommendations hardly outperform when industry is ignored. In the U.S., financial 
analysts are usually specialized in one domestic economic sector. The extension of the Boni 
and Womack (2004)’s study to the European case would bring interesting insight on the 
sources of country and sector specialists’ skills.
As I show that country specialists’ stock recommendations convey valuable information, 
while sector specialists do not, one may also reasonably wonder why sector specialists exist. I 
already partly answered this question when discussing customer needs, that is, the fact that 
portfolio managers now mostly think in terms of sectors rather than countries. However, this 
issue is in fact far more general. Several studies report that forecast accuracy improves when 
analysts restrict their attention to fewer firms, industries, or countries. While some –
essentially small – brokerage houses may not have any alternative, large brokers astonishingly 
assign their analysts to cover a relatively high number of firms, industries, or countries. What 
is the role of these analysts who cover many sectors and countries, while other analysts, 
presumably more accurate because they have less complex portfolios, already cover the same 
firms? Also, what is the importance attached by investors to these particular analysts’ 
forecasts, and how do they react to the information released by these analysts are additional 
questions that may deserve further investigation.
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